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Abstract
Many North American cities have recently opened or extended existing heavy and
light rail systems to provide high-quality public transport alternatives. Due to the high
capital and operating costs of rail transit, however, expanding the service coverage in a
cost-effective manner requires more flexible and less capital-intensive supplementary
modes such as buses. Integrating bus and rail services well can allow a transit system to
serve a broad variety of travel needs. One recent example of a city pursuing rail transit is
San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the 11-mile Tren Urbano heavy rail line is now under
construction and expected to open in 2002. Tren Urbano will connect with existing bus
and pdiblico (privately-operated jitney) systems. Over time, bus and pdiblico services
have generally declined as the region has grown more automobile-dependent.
This thesis considers the broad question of how to integrate bus and rail services
successfully, focusing on the transition from a bus-only system to an intermodal system.
Specifically, this thesis first develops a framework for analyzing specific integration
strategies and evaluates several potential approaches a transit agency can pursue. It then
discusses various planning principles that can assist decision-makers with strategic and
tactical integration issues. Some of these issues include operating arrangements, fare
integration, network design, and schedule coordination. To support these principles and
to provide insight for the San Juan case, this research evaluates the intermodal integration
experiences of five cities in the United States (Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco,
Washington, and Portland). In some cases, transit became more effective in both
traditional and non-traditional travel markets when buses were used to supplement rather
than compete with rail. In other cases, inattention to buses and a general lack of
schedule, fare, and route coordination resulted in less favorable outcomes.
Finally, this thesis applies the analytical framework, planning principles, and case
study lessons to develop and evaluate strategies for integrating San Juan's existing transit
network with Tren Urbano. For the buses, it focuses on evaluating service proposals for
key corridors and finds that the current network structure is well-suited to feeding Tren
Urbano and serving existing bus riders. For the pdlblicos, it addresses more fundamental
institutional issues. It explores the possibility of developing new contracted feeder small
bus or van service to Tren Urbano, redirecting routes to avoid direct competition with
pdblicos, and creating "Tren Urbano Plazas" to attract suburban motorists to transit.
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Thesis Co-Supervisor: Frederick P. Salvucci
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the past quarter century, many North American cities have built new heavy and
light rail lines to provide people with high-quality alternatives to mounting traffic
congestion in busy transportation corridors. While these systems by themselves have
attracted new customers to transit, they are also components of much larger transit
networks. Since new rail investments are large-scale, long-term and highly visible
efforts, agencies must focus on the finance, design, and construction aspects of rail
projects. It is easy to underestimate the importance of integrating the rail system with
existing transit services.
Given the symbiotic relationship between rail and bus, these modes can and
should complement each other in an integrated multimodal network. Transit's overall
effectiveness and efficiency depends in large part upon designing a coordinated system
that utilizes the strengths of each mode. Often the urban rail component forms a system's
symbolic backbone because of its service quality and visual presence. Compared to
buses, trains generally operate more frequently and rapidly, carry greater passenger
volumes, emit no visible pollution, and often run with full grade separation. Stations
provide better passenger facilities than roadside bus stops and have the potential to
encourage transit-friendly development. However, the cost of building and operating rail
transit severely constrains network extent and coverage. To expand its reach and broaden
its customer base, a comprehensive transit system requires flexible, less expensive
options such as bus to supplement rail service.
Opening or extending a rail line draws attention to transit. It presents an agency
with a rare and vital opportunity to improve a system's overall level-of-service, to create
excitement about transit, and to realize large long-term ridership gains. While the rail
line may attract the most attention, an agency should take advantage of this moment to
showcase the complete system by designing and demonstrating how an integrated
network of buses and trains can meet a variety of travel needs. Nevertheless, achieving
transportation and other goals with new rail investments is inherently a long-term effort.
Systems may take decades to mature because individual travel behavior and land uses do
not adapt to new transit systems overnight.
Clearly, a fundamental difference exists between long-term system design and
short-term implementation issues. The transition to a new rail system can create
uncertainty by disrupting established travel patterns and operating procedures. (The
transition can be equally challenging when introducing Bus Rapid Transit or other forms
of high-quality, high-capacity transit). The rail line may speed the commutes for some
current transit customers, but changes in bus routes may introduce transfers for others.
Transit employees may fear that the rail line will bring bus service cutbacks and
jeopardize jobs. Meanwhile, a rail line adds substantial new capacity to the transit system
that people are unlikely to fully utilize immediately. Some shifts from buses or
automobiles to rail may initially occur, but it probably will take years for travel patterns
to stabilize and even longer for land use and lifestyle changes to occur. Transit agencies
and elected officials often face tremendous pressure to demonstrate immediate results of
rail projects to the general public and to the media. Consequently, it is tempting to
pursue short-term strategies to boost rail ridership, such as reconfiguring the bus system
to serve only the rail feeder market. In the worst-case scenario, such strategies may result
in ridership losses, political embarrassment, and other unfavorable results.
The challenge facing transit agencies is to manage the transition to new rail
systems effectively, minimizing short-term impacts while making progress to achieve
long-range objectives. Given this context, this research aims to develop a framework and
analytical methods to assist transit planners with the process of integrating new rail lines
with existing transit systems. It focuses exclusively on new or extended heavy rail and
light rail lines and assumes that the decision to move forward with these projects has
already been made.
1.1 Background
Integrating pre-existing transit services with new rail lines is a complex task.
Clearly, it involves many technical decisions ranging from fare integration to network
design and schedule coordination. As importantly, these decisions also affect transit
employees, politicians, construction workers, voters, riders, and other stakeholders in the
transit system. An in-depth analysis of how intermodal integration impacts all these
groups is not the focus of this research. Nevertheless, one should acknowledge that
integration policies that might make technical sense may be difficult to implement in a
"real world" environment.
Transportation providers are important stakeholders. It is fairly clear that
operating a successful intermodal system requires the cooperation and dedication of
front-line employees. However, bus operators may feel threatened by a new rail line or
other high-capacity transit improvements. Presumably the rail line will reduce demand
for bus service along parallel corridors. Since trains can carry far more passengers per
operator than buses, some drivers could potentially face unemployment if a transit agency
decides to reduce bus service. Transit unions, which have historically resisted
privatization efforts, might also oppose rail systems particularly if they contract out
operations. At the same time, private carriers may also be hostile to rail investments,
which they may view as high-quality, subsidized competition.
Bus riders form another important stakeholder group. Building a rail system is
inevitably a high-profile and high-cost strategy compared with maintaining or expanding
a bus system. If a rail line lags behind ridership expectations, experiences construction
problems, or fails to capture a substantial portion of system ridership, bus riders may feel
that the rail system is receiving undue resources and attention. Relative to buses, the high
level-of-service on rail may also reinforce this perception: rail will usually offer a quicker
ride and shorter headways than the average bus route, simply because it runs in heavily-
travelled corridors along separate rights-of-way with a wide catchment zone.
Sometimes, separate transit operators as well as a lack of intermodal fare coordination
can further reinforce the perception that there are distinct and unequal bus and rail
systems.
Launching a new rail line may also directly impact the commutes of current
transit customers as bus routes are reconfigured to interface with rail. In many instances,
express buses that operate in rail corridors are either eliminated or truncated at rail
stations in order to avoid service duplication. Route restructuring often makes sense from
both the operator's and customer's perspectives if it translates into greater bus service
coverage, shorter headways, or expanded hours of operation. However, the introduction
of a transfer can make transit less convenient for express riders. A significant challenge
is to retain these customers by softening the impact of transfers with integrated fares and
schedules. An agency must weigh system efficiency and service improvements against
political concerns, and then take steps to mitigate potential adverse impacts on bus
customers.
Figure 1-1: Percentage of Unlinked Transit Trips Taken by Rail
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While a new rail line may attract many riders, it is unlikely to be the largest
component of a transit system until it becomes extensive enough to reach a wide
population and employment base. Figure 1-1 compares the number of unlinked trips
taken by bus and rail (heavy rail, light rail, and commuter rail) for North American
metropolitan areas with multimodal systems. Since some riders use more than one
vehicle to complete their trips and thus are "double counted", this measure gives an
imperfect but rough indication of the relative significance of bus and rail modes. In
North America, the number of rail trips exceeds bus trips in only three cities: New York,
Boston, and Washington. Each features an extensive set of rapid transit and commuter
rail lines radiating from strong central business districts. Atlanta, Toronto and
Philadelphia have rail mode shares ranging from 40 to 50 percent. Even in cities such as
Montr6al and Chicago that have extensive rapid transit systems, most people depend
either on both the bus and train, or exclusively on the bus. With the exception of
Calgary, smaller scale rail systems with just one or two lines typically capture only 10 to
30% of the total unlinked trip mode share.
One could also employ other measures besides unlinked trips to compare bus and
rail systems. Using passenger miles, for example, would show that rail lines often play a
more significant role in the total system, even in cities with limited rail service. Rail
usually captures a larger percentage of total travel relative to boardings since people
typically travel longer distances on rail (particularly commuter rail) than on buses.
However, using passenger miles instead of ridership may be difficult to justify politically,
since it can raise the perception of "favoring" certain groups of transit riders over others.
Given these considerations, multimodal planning should acknowledge the
significance of buses - as a means to access rail stations and as a network in its own
right. This is particularly true in cities developing new rail systems, where the great
majority of transit riders will still depend upon buses for at least a portion of their transit
trips. Although the ridership density per route mile is likely to be higher for rail than for
bus, buses will continue to cover a larger area. Developing a mature rail network over
the long-term through incremental system expansion will require support not only from
the general public and politicians, but also from transit providers and customers.
1.2 Motivation
A rail investment or other major transit infrastructure project is a complex
undertaking that typically takes many years or even decades to implement. Given this
long time frame for rail projects, planners, engineers, and managers initially concentrate
on financing, physical design, and construction itself. Decisions about fare and service
integration with existing transit modes are often deferred until later and may not always
receive adequate attention. Consequently, although integration efforts have led to large
ridership gains on both trains and buses in some cities, others have produced less
impressive results. This work has two primary motivations: to address intermodal
integration issues generally with application to any North American metropolitan area
developing a rail system, and to make specific recommendations for San Juan, Puerto
Rico, where the Tren Urbano heavy rail system is currently under construction.
The opening of many new rail systems throughout North America in the past
quarter century has brought this issue to the forefront. Tables 1-1 and 1-2 list major
North American cities that have opened heavy and light rail systems since the mid-1970s
(they do not include commuter rail systems, another fast-growing rail mode). In addition,
older rail systems in cities such as Boston, Chicago, and Toronto have also expanded.
Table 1-1: Heavy Rail Systems Built since the Mid-1970s
City Opening Length Rail Operator Bus Operator(s)
Year (Miles)
Atlanta 1979 46 MARTA Same
Baltimore 1984 15 Maryland MTA Same
Los Angeles 1993 18 LA MTA Same
Miami 1984 21 Metro-Dade Transit Same
San Francisco 1974 95 BART San Francisco
MUNI, AC Transit,
SamTrans, others
San Juan 2002 11 Tren Urbano AMA, Metrob6s,
(contracted service) Piblicos
Vancouver 1986 17 BC Transit Same
Washington 1976 96 WMATA Same; also Ride-
On, Fairfax
Connector
Source: 1997 National Transit Database (FTA, 1999), agency web sites
Table 1-2: Light Rail Systems Built since the Mid-1970s
City Opening Length Rail Operator Bus Operator(s)
Year (Miles)
Baltimore 1992 22 Maryland MTA Same
Buffalo 1985 6 NFTA Same
Calgary 1981 18 Calgary Transit Same
Edmonton 1978 9 Edmonton Transit Same
Dallas 1996 20 DART Same
Denver 1994 5 Denver RTD Same
Jersey City 2000 21 New Jersey Transit Same
Los Angeles 1990 41 LA MTA Same
Portland 1986 33 Tri-Met Same
Sacramento 1986 20 Regional Transit Same
St. Louis 1993 17 Bi-State Transit Same
Salt Lake City 1999 15 Utah Transit Auth. Same
San Diego 1981 50 S.D. Trolley San Diego Transit
San Jose 1987 28 SCVTA Same
Source: 1997 National Transit Database (FTA, 1999), agency web sites
In most situations, transit agencies building new rail systems produce integration
plans internally or with the help of consultants. Of course, their work is limited to the
specific environment of interest. Most agencies do not have the financial resources to
analyze peer systems and learn from their experiences, or to develop an analytical process
to weigh alternative strategies. This is sometimes complicated when different rail and
bus agencies operate in the same metropolitan area. Research on this topic has tended to
focus on specific aspects of multimodal systems such as transfers, fare policy, or network
structure, but not how these various aspects relate to each other. In addition, few papers
discuss the process of moving from a bus-only operation to an integrated bus and rail
system or the political implications of such shifts. From this standpoint, this research
aims to develop a comprehensive analytical approach to integration issues with a
concentration on the transition phase to an intermodal system.
1.3 The San Juan Context
A specific motivation for this work is the need to develop an integrated transit
network strategy for San Juan, Puerto Rico. San Juan is the latest American city to make
a major financially commitment to rail as a catalyst in transforming its existing surface
transit system, consisting of buses and pd'blicos (regulated jitneys), into a high-quality
multimodal network. Phase I of Tren Urbano, Puerto Rico's first modern urban rail line,
is set to link Sagrado Coraz6n at the southern edge of Santurce with the western suburb
of Bayam6n. The 17-kilometer, 16-station heavy rail alignment passes through major
trip generators such as the Hato Rey business district, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio
Piedras, and Centro Medico (see Figure 1-4). Phase IA, currently in the advanced
planning stage, will extend Tren Urbano from Sagrado Coraz6n to Minillas in the center
of Santurce. Subsequent extensions to Viejo San Juan, Isla Verde, and Carolina may
move forward depending upon the funding and "success" of the initial segment. Phase I
Tren Urbano is now well into construction with initial revenue operations expected in
2002.
Figure 1-4: Map of San Juan's Tren Urbano System
Source: Tren Urbano web site
Meanwhile, San Juan's existing transit system has faced serious challenges for
many years. Severe roadway congestion, automobile-oriented land uses, decades of
deferred maintenance and declining ridership have taken their toll on both the bus and
pdblico systems. Overcrowding and a limited span of service can make the transit riding
experience unpleasant and inconvenient. In the last few years, however, significant steps
have been taken to address these long-standing issues. The Autoridad Metropolitana de
Autobuses (AMA) or Metropolitan Bus Authority (MBA) bus system underwent major
route restructuring at the beginning of 1998. The new system features a core network of
high-frequency trunk lines supplemented by feeder routes running at least every half-hour
on weekdays. Routes converge at a half-dozen transit centers located strategically
throughout the metropolitan region, enabling most passengers to reach their destinations
with a single transfer. While the previous system had more lines, most routes ran very
infrequently, a problem compounded by a lack of reliability. The shift from a high
connectivity but low quality route structure to one based upon transit centers has helped
to stimulate ridership growth. Annual boardings increased from 16.6 million to 24.3
million between 1996 and 1998 (APTA, 1999).
The two Metrobd's services have also achieved some success. Metrobdis I,
operated by a private contractor, parallels the Tren Urbano alignment from Rio Piedras to
Sagrado Coraz6n and continues on to Viejo San Juan using exclusive bus lanes.
Metrobdls II, operated by AMA, runs from Bayam6n to Santurce via Hato Rey, serving
the endpoints of Tren Urbano but following a more direct route along Avenida Roosevelt.
While Metrobdis employs bus technology, it has managed to distinguish itself as a higher-
quality service, offering better frequency and using a separate right-of-way in some areas.
This service quality is used to justify a premium fare. Interestingly both Metrobdis I and
II have generated strongly positive rider responses but negative reaction from pre-
existing bus and pd'blico services.
In contrast, the pdiblicos have continued a long decline. A few North American
cities such as New York and Miami also have unsubsidized jitneys (both legal and
illegal) in addition to large-scale conventional transit networks. However, nowhere in the
United States are jitneys such an integral component of the total transportation system as
in San Juan and the rest of Puerto Rico. Except for routing and fare regulation, drivers
essentially can run whenever they want with whatever vehicles they own. To stay afloat
financially in a low-profit business, however, drivers must keep their costs low which
generally results in poor service quality. Aged vehicles, lack of air conditioning,
overcrowding, and infrequent off-peak service make pd'blicos unattractive particularly
relative to the automobile.
Any "paradigm shift" to improve pdiblico service quality in anticipation of Tren
Urbano faces two major obstacles. First, the pdiblico drivers want to maintain their
independence without government interference, using fare revenue as their income.
Second, government officials are reluctant to intervene since the pd'blico drivers now
provide an essential service without financial assistance. Without intervention, however,
the pdiblicos face an uncertain future at best in light of growing automobile use as well as
improved bus and rail services.
Since both the buses and pdblicos already face difficult challenges of their own,
transit planners must clearly pay extra attention to integrating these modes with Tren
Urbano. With the introduction of Tren Urbano, the surface transit system must improve
even more - an estimated 55% of the year 2010 projected 115,000 daily Tren Urbano
customers are expected to access stations by bus or pdiblico (USDOT et al., 1995). Most
of these are anticipated to be net new transit trips (in addition to current bus and pdiblico
riders), approximately equal to half of all current AMA riders. The problem of
developing an effective multimodal network is particularly difficult in San Juan.
Separate transit providers with varying operating procedures and standards can
complicate integration efforts. In addition, public perception towards transit is indifferent
at best as the automobile's popularity has soared over the past several decades. Finally,
because of the significant cultural differences between San Juan and cities on the
American mainland, effectively addressing transportation challenges requires blending
successful strategies used elsewhere with unique approaches that are sensitive to the local
environment.
1.4 Thesis Objectives
The primary purpose of this research is to develop and evaluate strategies for
integrating existing transit services with new rail lines and to apply the findings to San
Juan. The primary objectives are:
(a) To formulate an analytic framework to develop and evaluate integration proposals
(b) Evaluate various bus-rail integration practices from the perspective of the transit
operator, customer, and other stakeholders
(c) To understand the experiences of other North American cities that have developed
new rail systems
(d) To recommend specific integration strategies that adapt practices used successfully
elsewhere to San Juan's special transportation environment
1.5 Methodology
This thesis adopts a multiple-step research approach. First, it develops an
analytical framework to address bus-rail integration planning issues. This framework
emphasizes a planning process broken into a series of strategic (long-term), tactical
(medium-term), and operational (short-term) decisions. It also defines evaluation criteria,
general objectives for any intermodal system, and alternative approaches to meet these
objectives. Using this framework, this thesis develops planning principles for bus-rail
integration. The discussion primarily focuses on long-term strategic decisions since they
require advance preparation and have significant impacts on service delivery and
customer perceptions of transit.
To support the general planning principles in this thesis and to provide insight for
the San Juan case, this thesis evaluates the intermodal integration experiences in five
cities (Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco, Washington, and Portland). Each of the
selected case studies meets one or more of the following criteria: (a) major restructuring
of the surrounding bus network took place in response to a new rail line, (b) a new rail
line altered the social or political landscape with respect to transportation, (c) multiple
regional transit operators complicate route and schedule coordination, or (d) demand
responsive services meet some transportation needs. Admittedly, cultural differences
might limit the applicability of some of the lessons learned in these cities to San Juan.
However, automobile ownership levels, land uses, and travel patterns in San Juan are
somewhat similar to the selected case study cities. In addition, Miami was specifically
included in the case studies because its heavy Latin American influence and private jitney
system resemble the San Juan environment. The case studies can be found in Appendix
A, with references to them throughout the text.
With the developed planning principles and case study evidence, this thesis then
analyzes the situation in San Juan and makes recommendations for system improvements.
First, it identifies major integration issues in San Juan, including the strengths and
weaknesses of existing transit services and potential political obstacles. Second, this
thesis critically evaluates proposals for AMA and Metrobd's route restructuring in
conjunction with Tren Urbano. Appendix C contains a detailed technical analysis of
proposals for specific routes to support a set of recommendations. Finally, it identifies
the viability of alternative approaches for integrating the pd'blicos with Tren Urbano.
1.6 Thesis Organization
Chapter Two develops an analytical framework and defines alternative
approaches which planners and other stakeholders can use to evaluate various integration
proposals. It also explains how this research builds upon previous work.
Chapter Three discusses planning principles for intermodal systems. It also
emphasizes how external social and political factors can complicate seemingly simple
planning decisions. Specifically, it addresses network theory and fare coordination and
their influence on mode choice and route design, transfers, and automobile access to rail
stations.
Chapter Four examines several strategies for integrating San Juan's existing
transit system with Tren Urbano. The first section defines objectives and evaluates
service modification strategies for the AMA and Metrobdis systems. The second section
addresses the privately-operated pd'blicos, primarily identifying new operating paradigms
that may best achieve desired service characteristics economically.
Chapter Five summarizes the major findings of this research and makes
recommendations for follow-on research.
The Appendices contain material referenced throughout the text. Specifically,
the appendices include the evaluation of specific bus route modification proposals, an
analysis of the implications of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on vehicle
procurement, and case studies from cities with mixed intermodal integration experiences.
Chapter 2: Analytical Framework
This chapter develops a framework to analyze intermodal integration strategies.
First, it reviews existing literature and explains how this thesis builds upon previous
research. Highlighting critical technical and non-technical issues, it then develops a
planning process to guide decision-makers preparing to open a new rail line. It also
distinguishes between "feeder", "minimalist", and "integrated systems" approaches to
bus-rail integration planning. Finally, it defines objectives and associated criteria to help
formulate and evaluate service modification proposals.
2.1 Previous Research
Intermodal integration involves many complex issues ranging from transfers,
network design, and fare coordination, to the political implications of associated service
changes. To date, extensive research has covered many of these topics individually, but
often not in a multimodal context. In addition, relatively few papers address the
transition from bus-only systems to integrated bus and rail systems. This section
highlights some of the most relevant research covering one or more aspects of intermodal
integration, but is by no means exhaustive.
One of the primary objectives of this paper is to identify ways to integrate Tren
Urbano and regular buses in San Juan with the deteriorating pdiblico network. Several
papers and studies discuss strategies to improve private jitneys like the pdiblico system.
Takyi (1990) discusses the conditions under which jitneys can sustain economic viability,
namely in cities with cheap labor, inadequate conventional transit services, and low
expectations for service, comfort, and safety. His paper also identifies potential roles
jitneys can fill in a larger transportation system (e.g. supplemental peak hour service,
service on narrow streets). Takyi contends that buses and jitneys provide different types
of services and therefore can and should complement rather than compete with each
other. A primary limitation of his analysis, at least in terms of the case of San Juan, is that
jitneys become less attractive as income and automobile ownership rise.
Lau (1997) builds upon previous research by identifying niche markets for jitneys
as well as government intervention strategies to rescue failing jitney systems. Lau
develops an analytical framework to evaluate potential intervention strategies. Applying
the framework to San Juan's pdlblicos, Lau recommends a set of "experimental
strategies" on poorly performing pd'blico routes, routes that could supplement Tren
Urbano, and routes that would directly compete with rail. Possibilities include
contracting service to established carriers in corridors with poor pdiblico service,
government assistance with vehicle procurement, fare integration, and contracting
operations on a short-run basis with pd'blico drivers on routes that compete with Tren
Urbano.
Kaysi et al. (1999) investigate the role that the private sector (particularly jitneys)
may play in the public transportation operations. Their paper identifies the challenges
facing these services and develops potential external intervention strategies to assist the
private sector. These include regulation, financial assistance with capital expenditures,
and moving to other market arrangements such as contracted operations. The private
sector can also supplement instead of compete with conventional transit modes (e.g.
providing paratransit services or additional peak-hour runs on overcrowded routes). The
paper also outlines specific strategies to improve the situation in San Juan. These include
imposing new regulations that require pd'blico drivers to improve their vehicles and to
provide scheduled service, encouraging operators to penetrate the new Tren Urbano
feeder market, and developing new market arrangements such as contracting out services
to private carriers.
Extensive research has also been conducted into other integration issues such as
fare integration. Barr (1997) develops a methodology for evaluating intermodal fare
coordination decisions. His research primarily focuses on fare technology (e.g. smart
cards, magnetic stripe cards) and pricing policy. While improved technology can
improve revenue collection and rider convenience, Barr argues that favorable pricing
policies can produce clear benefits for users but may have positive or negative impacts on
revenue. The purpose of Barr's work is to assess the impacts of fare integration through
an analytical framework based on usage, financial, system, and external criteria. Another
objective is to apply this framework to the specific case of Tren Urbano.
Hirsch et al. (2000) recount how New York City Transit's recent fare integration
improvements have translated into double-digit ridership growth on both its subways and
buses. The authority has implemented an Automatic Fare Collection (AFC) system
throughout the network featuring a stored value ticket called the Metrocard. Customers
can either use the Metrocard as a debit card that allows free intermodal transfers or as an
unlimited-ride ticket for a specified time period. Hirsch et al. analyze Metrocard's
impacts on various ridership markets and system utilization. Their study is referenced in
Section 3.3.
Besides fare coordination, research efforts have also focused on developing
theoretical approaches to optimize transit networks. Baba (1995) formulates a theoretical
and computationally intensive model for a generic bus route network. To provide transit
agencies with a framework for bus route restructuring, his work develops a methodology
for solving the bus network design problem (BNDP): determining the best bus route
configuration and frequencies given bus transit demand, the street network, available
resources, and operational constraints. It adopts a heuristic approach, focusing on route
generation and frequency determination/vehicle allocation, encompassed in a single
automated design procedure. Baba's methodology improves upon previous BNDP
heuristic approaches by (a) incorporating a fleet size constraint, (b) identifying major trip
patterns and demand to guide route design, and (c) solving the BNDP using either a
general or transit center network design. This work develops a detailed route generation
and vehicle allocation procedure. The thesis then applies the proposed methodology and
automated design procedure to San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Lee and Vuchic (2000) present an iterative approach to handle the Bus Network
Design Problem, which they call more generally the Transit Network Design Problem
(TRNP). Three general objectives for an optimized network include (1) user travel time
minimization, (2) the transit agency's profit maximization (or net cost minimization), (3)
social benefit maximization or social cost minimization. For simplicity, they focus on
user travel time (including waiting, transfer, and in-vehicle travel times) minimization as
the primary criterion for their analysis. The algorithm used to determine an optimal
network consists of three major steps. First, an initial network is generated with a
minimum number of routes using a shortest path algorithm. Second, travel flow is
assigned to specific routes. Finally, the alignments of certain transit routes are modified
to reduce passenger travel times. This iterative approach also addresses the dynamic
characteristics between variable transit trip demand and optimal transit network design.
More specifically, the algorithm contains a feedback mechanism that recognizes the
dependent relationship between transit demand, transit supply, automobile usage, and in-
vehicle travel times.
Other work has analyzed multimodal transit systems, also from a theoretical
perspective. Wirasinghe (1979) develops an analytical model to describe a generalized
rail line and its feeder bus network. This model presents a nearly "optimal solution" to
feeder bus route design and rail station placement. To keep the model tractable, however,
Wirasinghe makes some key assumptions that limit its applicability; for example, the
model assumes a regular grid street network as well as ignores travel time variability and
schedule coordination needs. Nevertheless, it roughly approximates the relationships
between transit demand volumes, waiting times, walking distances, and operating costs.
Kuah and Perl (1988) build upon Wirasinghe's work by presenting an analytical model
for the design an optimal feeder bus network for a rail line. Unlike Wirasinghe's work
(and many other Bus Network Design Problem approaches), it includes bus stop spacing
as a parameter, since stop spacing affects walking time and in-vehicle travel time. It also
assumes that rail stations already exist, removing one decision variable from the analysis.
Chowdhury and Chien (2000) develop a method to optimize coordination in a
general intermodal network featuring a rail (or major bus) trunk line supplemented by
intersecting buses. The goal is to minimize an objective function - first among individual
routes and then the entire network - that includes both supplier (the transit agency) and
user (passenger) costs associated with transferring. Supplier costs are captured by the
operating costs of the trunk and secondary routes; user costs are represented by wait,
transfer, and in-vehicle travel times. The major decision variables include route headways
and slack times, or the extra time built into the schedule to increase the probability of
making a connection. With this objective function, Chowdhury and Chien propose a
four-step procedure to develop coordinated schedules. Their model assumes that the rail
line operates maintains a deterministic headway, which keeps the problem tractable but is
not always realistic, while bus arrivals at transfer stations are stochastic with
approximately a normal distribution. The model also assumes fixed demand, which
could limit its applicability since service frequency and ridership are clearly interrelated.
By highlighting important issues such as travel time, transfers, route directness,
and headways, these network models may prove useful to transit agencies planning new
rail lines and supporting bus services. However, it is generally very difficult for a model
to incorporate all the complexities of a large regional transit network. Furthermore,
theoretical models may give the impression that planners can simply design transit
services from scratch. In reality, transit operators and customers may be resistant to
major changes.
As a prime component of transit networks in general and particularly intermodal
systems, transfers have received considerable attention. Matoff (1994) and Hickey
(1992) argue that providing everyone "one-seat", transfer-free rides is logistically
impossible given the spatial layout of most North American metropolitan areas.
Schumann (1997) describes how a hierarchy of integrated transit services (e.g. regional
rail, trunk bus routes, circulators and shuttles) can be effective in allowing transit to serve
low-density areas and non-radial trips. They suggest that multimodal systems that
feature network connectivity (i.e. many points where passengers can switch between
intersecting routes) allow transit systems to become more responsive to multiple travel
patterns. This thesis builds upon their work by providing case study evidence to support
these concepts and developing incremental strategies for implementation.
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the physical design of transfer
facilities at rail stations is a key component of an intermodal system. The Transportation
Research Board's "Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual" (Kittleson &
Associates, 1999) provides guidelines on bus waiting areas, park & ride and kiss & ride
facilities, pedestrian flow within stations, ticket machines, and accessibility issues.
Horowitz and Thompson (1995) define some generic objectives for evaluating the design
of transfer facilities.
Other research has also investigated ways to mitigate the negative impacts of
transferring in order to achieve the full benefits of network connectivity. Vuchic and
Musso (1992) present a systematic classification and analysis of transfers based on the
headways of a passenger's initial and connecting routes. Part of their paper addresses
station layout and scheduling between frequent, intersecting rail lines which exchange
large volumes of passengers. At the other extreme, they also focus on developing a
"Timed Transfer System" (TTS) to improve transfer convenience between two or more
long headway transit routes, a strategy commonly employed to increase customer
convenience in systems covering dispersed activity centers with infrequent service.
Becker and Spielberg (1998) elaborate on the timed-transfer issue. They describe the
conditions under which it may be feasible to establish timed transfer centers in a network,
and develop a procedure for system scheduling. They also found that in the case of
Norfolk, Virginia, the introduction of a timed transfer network increased ridership
slightly despite a cutback in service hours and improved customer perceptions of the
system.
Hall (1999) investigates holding strategies to improve the probability of making a
successful transfer when an initial vehicle is delayed. Of course, holding also lengthens
waiting times for passengers on the connecting vehicle. The objective of the holding
strategy Hall develops is to minimize total passenger delay. He models the waiting
process in two steps, first optimizing holding times for known vehicle arrival times, and
then expanding the analysis to stochastic arrival times. When the length of the initial
vehicle's delay is known, Hall demonstrates that the optimal strategy will be either to not
hold the connecting vehicle or dispatch it at the initial vehicle's arrival time. In the
stochastic case, it is difficult to find the optimal dispatch time. Hall identifies a point at
which it makes sense to dispatch a connecting vehicle based upon the distribution of
arrival time(s) of the initial vehicle(s). The topic of real-time holding strategies is beyond
the scope of this thesis; for further information, Hall's paper provides references on this
subject.
Clearly, transfers can impact travel time, customer perceptions, and ridership. A
study by the Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS) (1997) in Boston attempts to
quantify this so-called "transfer penalty." Empirical data were collected and analyzed for
metropolitan Boston, a region with an extensive multimodal network that relies heavily
on transfers. The study concludes the "transfer penalty" is more onerous than initial
waiting time and over twice as onerous as in-vehicle time. Liu et al. (1997, 1998) reach
similar findings using a methodology than involves both stated preference data and
simulation. They also find that the "penalty" is greater for intermodal transfers (e.g.
between bus and rail) than for intramodal (e.g. bus-to-bus or rail-to-rail) ones. Section
3.5 discusses the results of this research in more detail. These studies are based on the
premise that a transfer-free bus ride may be better than a trip that involves both bus and
rail. This is an important consideration when deciding whether to discontinue express
buses that parallel a new rail line.
Other research has also attempted to investigate the holistic effects of bus-rail
integration on transit systems that have introduced new rail systems. However, most of
the existing literature that examines intermodal systems questions the appropriateness of
rail investments from a revisionist perspective, usually emphasizing economic factors
over other criteria. In contrast, this thesis looks at ways to coordinate existing bus service
with a new rail line at the time rail is being constructed.
Richmond (1998) attempts to explore this issue by comparing North American
cities with new light rail systems with those that have pursued bus "solutions". He
concludes that in virtually all cases, new rail lines have disrupted existing bus systems by
diverting financial resources from buses to rail construction and operations. He also
accuses transit agencies of reconfiguring bus networks to force passengers (particularly
from express buses) onto trains, resulting in additional transfers and artificially higher rail
ridership. In contrast, Richmond contends that express bus systems in Ottawa,
Pittsburgh, and Houston have been as or more successful than rail systems, but at much
lower capital costs.
Higgins (1981) examines the experiences of the San Francisco Bay Area's BART
system about seven years after the system's opening. Higgins' paper focuses on two
major points. First, he asserts that in retrospect an all-bus system would have been more
cost-efficient for the Bay Area than a coordinated rail and bus feeder network. Secondly,
he suggests that it might be better to maintain existing parallel bus services instead of
rerouting buses to new rail lines. He posits that automobiles may be more attractive than
a combination bus and rail trip. Citing that the operating and capital costs per passenger
trip were higher on rail than on local buses, he concludes that express buses should
operate on BART corridors instead of trains.
Denant-Boemont and Mills (1999) also approach intermodal integration from an
economic perspective. Citing systems in the United States, Canada, and Europe, they
conjecture that many new rail lines do not produce enough benefits to outweigh financial
assistance. In the cases where rail systems do make economic sense, Denant-Boemont
and Mills argue that cities may want to pursue intermodal competition instead of
coordination because coordinated multimodal operations "may well incur excessive
costs." Citing free-market economic principles, they posit that on-street competition
between bus and rail might be beneficial to passengers, even though they acknowledge
that the level-of-service on each mode may decline as a result of market saturation.
This thesis builds upon previous research by taking a comprehensive, analytical
approach to intermodal integration. It differs from other work because it addresses
critical issues that arise when transit agencies are preparing to transition from bus-only
systems to intermodal systems. Rather than delving into individual aspects of intermodal
integration, much of which current literature covers in great detail, this research explores
how these aspects interrelate. Furthermore, it develops a framework that also emphasizes
service, ridership, political and other evaluation criteria instead of just focusing
exclusively on transfers or economic considerations.
2.2 Planning Process
Formulating and evaluating an integration plan can be a long and complex
process. A major objective of this thesis is to develop a step-by-step analytical
framework to assist decision-makers in evaluating various proposals. Figure 2-1 outlines
this planning process.
At the start, transit planners must understand the financial, social and political
constraints of their operating environment. Resource limitations are likely to preclude
significant service expansion given the major investment in the rail line itself.
Nevertheless, the ostensible purpose of the rail line is to attract new customers to transit,
not merely to shift people from buses to trains. Accomplishing this basic objective
almost always requires a net increase in service. Boosting system utilization and
reallocating buses, particularly from lines that duplicate rail markets to ones that
supplement the rail line, can limit the need to expand bus operations to some extent.
However, a "zero-sum" approach whereby an agency redeploys all bus resources to serve
the rail feeder market will shortchange current riders and may result in overall ridership
losses. Thus, an agency should be prepared to initiate some additional bus service to
satisfy induced rail accessibility needs.
Figure 2-1: Outline of Planning Process
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Other preliminary steps in the planning process include assessing the strengths
and weaknesses of the existing system and determining major travel patterns and trends,
in order to identify areas for improvement. Given these a priori considerations, planners
should also define objectives and establish criteria to measure how they are meeting these
objectives. An approach, or a general strategy, must then be developed to meet these
objectives.
In the planning process, decision-makers should also understand the basic
principles of intermodal integration. Important issues include fare coordination, network
theory, and transfers. Chapter 3 discusses these items individually as well as how they
interact and influence each other. In addition to these generic principles, the experiences
of North American cities with new rail systems offer further insight into the critical
political and logistical challenges that can arise. The appendix includes case studies of
Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco, Washington, and Portland to support the ideas
presented in Chapter 3. With a grasp of these main concepts and knowledge of the
lessons learned from other cities, one can design and prepare an overall integration plan.
Meanwhile, soliciting public input throughout the process may bring fresh perspectives to
the discussion and familiarize customers with potential changes.
Formulating an integration plan requires a series of decisions that fall into three
major categories: strategic, tactical and operational. The pyramid shown in Figure 2-2
illustrates the relationships between these categories. The strategic level includes long-
term decisions such as the transit organization's network design and fare policy.
Although there are relatively few specific decisions to be made at this level, they are very
important because they require advance preparation and can significantly facilitate (or
inhibit) intermodal integration. Tactical decisions must be made more frequently. A
common tactical decision is the formulation or revision of the operations plan, which
usually occurs in conjunction with changes in driver assignments. This allows agencies
to respond to demand shifts by redeploying resources. Operational decisions are very
short-term in nature, consisting of real-time responses to schedule delays, service
disruptions, ridership surges during special events, etc.
Figure 2-2: Pyramid of Major Strategic, Tactical, and Operational Decisions
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This research primarily focuses on strategic planning because this lays the
foundation for subsequent tactical and operational decisions. (Some strategic engineering
decisions, such as the physical layout of bus stops and rail platforms at stations, are
beyond the scope of this research.) Although an agency can make strategic level
decisions at any time, key policies can be difficult to change once implemented due to
institutional inertia and customer resistance. This observation underscores the fact that
strategic issues should merit special consideration early in the planning process.
Determining the organizational paradigm of the bus and rail system is possibly the most
important issue. Two incompatible paradigms - such as contracted rail operations with
incentives and penalties to encourage schedule adherence, and a privately-operated feeder
bus network without schedules - will make fare coordination, scheduling and real-time
decision-making tougher. Likewise, an integrated fare policy can encourage customers to
take the most efficient route rather than one that merely avoids transfers. A well-planned
network structure can enable an agency to improve resource utilization by shifting buses
from routes that duplicate rail to ones that serve new markets.
At the same time, tactical and operational decisions can also influence the
effectiveness of an intermodal network, as well as customer perception. For example,
scheduling ample time for customers to transfer between modes can lower the chances of
missing connections due to service delays. Holding and other real-time intervention
strategies can also increase transfer reliability. While this thesis covers mostly strategic
intermodal planning, it also briefly discusses some tactical and operational issues
affecting transfers since this is a major - and often controversial - component of many
multimodal systems.
After designing and preparing an integration plan, an agency must then present it
to the public since the law requires public notification of major service changes. At this
point, planners have an opportunity to explain and justify changes and possibly cycle
through another iteration with customer suggestions. They should also develop a plan for
the staged implementation of service changes. Finally, after the rail line opens, the
operator should evaluate services and modify them if necessary.
2.3 Objectives
A preliminary step in the bus-rail integration planning process is to establish key
objectives. As indicated in the planning process flowchart above, one should consider
the strengths and weaknesses of existing transit, travel patterns and trends in the
metropolitan area, as well as financial and political realities when establishing objectives
for an integration plan. One should also identify target markets where transit can become
a feasible or competitive travel mode. While planners will need to tailor objectives for
individual systems, some general objectives will apply in nearly all cases:
e Attract new riders
A primary goal of a new rail system is to attract new transit riders, especially since heavy
political pressure exists to meet ridership expectations. Merely shifting riders from the
bus to the train is unlikely to justify a major investment. A prudent restructuring of bus
services can also increase ridership on the bus system by facilitating access to the train
and between destinations not along the rail line.
0 Retain existing ridership
The opening of a rail line should not cause the existing bus system to decline. Some
riders will certainly shift from bus to rail and that would benefit both the passenger and
operator. However, for both social and political reasons, bus route restructuring for the
train should not drive existing bus riders away from transit. Therefore, the bus-rail
integration planning process must balance the desire to achieve the first objective with
the need to retain existing ridership.
0 Maximize effective use of the rail system
Since rail infrastructure is expensive and is a sunk cost, clearly a transit agency must
capitalize on its investment. In terms of labor costs, higher-capacity vehicles can allow
rail to transport passengers more economically than buses along high-demand corridors.
e Ensure political support for future rail extensions
Because of high cost and implementation time, rail systems are built over decades, line
segment by line segment. Maintaining political support for continuing to expand the rail
system is usually essential to long run success. Often critics have assailed new rail
segments for under-utilization, high construction costs, favoring "choice" riders and other
demographic groups, and for disrupting existing bus systems. Whether or not they have
legitimate grounds for such complaints, they have (ironically) succeeded in allying anti-
tax and anti-transit forces with bus riders in some cities. Their attacks have sometimes
resulted in diminished public support for and/or abandonment of further rail construction.
On the other hand, a well-integrated transit system that meets today's diverse
transportation needs can win support not only from regular transit patrons, but also from
non-riders and occasional users. Having a large support base is critical for future transit
expansion. Thus, any integration plan must provide high-quality service to solidify the
broad constituency needed to expand rail transit.
0 Improve Productivity
No major North American public transit system turns a profit. However, a prudent
allocation of resources that boosts ridership and takes advantage of the relative economic
and technological strengths of bus and rail modes can help improve overall productivity.
2.4 Criteria
After establishing broad objectives, transit agencies should also develop criteria to
measure how well integration proposals fulfill these target goals. Criteria can fall into
broad service, customer, financial, productivity and external categories, and possibly
others depending on the situation. Of course, these categories as well as the criteria
themselves can vary, reflecting values of each organization and the particular
circumstances of the metropolitan area. Below is one possible set of criteria:
Service Criteria
e Network coverage and connectivity - By establishing where customers can travel, the
route network is the basic building block of a transit system. Planners should
consider how route restructuring proposals affect the ability of passengers to travel
throughout the urban area. Network coverage refers to the areas easily accessible to
transit. Connectivity refers to how well rail and bus lines interface to allow
passengers to reach a variety of destinations. In some cases, bus reallocation from the
rail corridor to other parts of the region can improve an agency's ability to serve new
customers.
" Route Directness - Circuitous routing or trips that involve many transfers can
discourage ridership. On the flip side, a transit agency cannot provide direct service
for everyone given the multiplicity of travel patterns in any region. Changes to
integrate bus and rail services should balance the desire to offer customers direct
service with other goals including network connectivity and operational efficiency
(i.e. eliminating service duplication).
" Service Frequency and Span of Service - While service frequency is a function of
demand along a given transit route, it is also a primary factor influencing people's
mode choice. When evaluating service integration proposals, it is important to
consider how changes can affect service frequency or span of service. For example,
resource allocation from bus lines that parallel rail to overcrowded routes or ones that
operate in underserved areas can make transit more attractive to new customers.
" Operational Impacts - The introduction of a rail line and associated bus service
modifications may have large impacts on overall system reliability. Operational
reliability is an important criterion to consider when formulating integration
proposals. For instance, shortened bus routes circulating around neighborhoods tend
to have better schedule adherence than radial express routes travelling along
congested highways. Meanwhile, rail systems potentially have better service
reliability than typical bus routes because they operate in exclusive rights-of-way
rather than in general traffic.
Ridership Criteria
e Ridership impacts: New rail lines and associated bus modifications clearly affect
ridership. Better service levels and fare coordination generally result in higher
patronage, but resource limitations constrain system growth. When evaluating
service changes, planners should also attempt to determine how they might affect new
and existing customers differently. Since it is usually easier to lose riders quickly
than to attract new ones, appropriate integration strategies should balance the need to
attract new customers with retaining existing ones.
" Equity concerns: Changes in a transit system that occur when a new rail line opens do
not always affect all population groups in the same way. For example, the rail system
may introduce a transfer for certain transit-dependent bus riders, but may succeed in
attracting "choice" riders from their cars. Of course, the definition of equity is
nebulous: it may mean that all people receive the same level-of-service or that
disadvantaged people with fewer resources receive additional transit service.
Nevertheless, planners should be particularly sensitive to how their integration
strategies affect people with different levels of income and mobility.
Financial & Productivity Criteria
e Marginal costs and revenue: Each service modification (or fare policy) proposal will
impact operating costs and revenue, often in a non-linear manner. For example, it
costs more to provide service during rush hours than at other times; not only does an
agency have to size its fleet for the peak, but it may also have to pay spread premiums
to drivers whose shifts extend over a long workday. In addition, different service
levels and fare policies can dramatically impact ridership, which affects revenue.
Various analytical models can help agencies estimate marginal costs and revenue for
a given service change.
" Service effectiveness: Service effectiveness, a productivity measure of how well the
public utilizes provided service (e.g. passengers per vehicle hour or per vehicle mile),
helps to demonstrate the social contributions of a given service modification.
Boosting ridership (relative to service) can help improve service effectiveness and
can reduce subsidies per passenger, since higher ridership levels translate into greater
revenues. Of course, cutting back service but trying to retain as many riders as
possible can also improve service effectiveness, but this typically leads to a
downward spiral of service cuts, higher fares, and lost ridership. The lag between
service modifications and ridership increases (or decreases) is of major importance
and requires explicit acknowledgement to avoid confusing short-term and long-term
impacts.
" Cost efficiency: Cost efficiency is another productivity measure that describes the
unit cost of providing service, independent of ridership. Common cost efficiency
measures include labor cost per vehicle hour or per vehicle mile. Cost efficiency is
one of the primary considerations in selecting an operating model (e.g. directly-
operated service); one of the primary arguments for contracted operations is that
private carriers can achieve better cost efficiency than the public sector. When
designing an intermodal network, cost efficiency differs for bus and rail.
" Cost effectiveness: Cost effectiveness is a commonly used productivity measure that
relates costs, revenue, and ridership, as well as encapsulates both service
effectiveness and cost efficiency. Specifically, it compares the monetary social cost
of providing service (subsidy) with transit's beneficiaries (number of passengers).
Net cost per passenger is a common measure of cost effectiveness.
Since transit agencies must always balance the desire for high service levels with
available financial resources, productivity measures such as net cost per passenger are
often used to evaluate service modification proposals. While productivity criteria are
clearly important to keep an agency financially stable, it probably should not be the
primary concern during the transition to a new rail system. During this period, a critical
objective is to get people to try the new rail system and become regular customers.
Changes in travel patterns, new system capacity added by rail, fare incentives to attract
new customers, and other factors can lead to "inefficiency" (at least as perceived in the
short run.) Using productivity as the primary evaluation criteria for integration policies
may lead to decisions that discourage system usage.
External Criteria
e Political Risk: In some cases, it may make sense not to pursue a strategy that meets
other service, ridership, financial, and performance criteria if it is not politically
acceptable. For example, eliminating express bus routes on the rail system's opening
day may draw unfavorable attention. Rail skeptics may feel that the agency is forcing
bus passengers onto rail, while bus operators may complain out of fear they could
lose their jobs. Similarly, opening a rail line and increasing fares simultaneously can
embarrass the agency even if it brings additional revenue. Clearly, political
acceptability is an important evaluation criterion for any integration strategy.
2.5 Approaches
This section outlines some general approaches a transit agency can take to fulfill
the objectives outlined in section 2.3. While presented as distinct models, these
approaches are not mutually exclusive. Some appropriate strategies may use a
combination of approaches.
* Minimalist Approach
The minimalist approach makes few service changes. Only minor and obvious
modifications are made, such as changing bus routes that run close to rail stations to stop
at the stations. Limiting changes would primarily satisfy existing customers under the
presumption that many people choose where to live based on transit availability. A bus-
rail integration plan developed for the Boston's northwest Red Line extension notes, "It
was felt to be poor marketing strategy to jeopardize the current ridership in the hopes of
gaining new ridership with a radically revised service delivery strategy. Current riders
can be lost immediately, while a substantial amount of time is required to build up new
ridership" (MBTA, 1985).
However, this approach may lead to an inefficient use of resources and miss
opportunities to tap new markets. For instance, an agency may decide not to reduce any
bus service that parallels a rail line. This would directly impact rail utilization and
perhaps result in an oversupply of service along the corridor. Meanwhile, the agency
might also have to forgo redistributing bus resources to under-served communities, or
redesigning routes to facilitate new trip patterns. Thus, the opportunity cost of this
decision also may include lost potential ridership on the entire system.
* Feeder Approach
The feeder approach prioritizes bus accessibility to the rail system. Bus routes
that travel anywhere near the rail alignment are transformed into feeders that deliver
passengers to the rail station. In the short term, this strategy will likely maximize rail
ridership by shifting existing bus riders to rail. Higher ridership would help project an
image of "success" and reinforce rail as the system's symbolic centerpiece.
One disadvantage of the feeder approach is that it requires transfers for many
former "one-seat" bus riders. Some people may also find it easier to drive to a park &
ride lot instead of taking a feeder bus. Fortunately, schedule and fare coordination can
help mitigate these impacts. Perhaps more seriously, the feeder approach may greatly
inconvenience passengers whose origins and destinations are not near the rail line.
Truncating bus routes at rail stations may result in lengthy trip diversions as well as
added bus-to-bus transfers. This may lead to the perception that the investments in rail
transit are at the expense of the bus system.
Integrated Systems Approach
The integrated systems approach strives to create a system that takes advantage of
the strengths of bus and rail modes by considering their respective operational and
financial effectiveness and efficiency. As importantly, it emphasizes providing the most
efficient travel options for customers, whether by rail, bus or a combination of both.
Unlike the other approaches, it explicitly balances the desire to build rail ridership with
the needs of current patrons. In the long run, this strategy may possibly attract more rail
and bus customers. Depending on the rail corridor characteristics, a reallocation of bus
services to decrease headways or introduce new service to other areas could achieve
significant ridership gains. In the short term, however, this strategy may not necessarily
result in as much rail ridership as the rail-oriented approach.
Over the long run, which strategy should an agency choose when altering bus
routes to accommodate a new rail line? The answer in current practice often depends on
many factors including the political environment and financial resources. It typically
differs based upon whether the same or separate authorities operate the buses and trains.
For example, a bus-only agency interested in retaining its customer base may choose the
minimalist approach, continuing parallel express bus service that competes with the rail
services of another agency. Among multimodal agencies, political pressures to achieve
rail ridership projections commonly result in a rail-oriented "feeder" network design
approach. Unfortunately, this may greatly inconvenience customers whose travel
patterns do not naturally "fit" the new rail line, leading to the perception that the agency
is trying to force bus passengers onto the train to make it "look good".
While the minimalist and rail-oriented approaches seem like quite natural
responses to the bus-rail integration issue given a specific institutional, cultural and
physical environment, in the long run an integrated systems strategy may be preferable.
Admittedly, geographical and financial constraints may make this option more feasible in
some cities than others, and indeed easier along certain segments of a particular rail
alignment. Nevertheless, framing the bus-rail integration issue in terms of designing an
efficient system for both the operator and public offers several advantages:
= Compared to the rail-oriented feeder approach, an integrated systems strategy takes a
broader view of intermodal planning. Not only does it address bus feeder access
needs, but it also explicitly acknowledges the complexity of today's travel patterns.
Heavy demand and potential transit-friendly development opportunities along a
corridor can justify building a new rail system; however, transit can also play a role in
many other travel corridors that exist today in metropolitan areas. An intelligent
nework design can transform a purely feeder-based route scheme into a more
comprehensive one.
* Unlike the minimalist approach, an integrated systems strategy takes a proactive view
of network design. It encourages an agency to design services to improve trip speed
and reliability, coordinate schedules, achieve operating efficiencies, and expand
customer markets where possible by reallocating (and expanding) bus resources. An
integrated systems strategy can incorporate elements of both the minimalist and rail-
oriented approaches for specific locations. For example, planners may not need to
make many changes to integrate services at a station that has historically served as a
bus hub. The existing route structure would continue to accommodate current bus
riders, while the buses would effectively make the train accessible from outlying
areas.
* Over the long run, an integrated systems strategy has greater potential to build transit
ridership. An integrated system can give people confidence that transit can work for
them, even if the higher-profile train cannot initially take them where they want to go.
This translates into greater support for rail expansion and for public transportation in
general as an alternative to driving.
* Incremental Approach
While an integrated systems approach makes sense over the long run, it can
clearly inconvenience some people in the short term if it causes them to alter their travel
patterns. In addition, transit planners may have difficulty accurately predicting the
outcome of service changes associated with an integrated system despite careful analysis
and modeling efforts. Since new rail systems are often under intense scrutiny during and
shortly after opening, an incremental strategy of implementing bus service changes is
worth considering.
Specifically, an agency might pursue a minimalist approach initially with
relatively minor service alterations on opening day. Current bus riders will not be forced
to alter their travel patterns, at least initially. Bus drivers are more likely to feel
comfortable if there is clearly no threat to their jobs. In addition, this strategy may
include temporary fare discounts on the rail system to entice people to try the new
system. A few months later, initial scrutiny fades and the agency has time to assess the
impacts of the rail system on travel behavior. Some bus riders will have certainly
switched to rail to take advantage of a higher level of service, and the agency could then
justify major bus service modifications and fare changes. It is important to explain this
strategy to the public openly. Agencies must clearly state that in the future, bus services
may be redeployed, not curtailed, and that low fares are introductory discounts for the
transitional period only.
While the incremental approach can stabilize bus ridership and insulate an agency
from some political criticism, two major obstacles impede implementation. First, service
duplication consumes additional operating resources, but is not likely to increase
ridership substantially. Secondly, rail ridership cannot reach its potential without support
from the bus network. Nevertheless, it may make sense to "buy" stability and insulation
from political criticism. For this approach to work, an agency must accept that
inefficiency is necessary during the transition phase. Although this may seem like a
waste of resources, the marginal cost of providing some excess service over a relatively
short period is small compared to the rail system's capital cost. In addition, an agency
must explicitly emphasize to the riders, the general public, the media, and others that
actual ridership cannot reach expectations until all the support services are in place.
Chapter 3: Bus-Rail Integration Planning Principles
This chapter introduces some basic planning principles for integrating buses with
new rail lines. After outlining desired level-of-service characteristics from the
customer's perspective, it then addresses some strategic, tactical, and operational issues
using the analytical framework presented in section 2.2. It focuses primarily on strategic,
long-term questions but also mentions the tactical and operational issues that are
fundamental to high-quality service delivery.
3.1 Desired Level-of-Service Characteristics
The success and utility of new rail systems depend critically upon effective
integration with the existing transit services. Generally speaking, any intermodal system
will need to offer a consistent and high quality level-of-service in order to retain existing
ridership and attract new customers. Some of the most important service attributes
include:
e Service Frequency - Reducing out-of-vehicle waiting time enhances passenger
convenience particularly in an intermodal network that relies on transfers. While
budget constraints may limit an agency's ability to provide short headways on all
routes, schedule coordination on low frequency routes can partially compensate for
lower service levels.
" Schedule Reliability - Services should operate according to published schedules.
Customers should know the expected trip time, as well as when to leave so as to
minimize transfer wait time.
" Integrated Fares - An intermodal system should offer a fare structure that makes
transferring between modes convenient. Lack of fare integration and varying fares
across modes often contribute to perceptions that bus and rail operators do not
coordinate with each other.
" Vehicle Comfort and Accessibility - Vehicles must be clean, comfortable, and
climate-controlled. The interior design should also be able to accommodate large
passenger volumes quickly and comfortable. In addition, they should provide
accessibility to people with disabilities, as mandated by the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Improvements such as low-floor vehicles can also make a system
more user-friendly.
* Route Structure - Ideally the bus and pd'blico route structure should provide access to
the rail line while retaining convenient service for non-rail customers, particularly for
local and crosstown trips
3.2 Organizational/Operating Paradigms
When designing and building a new rail line, planners must determine an
appropriate operating paradigm for the organization. Sometimes the public agency
running buses assumes responsibility for the rail system; at other times, an entirely new
agency is formed. Table 3-1 presents the major options, highlighting the advantages and
disadvantages of each. This choice not only impacts cost efficiency, but also the overall
effectiveness of intermodal integration. For example, two fundamentally different
paradigms, such as the unregulated and contracted operations models, will make
coordination between systems difficult.
The great majority of North American transit systems employ the publicly-
operated model, although there is also increasing use of contracting, particularly for
demand responsive service and commuter rail operations. Both paradigms depend upon
public financial assistance, although the contracted operations option uses competitive
bidding among private sector firms in an attempt to realize cost savings. With the
exception of Tren Urbano in San Juan, all North American heavy and light rail operations
use the publicly-operated model. Furthermore, regional agencies almost always operate
both the bus and rail systems. Independent suburban bus systems may also serve rail
stations in some of these cases. A few rail operations, such as BART in San Francisco,
are completely separate from bus systems
Table 3-1: Major Operating Paradigms
Description Advantages Disadvantages
Unregulated/ Privately operated, few Competition among Unprofitable routes, low
Deregulated barriers to entry or exit, operators ostensibly density areas, and off-peak
little government oversight encourages better service at services neglected;
a low cost; government does coordination difficult;
not have to subsidize High demand areas over-
operations served; overfilled vehicles to
maximize revenue; driving
"tcompetitively" may
jeopardize passenger safety
and lead to maintenance
_____________________ 
neglect
Regulated Privately operated, but with Similar to unregulated! Similar to unregulated!
Competition some government regulation deregulated model; deregulated model;
pertaining to safety, government regulation can government regulation may
maintenance, fares, etc. help meet some societal cause operators to fail
_________________________ 
objectives
Threatened Government threatens Potential to produce cost- Threat of competition may
Competition competition by using efficient, high-quality service be illusory, which diminishes
renewable contracts with the model's effectiveness;
private operators, but avoids potential corruption and non-
direct street competition competitive bidding
Private A single private company Potential for better service Private monopolists less
Monopoly operates public transport coordination; government likely to fulfill fundamental
with some government can more easily impose societal objectives for public
regulation mobility, equity, transit, favoring infrequent
environmental and other and overloaded services;
broad objectives; less incentive toward cost
organization motivated to efficiency and service quality
earn a profit because they are insulated
from competition
Public The public sector directly Theoretically able to best Less incentive to achieve
Monopoly operates public transport serve public transport's cost-effectiveness, grow
services accessibility, equity, and ridership, or penetrate new
other societal objectives; markets; pressure to avoid
potential for better service increasing subsidy may
coordination; long-run result in service cutbacks
stability with less risk of rather than cost streamlining
financial failure
Contracting Public authority delegates Potential for improved cost May not reduce costs if
Out operating responsibility to efficiency through the bidding process is not
private companies through bidding process; public competitive, especially with
competitively-bid contracts authority still able to specify a lack of qualified bidders;
service quality and levels to contractor may not focus on
meet societal objectives customers or "cut corners";
monitoring of private
company performance can
be costlyand difficult
Source: Salvucci et al. (1997)
Within the same region, different transit agencies and operating models can
sometimes be compatible. In Los Angeles and Washington DC, for example, publicly
operated multimodal systems provide most transit service but coexist with contracted out
suburban bus operations. A few multimodal transit agencies, such as Denver's RTD and
Boston's MBTA, operate some services with public employees and others with
contracted workers. From a customer's standpoint, these two models can work together
since the public authority retains control over schedules, routes, and fares.
Even within the same organization, however, integration can be difficult. In
general, different transit agencies and operating models within the same region can
further stymie coordination efforts. In the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, there
are over two-dozen transit providers ranging from the nation's eighth largest system to
mini-operations with just one or two routes. With divergent interests, agencies may not
always agree on service duplication, fare integration, and schedule coordination policies.
Widely different operating paradigms can further complicate matters in cities with
comprehensive bus and rail systems. In Miami and New York, for example, privately
operated jitney services categorized as "regulated competition" operate alongside busy
public bus corridors. Jitneys are hard to coordinate with rail, or for that matter with
regular buses and other jitneys, since they charge separate fares without transfer
privileges and do not adhere to fixed schedules. In fact, Miami's transit agency
experienced a public backlash when they allowed jitneys to replace some bus routes
when their rail system opened. (For more information on San Francisco and Miami,
please refer to the appendix.) Experience from other cities suggests that planners should
carefully weigh the organizational options for new rail systems in relation to pre-existing
transit systems. These early but critical decisions set the tone for other integration
policies.
3.3 Fare Coordination
Fare coordination is extremely important in a system that relies on transfers to
maximize the destination opportunities available to customers. Substantial literature
already exists regarding fare coordination, particularly in the areas of fare policy and fare
collection technology. With regard to intermodal fare integration, Barr (1995) developed
a framework for analyzing specific fare integration strategies. Rather than repeating
previous research, the work here briefly discusses how fare coordination policy may
influence network structure decisions and passenger willingness to accept service
changes in conjunction with a new rail line.
From an operator's standpoint, a rail system provides opportunities to reconfigure
the bus system. Although these changes can improve efficiency and network
effectiveness from a systemwide perspective, some trips may require an additional
transfer. In addition, new riders who begin or end their trips away from the rail corridor
may need to ride buses to access stations. The fare policy should encourage customers to
use the most efficient route(s) possible to reach their destinations, whether they are
travelling by bus, rail, or both.
Table 3-2: Transfer Policies for Major Intermodal Systems
City Rail Fare Bus Fare Same Transfer Policy
Operator?
Atlanta $1.50 $1.50 Yes Free transfer
Baltimore $1.35 $1.35 Yes No transfers; $3 day pass
Boston $.85+ $.60 Yes No transfers; $5 (visitor's) day pass
Buffalo $1.25 $1.25+ Yes Free transfer
Chicago $1.50 $1.50 Yes $.30 transfer; $5 (visitor's) day pass
Cleveland $1.50 $1.25 Yes Free transfer, or $4 day pass
Dallas $1.00 $1.00 Yes Free transfer, or $2 day pass
Denver $1.25 pk, $1.25 pk, Yes Free transfer, or $3 day pass
$.75 base $.75 base
Los Angeles $1.35 $1.35 Yes $.25 transfer
Miami $1.25 $1.25 Yes $.25 transfer
New York $1.50 $1.50 Yes Free transfer, or $4 day pass
Philadelphia $1.60 $1.60 Yes $.40 transfer, or $5 day pass
Pittsburgh $1.50+ peak $1.25+ Yes $.25 transfer
$1.25+ base
Portland $1.15+ $1.15+ Yes Free transfer, or $3.60 day pass
Sacramento $1.50 $1.50 Yes Free transfer, or $3.50 day pass
St. Louis $1.25 $1.25 Yes $.10 transfer, or $4 day pass
Salt Lake City $1.00 $1.00 Yes Free transfer, or $2 day pass
San Diego $1.00+ $1.75+ Yes Transfers cost the difference between rail and bus
fare, or $5 day pass
San Francisco $1 $1 No Free transfer (MUNI light rail to/from bus)
$1.10+ $1 $.50 transfer (BART to/from MUNI)
$1.10+ $1.35 $1.15 transfer (BART to/from AC Transit)
$1.10+ $1.10 No transfers (BART to/from SamTrans)
San Jose $1.25 $1.25 Yes No transfers; $3 day pass
San Juan - - No Undetermined
Washington $1.10+ $1.10 Yes $.25 rail-to-bus; no bus-to-rail transfers
Calgary $1.60 $1.60 Yes Free transfer, or $5 day pass
Edmonton $1.60 $1.60 Yes Free transfer, or $4.75 day pass
Montr6al $1.90 $1.90 Yes Free transfer
Toronto $2.00 $2.00 Yes Free transfer, or $7 day pass
Vancouver $1.50+ $1.50+ Yes Free transfer, or $6 day pass
Source: Agency web sites
Table 3-2 summarizes the intermodal fare policies of major North American
multimodal systems. The majority of transit operators offer free or heavily-discounted
transfers, unlimited-ride day passes, or a combination of both. In general, having a single
regional transit provider overseeing all modes greatly facilitates fare integration. A major
exception is Boston, where customers pay different bus and subway fares with no transfer
privileges. Although individual subway and bus fares are among the lowest in the United
States, the lack of transfers raises the price for intermodal trips and makes the rail and bus
systems appear independent.
Separate transit providers within a region often resist fare integration efforts
because of potential revenue loss. In the long run, such fare policies can encourage
inefficient and duplicative network structures that benefit neither party. Appendix A
describes such a situation in the San Francisco Bay Area. In this case, BART, the
regional heavy rail operator, and AC Transit, the bus system serving the area east of San
Francisco, provide only a nominal discount on a combined bus and rail fare. Meanwhile,
AC Transit's transbay commuter buses to San Francisco cost much less than intermodal
trips (Bay Area Transit Information website). This fare policy increases the demand for
duplicative service and encourages AC Transit to provide it. In fact, AC Transit's
Transbay Comprehensive Service Plan states that in the future, "the District may need to
initiate peak-hour bus service even in areas well-served by BART" (AC Transit, 1998).
To justify this policy, AC Transit cites BART's capacity constraints, but BART's internal
documents indicate that the agency is attempting to address this issue by increasing
system throughput (BART, 1999). While transbay customers benefit from additional
transportation choices, the opportunity cost of such decisions is high: in 1996, AC Transit
slashed owl, weekend, and evening buses in communities with no other transit
alternatives (Pimentel, 1999).
Even within a single intermodal agency, a lack of fare coordination can cause
problems. In Washington, DC, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) encountered opposition when it extended the Metro system to Anacostia, a
low-income neighborhood. Buses that used to run into the central business district were
truncated at the Anacostia station. Although riders received a substantial discount when
transferring from rail to bus, they paid two full fares in the opposite direction. Customers
were justifiably concerned with the financial impacts of transferring since they had paid a
single fare prior to the rail extension. To respond to these concerns and to avoid having
to restore duplicative bus service, WMATA management ultimately reduced fares by
about 40% on selected Anacostia bus routes, which in effect lowered the transfer fee
(Erion, 1998). In contrast, recent improvements in intermodal fare policies have resulted
in huge ridership increases. In July 1999, WMATA simplified bus fares and reduced rail-
to-bus transfers to $0.25. These transfers used to cost between $0.25 and $2.25 or simply
were not available, depending upon time of day, direction, and jurisdiction. These efforts
contributed to an immediate ten percent ridership jump (WMATA Press Release, Oct. 20,
1999). Appendix A provides additional background information and details.
New York City is perhaps the best North American example of how fare
coordination can boost ridership and increase customer convenience. Historically, New
York City Transit had offered free subway-to-subway and bus-to-bus transfers, but no
discounted intermodal transfers. This resulted in a de facto two-zone fare structure for
customers who rode both the bus and subway. In the 1990s, the transit authority
implemented an automated fare collection (AFC) system on all buses and rail stations
using the MetroCard, a magnetic swipe card. In July 1997, it introduced free transfers
between subways and buses, including buses operated by private carriers. It later
initiated bulk-ride discounts and unlimited-ride 1-day, 7-day, and 30-day rolling passes.
Between January 1997 and June 1999, New York experienced double digit
ridership increases mainly as a result of these fare incentives. Specifically, weekday
subway and bus ridership increased 12.5% and 40.8% respectively. Weekend ridership
also grew by 17.6% and 37.2%, indicating that the Metrocard has also encouraged off-
peak usage. By comparison, New York City employment rose 4.9% during this period.
While some of the growth can be attributed to a real fare decrease for intermodal trips,
fare elasticity only accounts for part of the increase. Today there are about 500,000
intermodal trips systemwide (many of which were already occurring before the fare
incentives), but weekday ridership on buses alone grew by about 600,000 trips between
June 1997 and June 1999 (Hirsch, 2000).
A follow-up study prepared by the transit authority, "The Effects of Fare
Incentives on MTA New York City Transit Ridership", argues that convenience and
flexibility of fare payment also helps explain the Metrocard's success. Growth has
resulted from "a reduction in the marginal cost of certain trips to zero, including induced
trips made by passengers holding unlimited-ride MetroCards [i.e. off-peak and non-work
trips] and feeder bus trips made by existing subway passengers using the new free
intermodal transfer." Introducing free intermodal transfers also appears "to have shifted
some passengers from a two-bus trip to a subway-bus" trip (Hirsch, 2000). In other
words, most customers now choose the most efficient and quickest path (i.e. often one
that involves the subway) rather than a slower all-bus trip that used to avoid a transfer
fee. Moreover, the significant increases in bus ridership (around 40%) suggest that fare
incentives did not merely shift customers from bus to rail, but actually induced more bus
usage. Metrocard has fueled an upward spiral of higher ridership and more service:
between 1997 and 1999, revenue seat miles increased 10% and 11% on buses and
subways respectively. The current number of peak buses is now 20% higher than in 1996
(Hirsch, 2000).
Of course, financial considerations limit an agency's ability to provide transfer
discounts. In New York's case, fare revenue decreased slightly (-3.7%) and the farebox
recovery ratio dropped about five percentage points (Tucker and Stuart, 2000).
Nevertheless, planners designing new rail systems should still consider a coordinated fare
policy. When a rail line opens, it is especially important to offer transfer discounts and
perhaps artificially low introductory fares to entice people to try the new system.
Particularly with a new rail line, mandates or external pressures to achieve a high cost
recovery ratio can result in cutting corners on service or maintenance and missed
ridership potential. This may lead to a downward spiral of higher fares, more service
reductions, and deferred maintenance, which ultimately makes it more difficult for transit
- both buses and new rail systems - to fulfill important social goals and compete with the
automobile.
Given the recent experiences in New York and Washington, DC, it seems
reasonable to conclude that simplifying and lowering the cost of intermodal (and
intramodal) transfers can attract new patrons to the system and encourage existing
customers to ride more frequently. By making vehicles look fuller, the large off-peak
ridership growth in New York's case may have also had the side impact of increasing
customer perceptions of security. This, in turn, encourages people to utilize transit not
only for commuting, but also for other activities and can reduce the need to own multiple
cars. As importantly, induced demand on bus routes that serve rail stations lessens the
pressure to build park-and-ride lots and permits better bus frequency, which also benefits
passengers on these routes who rely on buses exclusively.
3.4 Network Structure
A new rail line presents many opportunities to modify bus routes in order to avoid
service duplication, expand into new areas, etc. For simplicity, the analysis of bus
integration proposals often focuses on individual route impacts. This section, however,
considers the effects of bus restructuring efforts on the entire network and evaluates
strategies for their implementation.
3.4.1 Background Information
It seems fairly self-evident that a route network is a primary factor in determining
which travel patterns transit can serve effectively. A new rail line and other significant
transit investments may provide opportunities not only to directly boost "choice"
ridership, but also to redesign the existing bus network to make it more responsive to
diverse travel needs. Many transit systems, particularly in older metropolitan areas,
historically evolved to serve radial travel patterns between central business districts and
outlying neighborhoods and suburbs. Clearly, a strong downtown and a compact urban
environment are most conducive to effective transit services and foster a symbiotic
relationship between frequent service and high ridership. In contrast, transit has a much
more difficult time competing with the automobile in the suburbs, particularly for suburb-
to-suburb trips. Abundant free parking, high car ownership, higher incomes, automobile-
oriented land uses, and other factors discourage transit usage. Table 3-3 illustrates this
point by breaking down public transport's mode share for work trips in the United States
by home and work locations. While transit captures approximately 14% of trips within
the central city and 6% between suburbs and the city, it performs poorly in the suburb-to-
suburb market with just a 2% mode share.
Table 3-3: Public Transport Mode Share in the United States (1990)
Location Work in Central City Work in Suburbs
Live in Central City 14% 6%
Live in Suburbs 6% 2%
Source: Pisarski (1996).
At the same time, transit's most competitive market (commuting within the
central city) no longer dominates. Table 3-4 shows that suburb-to-suburb commuting
comprises almost 44% of work trips in the United States, eclipsing all other categories.
Although some cities have rebounded in recent years, decentralized and low-density
development trends remain strong. Table 3-5, which breaks down the total commuting
growth between 1980 and 1990 by home and work locations, shows a clear
suburbanization trend. Over this period, the American workforce increased by about 18.5
million. Of this total, suburb-to-suburb travel captured 58% of this growth while travel
within central cities captured just 10%. The traditional suburb-to-city and reverse-
commute had a healthy share of this growth given their size, however, indicating
potential opportunities for transit.
Table 3-4: Basic Metropolitan Commuter Flows in the United States (1990)
Location Work in Central City Work in Suburbs Total
Live in Central City 24,330,000 (30.1%) 5,970,000 (7.4%) 30,300,000
Live in Suburbs 15,260,000 (18.9%) 35,350,000 (43.7%) 50,610,000
Total 39,590,000 41,320,000 80,910,000
Note: Numbers include those commuters who work within the metropolitan area where
they live.
Source: Pisarski (1996).
Table 3-5: Share of the Increase of Metropolitan Commuter Flows (1980-1990)
Location Work in Central City Work in Suburbs
Live in Central City 10% 12%
Live in Suburbs 20% 58%
Note: Between 1980 and 1990, the number of American workers grew by 18.5 million,
from 96.6 million to 115.1 million.
Source: Pisarski (1996).
It is important to note that Tables 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5 focus on commuting patterns
only, not on non-work travel where transit is generally even less competitive. The tables
also show aggregate data for the entire United States, but figures can vary greatly by
geographical location. Older East Coast cities with extensive transit networks and
relatively strong central business districts, for example, generally have much higher
transit mode shares than Sunbelt cities that boomed after the Second World War. Since
many new rail systems serve predominantly automobile-oriented cities such as Dallas,
Denver, Los Angeles, San Diego, Salt Lake City, Sacramento, Atlanta, and San Jose,
examining cost-effective ways to adapt intermodal networks to low-density environments
is relevant and worth considering (even if a long-term objective is to foster "transit-
oriented" development).
For reasons discussed earlier, however, transit almost inevitably performs worse
in low-density areas than in concentrated urban centers. With limited resources, the
opportunity costs of capturing new markets can be high. For example, expansion in
suburban areas may come at the expense of cities where the additional resources would
likely produce higher returns in terms of ridership and cost-effectiveness. Service
dilution in urban areas can make cities less attractive places to live, which may ultimately
encourage further suburbanization.
Nevertheless, rudimentary transit service already exists in many low-density areas
of North American metropolitan regions, but is often underutilized. In larger cities,
service may consist of local and commuter express buses to and from the central business
district and community shuttles. Many of the recently-built rail lines penetrate such areas
as they radiate outward from the central business district. This suggests that a new rail
investment may provide opportunities to reallocate bus resources and/or boost bus service
to meet induced rail feeder demand to improve system utilization. Consequently, the
intermodal network may be able to serve existing or untapped travel markets better.
Section 3.4.3 discusses these concepts in more detail.
Reverse commuting to suburban office parks or "edge cities" is a specific
example of a potential niche market. Abundant parking, circuitous street layout, good
highway access and other impediments make it hard for transit to compete with
automobiles. Running frequent, direct express buses from a single employment center to
points throughout the metropolitan area is unlikely to be either cost-effective or
productive because of low demand densities. However, if an employment site is located
near a rail station, it may be possible to operate a bus shuttle that connects with rail
service. Since the shuttle operates short distances, schedule reliability would be generally
easier to control and it would require relatively few resources to offer reasonable service
levels (compared to a long route).
Realistically, these efforts will not produce huge mode share gains for transit
without fundamental changes in land use and automobile pricing policies. Portland,
Oregon, demonstrates that they can make an impact, however. When light rail was
extended to the western suburbs, the transit agency used these concepts to convert a
primarily radial bus network with a heavy commuter express emphasis into one focused
around key rail stations. As a result of these changes, transit's mode share of afternoon
peak-direction trips rose from 13% to 20% along the corridor; even more impressively,
the afternoon reverse-commute transit usage more than tripled from 4% to 14% (Tri-Met
and ODOT, 1999). Appendix A describes Portland's experience in more detail.
3.4.2 A Priori Considerations
As discussed in section 3.4.1, a new rail line gives transit agencies an opportunity
to redesign bus services to create an intermodal network that meets existing ridership and
anticipated demand. In terms of service reallocation, a common question that arises is
whether to retain or discontinue a bus line that parallels the rail alignment. In Appendix
B, a mathematical model is developed to analyze this situation. This model incorporates
cycle time, headways, service reliability, passenger loads, and other factors that can
influence such a decision. Its basic premise (and limitation) is that the decisions about
route changes can primarily be reduced to operational and financial impacts.
The results of the model suggest that it may make sense to truncate or reduce
parallel service under one or more of the following conditions:
(1) Load factors/capacity are much higher for the train than the bus. This seems fairly
self-evident given the technological differences between the two modes.
(2) The difference in cycle times for the pre- and post- rail bus route is large, especially
relative to the cycle time for the train. Longer-distance buses also tend to have poorer
reliability, especially compared to the train. Clearly, bus routes that duplicate rail
services for a long distance are better candidates for truncation than those that do not.
This assumes a demand profile for the train where most people are travelling to the
central business district; an agency could short-turn trains to better match capacity
with the load profile.
(3) A small number of people would have to transfer from bus to rail.
(4) The marginal cost to run a train is relatively low per passenger, and the marginal cost
to run a bus is relatively high.
While the model presented in Appendix B offers some help, it cannot address
many aspects of this complex choice. For example, it does not model the larger network
impacts of route design policy or the distinction between commuter-oriented and regular
buses. It also does not handle some of the political subtleties that surround these
decisions; for instance, the low marginal costs of operating rail service relative to its high
infrastructure costs may encourage agencies to maximize rail usage and level-of-service.
In contrast, the presence of separate bus and rail operators can result in duplicative bus
service even when it is slower, less efficient, or less reliable. This and the following
sections supplement Appendix B by providing a more comprehensive analysis to assist in
decision-making. Namely, they discuss the relationships among network structure,
transfers, schedule coordination, and service planning.
3.4.3 Basic Network Structures
Prior to the introduction of a new rail line, a transit system may offer one or a
combination of several basic network structures. These networks are a function of road
network geometry, the location and relative strengths of the central business district and
secondary activity centers, employment and residential densities, and other variables.
Some common networks include:
" Grid - As the name implies, this network looks like a grid with two sets of parallel
routes intersecting at right angles. Grid networks serve a variety of travel patterns
either directly or with a single transfer. Since it is mathematically impossible to time
connections at all interchange points, a grid network functions most effectively when
routes run on short headways.
" Radial - This network features sets of routes that radiate from the central business
district (CBD). Since it offers direct, one-seat rides for CBD trips, it works well with
a strong urban core relative to peripheral activity centers. Depending on the extent of
bi-directional service, this network can also facilitate reverse-commuting. However,
suburb-to-suburb trips are often inconvenient if they involve circuitous routing
through the CBD.
" Modified Radial - In a modified radial network, crosstown and circumferential routes
supplement radial trunk lines. They support some suburb-to-suburb and non-CBD
intraurban trips as well as radial travel. The level of service provided on both radial
and crosstown lines usually declines as distance from the CBD increases. This
network is most effective in central areas where shorter headways reduce transfer
time.
* Nodal - In a nodal network, routes converge at hubs (often called "transit centers")
located at major activity centers. These resemble radial networks, but on a much
smaller scale. They serve many origin-destination patterns within a local area
without a lengthy diversion through the CBD. At these hubs, it is possible to
coordinate arrivals and departures to minimize transfer time. Physical facilities at
transit centers are usually more amenable to transfers, compared to grid or radial
networks where passengers switch vehicles at street intersections.
Transit services can also be classified by stopping patterns. In addition to basic
local bus service that makes frequent stops, larger cities often include limited-stop and
express buses to speed travel along busy corridors. A limited stop route overlaps a
corresponding local route, but only stops at major intersections and transfer points.
Express buses usually connect residential neighborhoods and/or park-and-ride lots with
downtown employment centers, by running non-stop along highways. In a few instances,
some agencies are also beginning to identify niche markets where they can successfully
implement suburb-to-suburb express service.
These network classifications provide a natural framework for assessing the
service and operational impacts of opening a new rail line. This analysis first focuses on
the simple case of integrating rail with local buses and then investigates the more
complex situation of parallel express buses.
3.4.4 Rail impacts on local buses
In a network with local buses - whether grid, radial, modified radial, or nodal - a
new rail line will typically parallel an existing bus route. Since the two services
physically overlap, the issue of reducing or possibly eliminating bus service arises. While
buses and rail may operate in the same corridor, however, they may actually serve
different markets and thus it may not make sense to eliminate the bus route. (For
simplification, this analysis ignores the fact that riders may prefer one mode over the
other for vehicle comfort, image, or other reasons.) Compared to buses, trains make
fewer stops, travel on their own right-of-way, and can carry larger loads per operator.
Thus, rail serves as a high-capacity, longer distance mode. In contrast, parallel bus routes
better handle local and intermediate travel - trips that begin or end beyond easy walking
distance from a rail station. The rail system will likely draw some passengers away from
buses, particularly people who travel longer distances. Thus, it will usually make sense
to adjust the level-of-service on parallel bus routes to reflect lower demand.
The question then becomes one of whether bus and rail serve similar enough
markets to warrant discontinuation of the bus route. Given these considerations, rail
station spacing is perhaps the most important factor in this analysis. Clearly, the market
distinction between bus and rail services diminishes as the distance between rail stations
drops. What is the distance threshold at which parallel bus service becomes appropriate?
Of course, this depends upon land uses, climate, sidewalk availability and quality, as well
as other factors. Empirical evidence supports the self-evident hypothesis that the
inclination to use rail declines as the walking distance from a station increases. Figure
3-1 summarizes previous research findings on this topic.
Figure 3-1: Station Access Behavior
Source: Bernick and Cervero, 1997
Beyond a station-spacing of about 1/2 mile, bus transit is generally needed to
access rail and, presumably, to fill in the service gaps between stations. "Most people"
are willing to walk about 2,000 feet, or 3/8 mile, from transit to work (Bernick and
Cervero, 1997). In a one-dimensional linear corridor, it appears that station spacing of
somewhere between 3/4 and 1 mile, or twice the "maximum" walking distance to either
station, could theoretically serve all demand. In practice, however, transit corridors are
two-dimensional which effectively reduces this distance because people from side streets
must walk further.
Table 3-6: Parallel bus service in selected North American rail corridors
City Rail Corridor Approximate Approach
Station Spacing
Boston Mass Ave. (Red Line) 1 mile Parallel local buses
Buffalo Main St. to 1 mile Parallel local buses
Chicago Milwaukee Av. /4 mile Parallel local buses
(Blue Line)
Los Angeles Vermont Av. 1 mile Parallel local and limited stop buses
(Red Line)
Wilshire Blvd. 1/2 to 1 mile Parallel local buses (discontinued
(Red Line) limited stop buses)
LA-Long Beach 1 mile Parallel local buses (discontinued
(Blue Line) freeway express buses)
Philadelphia Broad St. 1/2 mile Parallel local buses
(Orange Line)
Portland Burnside St. to 1% miles Parallel local buses on streets about
_ mile to either side of rail alignment
San Francisco Mission St. 1 to 1/2 miles Parallel local, limited, and peak-hour
(BART) _express buses
San Jose First St. mile No parallel buses except in
downtown area
Toronto Yonge St. % to 1 miles Full-time parallel buses along portion
of route with distant station spacing,
peak-hour and overnight buses along
entire route
Bloor-Danforth Sts. % to mile No parallel buses except for
overnight hours
Source: Transit agency system maps
Table 3-6 illustrates how a handful of North American transit agencies handle the
question of whether or not to offer local bus service that parallels a rail line. In general,
agencies tend to operate parallel bus service when the distance between rail stations
exceeds mile. (In fact, few of the systems surveyed had rail station spacings less than
the mile threshold for operational and construction cost reasons.) At that point,
destinations directly along the rail line are within about a five-minute walk, or mile, of
a station. This suggests that agencies should strongly consider retaining some parallel
bus service to address local needs when rail stations are more than a mile apart. This
parallel service does not necessarily have to be on the same street as the rail line, but
should be within close proximity.
A new rail line will also impact other local buses beyond those along the same
corridor. In a radial or modified radial network, it may be prudent to split long radial
routes under certain circumstances. In this situation, the inner portion would retain direct
service to the CBD while the outer portion would be rerouted to the rail system. Since
this strategy introduces transfers for outlying riders, it would be advisable only if it
produces tangible benefits such as:
(1) customers would enjoy faster trips on rail, despite the transfer
(2) the split would "balance" loads on the inner and outer portions of the route
(3) it would increase bus service reliability, as cycle times decrease with shorter routes
As a variation of this strategy, radial routes could be rerouted to, but not truncated at, rail
stations. Faster rail travel times would still encourage CBD-bound travelers to transfer,
but intermediate traffic would not be inconvenienced.
In a grid network, rail might alter the overall route structure very little. With the
exception of a few parallel lines immediately adjacent to the rail line, bus routes can
continue providing broad coverage. Transfer traffic from rail will help support
intersecting parallel routes. This in turn may lead to shorter headways, increasing the
grid's effectiveness. Customers will also benefit from fast, frequent line-haul rail service.
Depending on the city's geography, it may be possible to switch from a pure grid to a
grid and nodal combination that focuses buses on key rail stations. Since a grid system
already relies on transfers, the new rail line is not likely to "force" new transfers on
passengers.
In a nodal network, integrating buses with a new rail line is relatively simple if
rail stations are located at or near existing bus hubs. Since passengers are already
accustomed to switching buses to reach their destination, transferring between buses and
rail is usually not a significant change. In Portland and other cities, transit agencies
relocated or established timed transfer centers adjacent to suburban light rail stations
several years prior to rail service (see Appendix A). Not only did this prepare the public
for intermodal transfers, but made the system more responsive and also improved the bus
system in the interim. The nodal network is also consistent with the vision of rapid
transit and a polycentric urban form described in Section 3.4.5. In this paradigm, key rail
stations become bus transit centers surrounded by clustered development. At these
centers, it is also possible to coordinate schedules between buses and trains so customers
can transfer with minimal additional waiting time. To make these connections reliable,
an agency may have to develop real-time holding strategies for delayed trains.
Thus, introducing a new rail line into a local network of buses is relatively
straightforward. In grid and nodal networks, many bus routes can remain intact.
Passengers who can use the rail line benefit from a higher level-of-service; meanwhile,
service changes will not disrupt non-rail travel patterns. In radial and modified radial
networks, customers on the outer portions of local radial bus lines may have to transfer,
but the train's faster and more reliable service can mitigate this inconvenience,
particularly with coordinated schedules.
3.4.5 Rail impacts on express buses
When radial express buses parallel a rail line, however, the transition may be
more difficult. Express buses usually offer a direct peak-period ride from the home or a
nearby park-and-ride lot to downtown without intermediate stops. Since express buses
use taxpayer-supported highways, they are also an inexpensive way to extend high-speed
transit service to the suburbs. Due to these characteristics, they often attract "choice"
riders who live in the suburbs and work in the city. If a transit agency were to truncate
the line at the nearest rail station, sometimes the added transfer time can be greater than
train travel time savings. These observations seem to suggest that a transit agency should
retain parallel express buses since they offer a premium level-of-service. Furthermore,
modifying these services may be politically unpalatable and may look like a way to
artificially boost rail ridership. For these reasons, many rail skeptics criticize transit
agencies for converting express bus routes into rail feeders.
Of course, converting express buses into rail feeders may not always negatively
affect riders. While most transit agencies charge premium fares on express buses, they
usually offer comparable local bus and rail fares with intermodal transfer discounts (see
Table 3-2). Thus, a combination local bus and rail trip fare is often lower than the express
bus fare although this would not apply to the few intermodal systems using zonal fare
structures (e.g. Pittsburgh and Portland). In addition, service reliability may improve if
buses no longer have to fight traffic on congested roadways leading into the central
business district.
Figure 3-2: A Schematic Radial Express Bus Network
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Source: Vuchic (1981)
By focusing strictly on avoiding transfers, however, other important issues such
as network connectivity, frequency, and service efficiency may be overlooked. Radial
express buses usually serve only the peak-period downtown-bound suburban commuter
effectively. They do not facilitate multiple trip patterns even though they can consume a
disproportionately large amount of operating resources. Figure 3-2 illustrates how
commuter buses along a generic corridor struggle to accommodate even a limited number
of transit patterns. Direct service between m neighborhoods and n distinct CBD
destinations requires mn individual routes. The mn routes typically cannot support short
headways since no passenger or trip consolidation occurs and the demand between any
particular neighborhood and the core destination is likely to be low. Ridership on
individual routes is further limited because there are few if any intermediate stops along
the trunk section, which is usually a highway. Express routes seldom operate during the
off-peak when demand is much lower. In addition, express routes generally do not serve
local needs well even though they originate in residential neighborhoods because of their
radial orientation and limited schedules. Thus, a transit agency may also need to operate
a redundant basic local bus network to enhance overall mobility.
Busways and HOV highway lanes that may exist in a potential rail corridor tend
to encourage this network structure. Pittsburgh's two busways, for example, resemble
trees with about twenty branches each. Although busway service itself is frequent (but
uncoordinated), peak-hour headways on individual routes can exceed 45 minutes. During
the off-peak, buses commonly run every 1 to 2 hours, it at all. This level of service
attracts few customers. Frequencies are relatively poor because the network is not
designed to serve multiple trip patterns. Even simple non-CBD travel can be difficult.
For example, customers often cannot travel between two adjacent neigbohorhoods on
opposite sides of the busway without transferring between infrequent routes. With
dozens of long suburb-to-CBD expresses and no trunk-line consolidation, Pittsburgh
devotes so many resources to support this network that it only offers limited "general
mobility" routes in the busway catchment area (Port Authority Transit website).
Houston's HOV/Transitway system, one of North America's most extensive
commuter bus networks, represents a variation on the same theme. METRO Transit's
express buses run on reversible HOV highway lanes, linking peripheral park-and-ride lots
and downtown Houston primarily during rush hours in the peak direction. Local and
express buses capture approximately thirty percent of all downtown work trips, a
spectacular figure given Houston's sprawl and well-developed highway system. Despite
the transitway's large capital cost, however, its physical design inhibits network
connectivity since there are no intermediate stations or even reverse-peak lanes.
Transitway routes bypass urban communities and major "edge cities", miss many
reverse-commute and off-peak ridership opportunities, and connect to few local routes
outside downtown. One of Metro's documents, the summary of the Downtown-to-
Astrodome (rail project) Major Investment Study, indirectly assesses the shortcomings of
the HOV/Transitway system in the context of Houston's development patterns:
"The transportation program of the future will need not only to provide increased
capacity, but to add new dimensions: bi-directional service will be needed in key
corridors, to address the increase in work destinations in the suburban areas...
METRO will need to provide for these 'reverse direction' trips, as well as suburb-
to-suburb travel, circulation within multiple activity centers, and expansion of
non-traditional service. At the same time, it is essential to preserve and strengthen
the vital core of the region through timely [bus and rail] transit investment."
(Metro, 1999)
A report on "Transit and Urban Form" (TCRP Report 16, 1996) characterizes
transit in Houston as two distinct bus systems - local and express. The demographic
differences between them are striking: only a quarter of local bus patrons are "choice"
riders, while more than ninety percent of express customers have cars and indeed drive to
park-and-ride lots. Few transfers occur between them and express buses capture just 8%
of total unlinked bus ridership (TCRP Report 16, 1996). This is a lower percentage than
for "comparable" new rail systems with far less geographical coverage, although this
issue involves network structure more than vehicle technology. Clearly, infrequent or
nonexistent off-peak and reverse-commute service as well as a lack of system
connectivity discourages ridership. In short, while Houston's commuter bus network has
attracted choice riders, it is very limited in scope and has not integrated well with the rest
of the transit system.
Figure 3-3: A Schematic Transit Network with Connectivity
Source: Vuchic (1981)
Opening a rail line along a corridor previously served by express buses presents
opportunities to improve system connectivity, frequency, and reliability. Specifically,
converting expresses to rail feeders that also serve local needs can benefit both the
customer and the transit operator. Figure 3-3 illustrates this strategy. In contrast to
Figure 3-2, it shows a network of local bus routes that connects with a high-speed, high-
frequency rail trunk line with intermediate stops. There are fewer, shorter bus routes,
each of which supports multiple travel patterns (shopping, school, reverse-commuting,
not just commuter traffic). Thus, they can operate more frequently with longer service
hours. Schedules are also more reliable since buses do not have to travel all the way into
the city. Of course, this strategy may result in the loss of some former express riders
who no longer enjoy specialized service; however, this general network has the potential
to increase ridership much more because it serves diverse travel patterns while still
facilitating the suburb-to-downtown commute. In the suburbs, where demand usually
does not warrant short bus headways, the transfer points can become timed-transfer
locations that facilitate suburb-to-suburb travel that would otherwise be served
ineffectively. Over the long run, these transfer points have the potential to encourage
more concentrated development.
Figure 3-4: Network Connectivity and Supportive Urban Form in Vancouver
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Source: TCRP Report 16, "Transit And Urban Form", 1996
Figure 3-4 illustrates such a network structure in Vancouver, British Columbia.
Four of Greater Vancouver's seven major regional centers, which feature a concentration
of employment, shopping and other land uses, are linked by the high frequency SkyTrain
rapid rail system. The SeaBus ferry connects SkyTrain and Downtown Vancouver with
another node in North Vancouver. All of the regional centers, including those not
adjacent to SkyTrain or SeaBus, also serve as major bus terminals. Trains and buses
converge and exchange passengers at these hubs. This route structure, coupled with
clustered development around major rail stations and a ban on highways within the city
of Vancouver, has resulted in a higher transit mode share than in similar U.S. cities.
Realistically, over the short term, it is unlikely that new rail systems will develop
an urban structure that supports network connectivity to the extent found in Vancouver.
However, implementing a "general" network in conjunction with a new rail line can help
transit serve markets that standard radial bus systems have difficulty accommodating. In
terms of cost effectiveness, new local bus routes may actually be less productive than the
radial express routes they replaced. However, radial express routes and local routes
clearly have different characteristics. A radial express route charges a higher fare and
operates only during peak-hours when transit in general is more heavily utilized, while a
truncated local line charges a base fare and runs during times with lower vehicle loads.
Similarly, overall system productivity may decrease because the rail line also operates
longer service hours.
Nevertheless, this restructuring strategy may still improve operating efficiency.
Despite their low service levels and limited coverage, radial express bus routes require a
disproportionately high number of vehicles and deadhead hours per trip operated because
of their long cycle times and limited service hours. Since buses travel long distances
along congested streets and highways, drivers often can only complete one or two peak-
period trips. Depending on the transit agency work rules and the availability of part-time
workers, these peak-hour runs can result in expensive driver spread penalties and make-
up time. Thus, a transit agency can lower peak equipment requirements and reduce
expenses for the bus fleet by converting an equivalent number of peak service hours to
off-peak service hours. In turn, more midday, evening, and weekend service can help
build more discretionary ridership.
In Portland, the opening of an 18-mile light rail extension resulted in significant
performance and operational changes for buses. The bus network now emphasizes route
connectivity and supports multiple travel patterns during both peak and off-peak periods
rather than direct, but infrequent express routes. Despite some major frequency and
coverage increases, weekday revenue hours did not increase significantly because buses
were reallocated from radial to local routes. Weekend revenue hours grew substantially,
in contrast. Discontinuing express lines also freed a disproportionately large number of
buses for redistribution during the peak and decreased the substantial deadheading
associated with these lines. The peak vehicle requirement actually decreased, while the
base vehicle requirement increased. This relieved pressure on the bus system during the
busiest periods, utilizes the fleet better throughout the day, and potentially reduces driver
spread penalties. As mentioned previously, this effort resulted in large increases in peak
and reverse-peak modal splits.
Washington, DC demonstrates how a rail system can successfully interface with a
busway to offer customers the advantages of both bus and rail modes. Commuter buses
from the Virginia suburbs traverse the Shirley Busway, two reversible high-occupancy
vehicle/bus lanes in the median of the Interstate 395, on their way towards Washington.
Instead of continuing into the city, however, buses terminate at the Pentagon just across
the river. From there passengers can connect to the subway to reach employment centers
in Virginia and the District of Columbia. Although this arrangement requires transfers, it
has expanded destination opportunities for customers, improved operating efficiency, and
allows more resources to be focused on local bus service. The Shirley Busway services
allow passengers in suburban neighborhoods to reach the subway quickly; from there, the
subway acts as a circulator around the sprawling central business district and peripheral
suburban centers. If the Shirley Busway services were to continue directly into
Washington, additional peak-hour bus resources would be required just to maintain
existing headways, and many customers would still have to transfer to reach peripheral
destinations. Please refer to Appendix A for details about the Portland and Washington
cases.
Other empirical evidence from throughout the United States supports the same
theory: intermodal networks that rely on transfers can serve more travel patterns (and
potentially many more passengers) than express buses alone. In fact, it is worth noting
that cities with large transit mode shares - New York, Toronto, Montreal, Chicago,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington, and Boston - rely on network connectivity
rather than route directness. In New York, for example, express buses carry around
40,000 weekday riders, just 2% of all bus boardings and 0.8% of the city's five million
unlinked system trips. These express buses run primarily between Manhattan and Staten
Island, the most remote borough without a link to the subway. In contrast, there are
approximately million bus-bus and million bus-subway transfers, as well as many
uncounted subway-subway transfers (Hirsch et al, 2000). High frequency bus and
subway lines that allow passengers to reach anywhere in the city with just one or two
transfers contribute to the system's success. Section 3.3 describes how ridership
skyrocketed after transfers became more convenient with the elimination of intermodal
transfer charges and introduction of unlimited-ride passes.
In short, transfers are often a crucial component of the bus-rail integration
strategy. An effective system that serves multiple travel patterns must emphasize the
connectivity between routes and modes, not merely directness. Furthermore, transfers
are not the only level-of-service variable that influences mode choice. Since the
introduction of transfers may permit bus route consolidation, service frequency can
increase on individual routes with the same financial resources. In turn, better frequency
can boost ridership. Recalling the positive experience of the implementation of a timed-
transfer network in Norfolk, Virginia, Becker and Spielberg (1998) argue:
"It is axiomatic in our [the transit] industry that transfers are bad. [Norfolk]'s
experience suggests that it is bad transfers that are bad. Well-designed timed
transfers benefit transit customers. Because travel is dispersed, there is, in fact,
no other practical way for a fixed route transit service to handle the dispersed
patterns of travel in today's multicentered metropolitan areas. The transit industry
needs to rethink service development from route design to network design with a
focus on reducing the negative perceptions of transfers."
In other words, the question (at least in the long term) should not necessarily be
whether to eliminate transfers altogether, but rather how to make transfers as convenient
as possible. When opening a new rail line, it is especially important to make the
transition period easy for customers who may have to transfer.
3.5 Transfers and Schedule Coordination (Tactical)
From the above discussion, the introduction of a transfer represents the most
visible negative impact of bus-rail integration. As with any transportation system, the
interchange points are often a greater source of problems than the links themselves.
Multiple transit operators, fare surcharges, uncoordinated schedules, unreliable running
times, and uncomfortable waiting conditions can all exacerbate this "transfer penalty."
Clearly, minimizing the inconvenience of transfers can help make an intermodal system
more attractive.
In a study on transfer penalties in the Boston metropolitan area (CTPS, 1997),
researchers identify the waiting time at the transfer point as a critical deterrent to transit
usage for home-based work trip making. Specifically, the study concluded that for the
Boston region, (1) the transfer penalty is worth several minutes of equivalent in-vehicle
time, (2) transfer waiting time is more onerous than initial waiting time, and (3) transfer
waiting time is over twice as onerous as in-vehicle time. Since Boston has unique
geography and a large transit ridership base, the study does not attempt to draw general
conclusions applicable to other cities. However, it does suggest that the transfer penalty
might be even higher in places where transit enjoys less of a competitive advantage than
Boston.
Liu et al. (1997, 1998) employ both a stated preference and simulation model to
determine a generic value for the transfer penalty. In their stated preference study, they
found that the penalty for an automobile-to-rail transfer (i.e. park & ride) is worth
approximately 15 minutes of travel time, 5 minutes for a rail-to-rail transfer, and about 8
minutes averaged for all transfer types (Liu et al, 1997). In the simulation study, they
use a binary logit mode-choice model to quantify the differences in transit mode shares
with and without transfers. In their analysis, adding a single rail-to-rail transfer only
slightly decreased transit mode share (by less than half a percentage point). In contrast,
adding an automobile-to-rail transfer (i.e. a trip where patrons had to drive instead of
walk to stations) decreased transit mode share from 12% to 6%. The difference between
the two situations, they hypothesize, is due to the fact that a park & ride trip is a mode
change that requires extra time to find a parking space, to walk from the parking space to
the station entrance, and perhaps to purchase a new ticket. In contrast, rail-to-rail
transfers can occur within a sheltered station environment, in many cases across a
platform.
Despite these perhaps negative findings about transfer penalties, Liu et al (1998)
suggest alternative strategies rather than abandoning transfers altogether in order to avoid
disrupting network structures. Specifically, they call for limiting the number of transfer
points through the "extremely judicious planning and placement of intermodal transfer
facilities within transit networks." The other approach they suggest is to make transfers
more pleasant through coordinating route schedules, increasing service frequency,
minimizing walking distances at transfer points, and improving schedule reliability. They
further suggest that intermodal transfer facilities may actually be positive because they
can potentially accommodate trip-chaining and promote urban development (i.e. with on-
site commercial activities.)
Given the previous discussion, it is safe to assume that at least some transferring
will be necessary in any intermodal network or, for that matter, any transit system with
intersecting routes. Clearly, an agency should focus on making transfers as convenient as
possible, mainly by decreasing transfer waiting time. (Offering safe, sheltered waiting
facilities at intermodal transfer points can also reduce the negative impacts of
transferring.) Transfer waiting time is a function of the headways of the passenger's
initial and connecting vehicles. Tables 3-7 and 3-8 are matrices of transfer wait times
broken down into four cases, which are based on the headways (short or long) of the
initial and connecting routes. Table 3-7 identifies issues from the passenger's perspective
while Table 3-8 highlights operational issues. While the distinction between "short" and
"long" headways is admittedly vague, in general new rail systems operate on "short"
headways (every 15 minutes or less during base periods and even better during the peak).
Headways on intersecting bus routes vary based on demand levels, but typically outlying
routes have longer headways (30 to 60 minutes is not uncommon) than ones in the urban
core.
Table 3-7: Transfers Issues from a Passenger's Perspective
From\To Short Headway on Connecting Vehicle Long Headway on Connecting Vehicle
Short Headway Short and convenient Can be convenient if passenger
On Initial Vehicle schedules trip properly and the schedule
is reliable
Large waiting penalty for missed
connections
Long Headway Short and convenient Generally inconvenient, except for timed
On Initial Vehicle transfers at key locations; not common
for intermodal transfers due to high rail
frequency
Table 3-8: Transfer Issues from Operator's Standpoint
From\To Short Headway on Connecting Vehicle Long Headway on Connecting Vehicle
Short Headway Inconsistent headways or headway Possible overcrowding on short
On Initial Vehicle multiples can cause uneven loading headway route if many long headway
and/or overcrowding, leading to vehicle routes leave simultaneously from a
bunching common transfer point
Long Headway Possible overcrowding on short Difficult to coordinate
On Initial Vehicle headway route if many long headway Possible Timed Transfer Connections if
routes have simultaneous arrivals at routes operate on consistent headway
common transfer point multiples
Source: Tables adopted from Vuchic and Musso (1992)
Case I: Short Headway to Short Headway
Case II: Long Headway to Short Headway
Cases I and II address the situation where passengers transfer to a short headway
route. In an intermodal network with high-frequency rail service, the bus-to-rail transfer
would fall under these categories. Case I would also include the rail-to-bus transfer if the
connecting bus runs on a short headway. From the passenger's perspective, switching
vehicles should be relatively convenient because expected waiting times are small for the
connecting route.
On short headway routes, passengers are more likely to arrive randomly to wait
for their vehicle than to depend upon schedules. The expected waiting time, assuming a
random and independent passenger arrival process, is given by the equation
h var(h)WT=-1+-
where WT = mean waiting time, h = mean headway
"Bunching" (i.e. irregular headways) creates service gaps followed by closely
spaced vehicle arrivals. Assuming that passengers arrive independently and randomly,
the chances are higher that people will arrive during the service gap (and wait longer)
than during the time when vehicles are close together. Thus, expected waiting time is a
function not only of the mean headway, but also the variance of the headway. Even
though short headways on a connecting route theoretically should be convenient for the
passenger, good operations control is clearly necessary to minimize transfer times.
If headways are inconsistent on the initial vehicle and a large number of
intermodal transfers take place at a specific interchange point, uneven loading can
quickly occur on the connecting vehicle. In the rail-to-bus direction, passenger
fluctuations at the transfer point can lead to bus bunching down the line, deterioration in
service quality and increases in average waiting time. In the other direction, trains have
an easier time absorbing passenger surges due to their greater capacity. However, they
are not immune from similar loading problems and consequently train bunching
(although headways are constrained by the minimum safe stopping distance). During
peak times, it makes sense to spread bus arrivals at rail stations evenly to avoid
overwhelming specific trains.
Case III: Short Headway to Long Headway
Of the four cases, transferring from a short headway route to a long headway
route presents the most opportunities for active intervention, both during the planning
phase and during operations. This typifies many rail-to-bus transfer situations in
multimodal systems, where trains usually run frequently at all times of the day but buses
(especially in suburban areas) may run only once an hour. It also generally arises when
low-frequency commuter-oriented express buses are converted to rail feeders. The
expected transfer time is given by the equation
7T (pmake)(t,,,f, ) + (1 - pmake)( headway)
where 7T = expected transfer time
pmake = probability that a passenger makes a connection
ttranfer = scheduled transfer time
headway = mean headway of connecting vehicle
For simplification, this equation assumes that
(1) passengers can always board the first available vehicle
(2) neither the originating nor connecting vehicle leaves early
(3) passengers board the originating vehicle that most conveniently "connects" with the
second vehicle
(4) pmake and t-anfer incorporate the time it takes physically to move from one vehicle to
another
(5) The second vehicle is on time
Note that the expected transfer time may overestimate a passenger's expected
waiting time at the transfer location should the originating vehicle arrive late. Clearly, a
transit agency should aim to minimize the expected transfer time to reduce passenger
inconvenience. Short of reducing headways on the low frequency route, this equation
suggests two approaches:
(a) reduce the scheduled transfer time
(b) increase the probability that passengers make their connection
This equation suggests that customers weigh waiting times uniformly, regardless
of whether or not they make or miss a connection. However, passengers may become
more agitated if they miss their connection and have to wait for the next vehicle,
especially if they arrive only a few minutes (or seconds) after the connecting vehicle
departed. Thus, a more plausible representation may be
TT (pmake)(t,,,,e, ) + (1 - pmake)( headway )(agitation factor)
Clearly there exists a strong relationship between the probability of making a
connection (pmake) and the scheduled transfer time (ttransfer). The longer the scheduled
connection time, the greater the chances of making the transfer successfully. If most trips
on the originating vehicle arrive "on-time", however, the larger the connection, the longer
passengers will have to wait before their connecting vehicle leaves. More specifically,
we may surmise that pmake varies depending upon the run-time reliability of both
routes.' If we assume for the moment that the connecting vehicle runs on schedule, then
p+Z7ra
pmake can be written as f r(t) dt
where r(t) dt = the unit run-time probability distribution for the first vehicle
p = mean run-time for the first vehicle
Zrr = number of standard deviations the transfer time represents
o= run-time standard deviation for the first vehicle
To lessen customer anxiety by reducing the transfer burden, an agency will want to
minimize expected transfer time by selecting a scheduled transfer time that minimizes the
following function:
'p+Z7TU X p+Z7T
T T= f r(t) dt 'tr,,,i, ) + 1 - r(t) dt} headway )(agitation factor)
Holding is an example of a real-time operational strategy to help passengers make their connecting
vehicles if their initial vehicle is delayed. For more information, please refer to the article "Optimal
Holding Times at Transfer Times" (Hall, Dessouky, and Lu, 1999).
Unfortunately, this formula may not have an "easy" solution and may require empirical
estimation. Clearly, more variable running-times ("fatter" r(t) distributions) make it more
difficult to limit expected transfer times. Fortunately, rail rapid transit will typically have
better reliability than buses if it includes adequate operations control since it operates in a
separate right-of-way. These conditions therefore facilitate the common transfer case
from a high-frequency train to a low-frequency bus.
A typical network in a major metropolitan area has many potential transfer points.
This fact precludes optimal scheduling in nearly all locations except for possibly the
busiest transfer points; in some cases a transit agency may have to resort to random
connections. In addition, to make this "optimal" scheduling work, rail and bus routes
should each run at a multiple of a common headway to ensure schedule consistency
throughout the day. For example, if trains operate every 14 or 16 minutes instead of
every 15 minutes, it is much more difficult to coordinate with buses that run at 15, 30, or
60-minute intervals. Since adjusting headways by just one or two minutes can alter
vehicle requirements, agencies must weigh customer convenience (and corresponding
ridership changes) with the marginal costs of improving schedules. In particular, they
should be particularly sensitive in the case where the new rail system introduces a
transfer for former "one-seat" bus riders.
Even if a connecting bus operates infrequently, active schedule intervention may
not be necessary if trains run "very frequently" (such as during peak hours). From the
customer's perspective, the important question is when to arrive at the station in order to
make a rail-to-bus connection. To estimate the necessary lead time for the connection,
one can sum the rail travel time and the rail headway, and then pad the result to ensure
enough time to transfer physically between vehicles and to guard against a minor delay.
Clearly, solid operations control that maintains consistent rail travel times and headways
(not necessarily equivalent to on-time schedule adherence) is necessary for this heuristic
approach to work regularly. Finally, transit agencies should inform passengers of the
estimated running and waiting times through public schedules.
Case IV: Long Headway to Long Headway
When both the initial and connecting routes run infrequently, it is difficult to
coordinate schedules to minimize the waiting times for all possible transfers. Some
transfers may be quick while others may involve lengthy waits. Transit systems that rely
heavily on connectivity and transfers to maximize destination opportunities available to
customers - such as grid networks - do not function well with low service levels. In
general, however, new rail systems (excluding commuter rail) operate frequently during
most periods of the day. Thus, this case applies less to intermodal transfers than to bus-
to-bus transfers on an infrequent network.
New rail stations often provide an opportunity to develop transit hubs where bus
routes converge, particularly if they are located near major activity centers. In such
situations, it may be possible to establish timed-transfers for routes with low frequencies.
Sometimes called a "pulse" system, buses on different routes are scheduled to arrive and
depart simultaneously, with a layover period to allow passengers to transfer conveniently
in all directions. Coordination with rail service may also be desirable but not necessary if
trains operate frequently.
Several logistical difficulties may arise when attempting to implement timed-
transfers in an intermodal system. Only a limited number of locations can offer timed
transfers. Due to the many connection points within the network, it is mathematically
impossible to schedule timed-transfers everywhere without seriously lengthening running
times. To ensure consistent vehicle meets, routes must have the same headway or an
even multiple of a common headway (e.g. 30 and 60 minutes). An effective timed-
transfer network also requires high on-time performance; customers who miss
connections by even a few minutes must wait a full headway. Finally, a timed transfer
system may increase vehicle requirements. Coordinating schedules at the transfer point
may require excessive layover/recovery times and preclude interlining opportunities.
Given these limitations, a pulse schedule system may make sense if bus-to-bus transfers
constitute a significant fraction of all passenger movement at the interchange points.
Some cities have attempted to implement timed-transfer networks in areas with
relatively infrequent transit service. With the extension of light rail to its western suburbs,
Portland established three new transit centers at key rail stations. To facilitate both bus-
to-bus and bus-to-rail transfers, buses arrive and depart simultaneously with a few
minutes of layover time to let passengers change vehicles. Some bus routes operate as
often as every 15 minutes during the off-peak, but half-hourly or even hourly headways
are more typical. Since trains run frequently, intermodal coordination is not absolutely
vital; however, buses are consistently scheduled to leave a few minutes after the train
departs from the station. An integrated, three-zone fare structure with free transfers also
helped make the system equitable for passengers who had to transfer to complete their
trips (Tri-Met website).
In contrast, in Washington DC, the lack of schedule coordination has tended to
worsen the transfer waiting time problem. Specifically, transferring from rail to bus can
become inconvenient during off-peak hours when vehicles arrive less frequently. On
Saturdays, for example, trains run relatively frequently (every 12 minutes) but do not
consistently meet with buses that operate 20, 30, or 40-minute headways (WMATA
website). Uneven headways make it difficult to coordinate schedules and minimize
waiting times for all transfers. Please refer to Appendix A for more details about
Portland and Washington, DC.
3.6 Political Considerations and Implementation Strategies
As discussed earlier, transit agencies often face criticism for truncating or
eliminating bus service along rail corridors. A prudent customer-oriented and political
strategy would be to redistribute bus resources to underserved areas and/or untapped
markets. Improvements may include longer service hours, better frequencies, and/or
more comprehensive network coverage. As mentioned earlier, the rail line introduction
presents a unique opportunity to redesign the network to be more responsive to a variety
of travel patterns. A transit agency can only realize these gains if it makes a commitment
to balance bus cutbacks along the rail line with improved frequencies, service hours,
coverage, etc. elsewhere. Simply reducing bus service without demonstrating any
tangible benefits for bus customers may lead to political troubles and lost ridership. It
certainly will not generate and might jeopardize public support for future rail extensions.
Two basic obstacles impede the immediate implementation of this type of
network. First, agencies may be financially constrained, especially after completing rail
projects, and may be tempted to cut rather than reallocate bus service. Secondly, bus
reallocation means that some people gain new bus service while others "lose" it. People
are likely to vehemently oppose transferring and real or perceived bus service reductions,
even if they are offered an alternative on the new rail system. In contrast, people who
might potentially benefit with improved bus service as a result of resource reallocation
probably will voice little support for changes because they already rely on other transit
routes or different modes. Thus, a transit agency runs the risk of quickly losing existing
customers without their immediate replacement by new riders.
Two case studies examined in Appendix A (Los Angeles and Miami) illustrate
this general theme. In Los Angeles, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ran into
difficulties when it was developing a bus integration plan for the Red Line subway
extension to Hollywood. Instead of continuing to run radial express buses past major
intermediate destinations along a congested freeway, the agency had planned to truncate
these lines at the rail terminal in Hollywood. At the same time, the move would have
freed bus resources to help the agency reduce overcrowding on core bus routes. Riders
would have also enjoyed lower fares, since they would have ridden two local-fare
services instead of an express route. Due to political pressures and vocal opposition from
riders and bus advocates during public meetings, the authority decided not to pursue
changes until subsequent subway extensions are completed (Richards, 1999).
In Miami, Metro-Dade Transit implemented major bus service changes in
conjunction with the opening of Metrorail in the mid-1980s. The integration plan "was
marketed as a service improvement when in reality it was a massive service cut." Many
areas lost evening and weekend service and some routes were transferred to private sector
jitneys, which lacked comfortable vehicles and fare coordination with publicly-supported
transit operations. The public demanded and ultimately won restoration of most services.
In the process, however, the agency suffered negative publicity and several top officials
lost their jobs (Fialkoff, 1990).
Given the experiences in these (and other) cities, it seems that sudden changes can
result in real or perceived negative impacts. As discussed in Section 2.5, an incremental
approach to service changes may be appropriate in some situations. Deferring significant
route changes until several months after the rail line's opening day allows rail ridership to
stabilize and gives an agency an opportunity to observe actual travel patterns.
Meanwhile, an agency should provide incentives to persuade bus customers to switch to
rail during the interim period. For example, an agency can reroute express buses through
rail stations so customers have the option of transferring to the train or remaining on the
bus. To offset the additional operating costs of providing the duplicative bus service, the
agency can raise fares for "through" bus passengers but charge local fares with free
transfers for people who decide to use the bus-rail combination. If riders respond to this
pricing incentive, then the agency could justify route truncation; otherwise, at least
passenger fares will cover more of the costs of operating an inefficient network.
Chapter 4: The San Juan Case
San Juan, Puerto Rico, is now constructing the Tren Urbano heavy rail system to
provide people with alternatives to the automobile which is often subject to heavy traffic
congestion. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Tren Urbano presents both an opportunity and a
challenge to transform the region's struggling bus and pdiblicos systems into a
coordinated, high-quality intermodal network. Using the analytical framework in chapter
2, the discussion of integration issues from chapter 3, and case studies from cities with
new rail lines in Appendix A, this chapter evaluates options for modifying San Juan's bus
and pdblico system in conjunction with Tren Urbano.
4.1 Background Discussion
Given the current state of San Juan public transit, the city faces some tough but
surmountable challenges in developing an effective integrated system. Different vehicle
standards, service levels, fares, and organizational arrangements make the task more
difficult than in typical North American metropolitan areas. Active intervention by the
public sector, particularly through financial assistance and pd'blico restructuring efforts,
can help produce the service quality to attract new riders.
Left alone, San Juan will have three organizational models when Tren Urbano
opens in 2002, each representing a different stage in the evolution of transit industry
operating practices. At the more rudimentary end, the pdblico "system" relies on
individual profit-motivated drivers organized into route associations. Commonly known
elsewhere as jitneys, these services are often important in developing countries,
capitalizing on low car ownership levels, captive ridership, and lower expectations for
service quality. In contrast, the AMA bus system directly operates fixed route bus
service, the model most commonly found throughout the United States. Metrobdis and
Tren Urbano employ contracted operations, a model some North American transit
agencies have successfully employed for fixed-route bus and paratransit services. It
relies on competitive bidding to control costs and improve service quality. Tren Urbano
will become the first North American heavy rail system to contract operations.
North American transit properties commonly use either the publicly-operated
monopoly or contracting out model, or both. Even cities with single multimodal
operators face integration difficulties. Metropolitan areas with separate agencies
controlling bus and rail operations grapple with additional fare, route, and schedule
coordination issues. In addition to the challenges of integrating distinct bus and rail
systems, the existence of an unfunded and declining pdiblico system in San Juan
complicates matters even further. The inability to control thousands of individually-
owned pdiblicos makes it hard to achieve the service quality necessary for effective
integration with Tren Urbano.
Table 4-1: Service Characteristics of San Juan's transit systems
Operator Tren Urbano Metrobs AMA Buses Piblicos
Operating Public agency Contracted Public agency with Private Individuals
Arrangements with contracted operations public employees
operations
Fares $1 $0.50 $0.25 Varies ($0.35-
____ ___ ____ 
_ _ ____ 
_  _  __ 
_ ___ ____ 
___ ___$0.65)
Span of 7 days/wk, 7 days/wk, morning 7 days/wk, morning Monday-Saturday,
Service morning to late to early evening to early evening daytimes only
night
Service 4 min (peak) 6-12 min 8-30 m (peak & Variable but
Headways 12 min (off-peak) (weekdays), 12-20 base), 15-60 mi frequent (peak),
min (weekends) (weekends) irregular to non-
_______________ 
existent (off-peak)
Schedule Good Good Fair but improving Generally
Reliability unreliable during
_______________ 
off-peak
Vehicle Comfortable Somewhat Somewhat Uncomfortable,
Comfort comfortable, with comfortable, with poor seating
air conditioning air conditioning arrangement, no
air conditioning
Accessibility ADA compliant Working to become Working to become Not ADA
ADA compliant ADA compliant compliant
Public Image Positive Positive Fair Mixed
Source: Wensley, 1999.
Table 4-1 compares key service variables for San Juan's transit systems. The
different operating arrangements and their associated economic implications have
contributed to significant disparities in service quality among San Juan's transit
providers. For instance, compared to the piiblicos, the publicly- supported AMA system is
more likely to balance cost and revenue considerations with passenger convenience. In
fact, AMA undertook significant route restructuring in early 1998 to improve reliability
and consolidate service onto fewer, but higher frequency and more direct routes that
connect at transit centers. Ridership responded with a 20% jump, reversing a decades-
long decline. AMA is also planning to run later in the evening to match Tren Urbano
service hours. Investment in AMA has also brought other improvements. New air-
conditioned buses, a more comfortable in-vehicle atmosphere, and improved wheelchair
accessibility have made the service more attractive. Metrobdis has also done well, aided
by financial assistance and a contracted service structure that has encouraged improved
service quality. The introduction of frequent, reliable service along two main corridors
has helped to stabilize falling ridership. Compared to AMA, Metrobdis charges a
premium (double) fare yet enjoys more support from the public. Continuing to bring
progressive transit ideas to San Juan, Metrobdis has recently introduced low-floor buses
(Wensley, 1999).
Of course, Tren Urbano is the most significant and visible transit investment in
San Juan's history. When it opens in 2002, it will provide a high level-of-service with
trains operating every 4 to 12 minutes until midnight seven days a week. Vehicles will
offer rapid and comfortable transportation, while stations will provide a safe and pleasant
waiting environment. A financial commitment by the government to building Tren
Urbano and upgrading AMA operations offers the promise of an integrated, high-quality
system.
In contrast, the lack of support for the pd'blico system in automobile-dominated
San Juan has resulted in a system in decay. Pdiblico mode share dropped from 9.2% in
1964 to 7.7% in 1976 to 4.8% in 1990, while automobile usage has skyrocketed from
62.7% to 90.7% over the same period (Lau, 1997). The automobile's growing popularity
has contributed to the downward pdiblico spiral because pdiblicos are increasingly stuck in
traffic. Declining ridership, low revenue, and a lack of financial support encourages
pdblico owners to "cut corners" on capital improvements and operating expenses for
survival. For instance, in contrast to the publicly operated systems, pd'blicos run
irregularly during the off-peak and generally offer no service evenings and Sundays. To
maximize revenue, the driver departs only when the vehicle is full, however long that
may take. Aged vehicles, deferred maintenance, lack of air-conditioning, and a poor
physical seating arrangement also contribute to an unfavorable image. Given this
perceived and actual disinvestment, the pdiblicos not surprisingly attract few "choice"
riders. Since pdblicos cover many neighborhoods that lack conventional bus service,
allowing the system to atrophy further could leave transit-dependent riders with
significantly reduced mobility.
In short, the San Juan experience to date suggests that public investment and
innovative operating arrangements in AMA and Metrobd's have improved transit services.
It has also shown that laissez-faire policies with respect to the pdiblicos have resulted in
decline and poor service quality. Coordinating bus and pd'blico services has not received
much attention in the past since each served distinct geographical areas with relatively
little overlap, and the services are planned and regulated by different agencies. In the
future, however, Tren Urbano ridership will rely heavily on both bus and pn'blico access.
San Juan's intermodal system will only be as strong as its weakest link; all elements must
function properly for the entire system to work.
Comparing the service characteristics of San Juan's transit systems reveals
various areas for potential improvement. For instance, fares vary from mode to mode
with no discounts for transfers, even among vehicles under the same operator. Span of
service, service headways, and vehicle comfort also differ, with a noticeable decline for
the pd'blicos. Potential "choice" Tren Urbano customers who value comfort and schedule
regularity are unlikely to be satisfied with pdblico feeder services. Without adequate
station accessibility, people may decide not to take public transit at all, despite the quality
of Tren Urbano itself. Consequently, pdiblicos in their present state may stunt Tren
Urbano ridership, inevitably diminishing support for further expansion.
4.2 Spatial geography of bus, piiblico, and Tren Urbano riders
The mismatch between Tren Urbano, bus, and pdblico riders presents another
challenge to effective multimodal coordination. While Tren Urbano will attract some
existing bus and pdiblico customers from parallel routes, many riders will continue on
their current travel patterns simply because the initial phase of Tren Urbano will not serve
their destinations. In other words, the bus and pd'blico systems will continue to play
important roles in San Juan even though Tren Urbano will emerge as the visual and
symbolic backbone of transit. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 demonstrate this point. Figure 4-1
shows the concentration of AMA and pdiblico riders by census tract, as measured by the
percentage of 1990 work trips taken by transit. Figure 4-2 shows the expected
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geographical distribution of future train riders expressed as a percentage of total
population, as forecast by the demand model used in the Tren Urbano Environmental
Impact Statement. While these maps are not directly analogous (one examines mode
share of adult work trips while the other looks at total population), they strongly suggest
that demographic and spatial differences exist between future Tren Urbano customers and
current pd'blico and bus riders.
In San Juan, many of the predicted areas of high Tren Urbano demand generally
do not correspond with bus and pdiblico-dependent areas. As expected, the Tren Urbano
demand model predicts that train riders will mostly live adjacent to the alignment. In
contrast, transit-dependent riders are concentrated in the Isleta, Santurce, Barrio Obrero,
Catafio, and Rio Piedras. Excluding people who work at home, transit carries over 30%
of work trips in some neighborhoods. Smaller concentrations of transit riders live in
western Carolina and in the area wedged between Expreso las Americas/Plaza las
Americas, F.D. Roosevelt, Centro Medico, and the Guaynabo border. Pdiblico usage is
heaviest in Bayam6n, the mountainous region to the south, parts of Carolina, and the area
between Barrio Obrero and Laguna San Jose.
Examining the distribution of income (Figure 4-3) in San Juan shows the
relationship between transit dependency and ridership on buses, pd'blicos and Tren
Urbano. Many areas that the demand model predicts will have high rail ridership also
share relatively high personal incomes and car ownership levels, suggesting Tren Urbano
should attract "choice" riders. Some of these areas include the San Francisco area south
of Centro Medico, Cupey and Guaynabo. In contrast, areas where a large portion of the
population has no access to an automobile correspond to the neighborhoods with high bus
and pdzblico ridership. Considering the socioeconomic characteristics of these areas, it is
likely that most bus and pdblico riders cannot afford a car.
4.3 Implications
San Juan faces some familiar and other unique challenges compared to other
metropolitan areas that have recently introduced rail systems. Like many cities, it is
introducing a rail line within a context of a car-dominated environment and a bus network
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with a transit-dependent ridership base. It must also overcome possible impediments to
effective system integration as a result of having separate bus and train operators.
Consequently, San Juan must not only focus on attracting "choice" riders to Tren Urbano,
but also improve the service quality for existing customers who may or may not be able
to use the train. Buses must continue to be a primary component of San Juan's public
transit system and not merely serve a feeder role for Tren Urbano. Coordination efforts
with the buses should focus on network design, operations planning, and fare policy.
Marketing efforts are also necessary to inform the public about changes to the bus system
as well as to attract new riders quickly to Tren Urbano.
San Juan must also salvage its troubled pdiblico system. Unlike some other cities
with jitney operations, for-profit pdiblico operations can no longer thrive in a city where
transit usage has plummeted as a result of increasing affluence and generally pro-
automobile policies. Revenue starvation has resulted in deferred maintenance, irregular
or non-existent service, and uncomfortable vehicles. Few pd'blico drivers have the means
or incentive to improve services or purchase new vehicles, let alone comply with federal
requirements such as full vehicle accessibility under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Fortunately, the existing pd'blico network already complements the future Tren Urbano
system, with major terminals located near key stations. Furthermore, with the arrival of
Tren Urbano, pdiblicos can concentrate on connecting neighborhoods to nearby rail
stations, rather than running along congested arterials into San Juan. Thus, efforts for
improvement should focus on handling the institutional and financial issues that are
critical to bolstering pdiblico service quality.
4.4 AMA and Metrobfis Analysis
As discussed above, coordination efforts between Tren Urbano and the two
publicly-funded bus systems (AMA and Metrobn's) should address network design,
operations planning, and fare policy. Organizational differences may also impact
integration, particularly concerning fares. For reasons discussed earlier (see Section
2.5), this analysis applies an integrated systems approach for long term bus-rail
integration planning in San Juan. In summary, in the integrated systems approach, the
route design tries to takes advantage of the relative strengths of the bus and rail modes.
This approach explicitly balances the desire to build rail ridership with the needs of
current riders. More specifically, this analysis focuses on two key customer groups: (1)
people using Tren Urbano for all or part of their trip and (2) people who rely solely on
AMA buses and Metrobdis. This strategy is particularly relevant given that there appear
to be significant demographic and locational differences between these two groups. One
must emphasize that this integrated systems approach offers ideas for long-term bus
service based on current ridership patterns; in the short run, an incremental strategy is
appropriate during the transition to Tren Urbano in order to soften the impacts of
potentially large changes.
The "Report on the Tren Urbano Feeder System" (Multisystems, 1999 [3])
presents some preliminary ideas for integrating AMA and Metrobdis routes with Tren
Urbano. This analysis builds upon this work by evaluating some of its key proposals
using the analytical framework developed in chapter 2. Given this approach, some goals
and questions associated with the feeder system plan include:
" Maximize effective rail system utilization: Are bus routes that remain in the Tren
Urbano corridor serving different markets than the train? Does the plan avoid
duplication and instead redistribute resources to underserved areas?
" Retain existing ridership: Do the proposed changes avoid seriously inconveniencing
existing bus riders? Do they introduce lengthy or costly transfers? Do they address
existing overcrowding issues?
" Attract new riders: Does the train offer the level-of-service necessary to attract
"choice" customers? Do buses provide the coordinated service necessary to extend
the rail system's reach?
e Improve operator efficiency: Within the Tren Urbano corridor, are passengers
encouraged to use the higher capacity and quicker rail mode? Do changes that could
disrupt existing commuting patterns result in cost savings that offset potential lost
ridership and revenue?
" Ensure political support for future rail extensions: Does the plan value both existing
and potential customers?
General Analysis and Recommendations
In several respects, San Juan is in a better position than other cities that have
transitioned from bus to multimodal systems. Specifically, the 1998 system restructuring
consolidated routes to provide more frequent service and connected them at transit
centers. As illustrated in Figure 4-4, Many of these transit centers are conveniently
located adjacent to Tren Urbano stations (for example, Hato Rey, Bayam6n, and Centro
M6dico). The system design allows passengers to travel fairly directly throughout the
San Juan area with at most one or two transfers. At the same time, the public has grown
more accustomed to transfers, a key element of any successful intermodal network.
Thus, even if the bus system were left alone, it would still partially fulfill the objectives
of feeding Tren Urbano and providing general mobility.
The most recent Tren Urbano Feeder Bus Plan (Multisystems, 1999 [3]) also
proposes an overall service expansion. The peak-hour pullout will increase from 201 to
252 buses once Tren Urbano opens. Maximum base headways will drop from 30 minutes
to a very respectable 20 minutes. In addition, buses will run 20 hours daily to match Tren
Urbano's span of service. This represents a significant improvement over current
conditions where nearly all AMA and Metrobn's service ends at 9 pm. Relative to
comparable North American operations, the proposed San Juan bus (and train) network
will offer excellent headways with long service hours. The plan does not, however,
propose major service coverage expansion (specifically into pd'blico territory) or
increases in route density within San Juan. Cost estimates of the new service were not
readily available.
Taken as a whole, the plan builds upon dramatic improvements in the AMA and
Metrobd's systems in recent years. Extra buses will shorten average waiting time and
relieve overcrowding. More evening service will make the system more attractive to off-
peak customers. The funding and political support for better bus service demonstrates a
commitment to retaining and expanding the existing bus customer base, in addition to
attracting riders to Tren Urbano. In short, the opening of Tren Urbano will not be used
to justify bus service cutbacks. Politically this should diffuse complaints that Tren
Urbano is consuming a disproportionate share of public transportation resources.

Of course, the plan is cognizant of the importance of prudent resource allocation
because of the financial realities of operating public transit. For example, better
frequency in some areas may be offset by a reduction in buses that duplicate the rail
corridor. To better utilize train capacity, other routes are slated to be rerouted to feed rail
stations. The plan also proposes some major changes to the core route structure in central
San Juan.
Appendix C evaluates some of the proposals presented in the Tren Urbano Feeder
Bus Plan using the evaluation criteria discussed in Chapter 2. To narrow the scope of this
analysis and concentrate on the system's most critical parts, this thesis concentrates on a
few key high-frequency trunk bus routes. These ones merit special attention because they
transport the majority of passengers on the AMA and Metrobdis systems. Seven out of
approximately 30 routes now carry over 60,000 of a total systemwide weekday ridership
of almost 100,000 (see Table 4-2). These buses currently handle both regional as well as
local travel and currently serve customers whose travel patterns may not necessarily
require a ride on Tren Urbano. Superimposing these routes onto a map of bus usage in
San Juan showing mode shares reveals how important these buses are to transit-
dependent neighborhoods (see Figure 4-5).
Table 4-2: Key High Ridership Bus Routes in San Juan
Route Daily % of AMA and Areas Served
Riders Metrobis Total
Metrobis I & 15,300 16.1% Viejo San Juan, Isleta, Santurce, Hato Rey, Rio
Metrobis Exp. Piedras
Metrobis II 8,900 9.4% Santurce, Hato Rey, Plaza Las Americas, San
Patricio, Bayam6n
A3 7,080 7.5% Cataho, San Patricio, Plaza Las Americas, Hato
Rey, Rio Piedras
A5 9,691 10.2% Viejo San Juan, Isleta, Santurce, Calle Lofza, Isla
Verde, Carolina
A6 6,882 7.3% Rio Piedras, Carolina
A9 12,455 13.1% Viejo San Juan, Isleta, Santurce, Barrio Obrero,
Barbosa, Rio Piedras
"A" & 60,308 63.7%
Metrobis
routes
Source: Multisystems SJMA Bus Ridership, January-April 1998
The Tren Urbano Feeder Bus Plan investigates the possibility of either splitting or
truncating several key routes (e.g. Metrobdis I, Metrobd's II, A9). Some potential
modifications involve reorienting routes to feed Tren Urbano, while others are intended
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to address load factor and reliability issues. Specifically, this analysis investigates
proposals to:
" Shorten the A9 route, which now runs between Rio Piedras and Viejo San Juan. The
northern terminus would be relocated to either Santurce or Isla Grande instead of
Viejo San Juan. Completely unrelated to Tren Urbano, this change would ostensibly
seek to address even passenger loads but would introduce a bus-to-bus transfer for
some passengers.
" Split Metrobd's II, which now runs between Santurce and Bayam6n. Metrobdis II
connects the endpoints of Tren Urbano, but takes a different route and serves
separate markets. The plan investigates the possibility of splitting the route at its
midpoint in San Patricio and creating two separate routes. The western half would
become a feeder route between Bayam6n and the Centro Medico area with reduced
service levels. The eastern half between San Patricio and Santurce would remain
unchanged.
* Eliminate the portion of Metrobdis I that parallels Tren Urbano. Metrobdls I, which
runs along San Juan's central spine from Viejo San Juan and Rio Piedras, would no
longer run between Santurce and Rio Piedras. However, other bus routes (Metrobd's
II and route A3) would continue to provide local service along this portion.
Appendix C uses the service evaluation criteria defined in section 2.4 and recent
ridership and origin-destination data to analyze these proposals. It finds that the current
key route structure serves existing and the anticipated future demand well. Buses not
only provide trunk service along major arterials, but also feed Tren Urbano at major
stations. As such, they meet both local travel and Tren Urbano accessibility needs. In
most cases, increasing frequency and extending service hours (rather than drastic route
restructuring) would be sufficient to accommodate anticipated changes in demand due to
Tren Urbano. Major changes - such as truncating route A9 or Metrobnis II - might
greatly inconvenience existing customers without producing appreciable Tren Urbano
ridership gains. In fact, they may even cause ridership to drop. In this sense, the
integrated systems and incremental approaches are also minimalist ones. Actually, most
of the major changes needed to integrate AMA and Metrobd's services with Tren Urbano
already occurred during the 1998 system restructuring. By introducing a bus system
designed around network connectivity and transfers several years prior to rail service, this
effort has already eased the transition to Tren Urbano.
While the San Juan's core bus network may not need major changes, it does make
sense to modify Metrobd's I service (both local and express) to avoid duplication with
Tren Urbano. Reducing or discontinuing Metrobnis I service that parallels Tren Urbano
would not severely impact the service quality for existing customers. Spaced
approximately mile apart, Tren Urbano stations are generally within walking distance
of the vast majority of Metrobdls I riders. In addition, other bus routes that parallel
portions of the Tren Urbano alignment (i.e. route A3 and Metrobdis II) would continue to
provide local service. To ease the transition to Tren Urbano, it may make sense simply to
reduce bus service levels on opening day, but defer route discontinuation until several
months later after observing ridership patterns. The fact that Metrobdis I is the best public
transit success in San Juan warrants extra caution in truncating or even reducing service
levels.
Although a reduction in Metrobdis I service may seem negative, it could actually
benefit customers. By avoiding service duplication, buses could be redeployed to the
portion of Metrobdis I that remains (between Santurce and Viejo San Juan). Additional
service along this corridor should help accommodate the additional demand generated by
passengers transferring from Tren Urbano. Shorter headways will also reduce transfer
waiting times. In addition, there is a possibility of expanding Metrobdis service
elsewhere. The Metrobd's concept - competitively contracted operations that provide
frequent, reliable service using exclusive bus lanes - has proven successful and is
popular. This concept deserves further exploration, particularly in future Tren Urbano
corridors (e.g. Rio Piedras-to-Carolina and Airport-to-Santurce).
Finally, the success of the planned intermodal network will depend upon a
coordinated fare policy. Having separate rail and bus operators in San Juan presents a
major impediment to fare integration. Currently, AMA and Metrobds rides cost 25 and
50 cents, respectively, with no free transfers issued within or between systems. Tren
Urbano trips are expected to cost $1.00. (Pdiblico fares vary but are generally higher and
do not include free transfers either.) So far, no specific intermodal or intramodal fare
arrangements have been determined.
Service changes that introduce transfers need mitigation such as reduced or free
transfers in order to minimize the cost impacts on riders. Otherwise, fares could more
than double. For example, a trip from UPR to Viejo San Juan that now costs 50 cents on
Metrobds I could cost up to $1.50 (the sum of Tren Urbano and a connecting Metrobdis
ride). With this de facto fare increase, ridership could drop and opposition to Tren
Urbano could rise. In contrast, improved fare coordination in New York and
Washington, DC has resulted in increased ridership (see section 3.3). Prior research
provides some concrete ideas for fare integration between Tren Urbano and San Juan bus
and pd'blico operators (see Barr, 1997).
4.5 Piblico Analysis
In terms of network structure, integrating the plblicos with Tren Urbano is
relatively simple. Relatively few route changes would need to occur because San Juan's
two largest pdiblico terminals, Bayam6n and Rio Piedras, are located close to Tren
Urbano stations. From these terminals, pdiblicos also provide extensive service coverage
in Bayam6n, Carolina, the highlands south of San Juan, and other target areas for Tren
Urbano feeder service. However, the pdblicos in their current state will not be able to
meet the anticipated demand generated by Tren Urbano. First, pd'blico service is
primarily geared toward transporting shoppers, workers and students to activity centers in
Bayam6n and Rio Piedras, not to other destinations along the rail alignment. The
existing fleet will not provide sufficient capacity to serve the new rail feeder market. In
addition, the pdiblicos' relatively poor service quality and vehicle conditions are unlikely
to attract many "choice" riders to Tren Urbano.
Thus, integrating the pdiblicos with Tren Urbano involves two related challenges:
overcoming the institutional barriers that now impede service quality and creating
attractive supplemental services to meet induced demand. Meeting these challenges also
requires sensitivity towards pd'blico drivers and their leadership. To ensure long-term
stability and growth for transit in San Juan, one must avoid the perception that new or
improved Tren Urbano feeder services - and Tren Urbano itself - are trying to drive the
pdblicos out of existence. Since the organizational structure of feeder operations plays a
major role in an integrated system's overall "success," this analysis primarily evaluates
alternative operating arrangements for both new and existing services. This research
investigates options for three areas with very different characteristics: Rio Piedras,
Bayam6n, and the region's periphery.
4.5.1 Rio Piedras Area
In Rio Piedras, the pdlblicos currently face some competition from less expensive
and more consistent AMA buses, particularly on routes that link the area with Carolina.
When Tren Urbano opens, further AMA improvements will be necessary to transport
passengers from outlying areas to rail stations. Service enhancements could include fare
integration, higher frequency, and potentially a "bus rapid transit" line along the PR 3
highway corridor between Rio Piedras and Carolina. Although transit would become
more attractive overall, competition from AMA could lead to pdlblico ridership losses.
Consequently, pdlblico drivers might perceive Tren Urbano (and AMA) as more
problematic than beneficial.
With the anticipated increases in transit demand due to Tren Urbano, AMA
service expansion in the Rio Piedras area is clearly important. Nevertheless, an initial
strategy of avoiding direct competition with the pdblicos could help diffuse potential
conflicts. The geography of the Rio Piedras area actually makes it possible to avoid the
overlap of AMA bus and pd'blico services, while still allowing AMA to provide the
necessary feeder capacity to Tren Urbano. Currently, several pd'blico terminals are
scattered throughout the Rio Piedras district, with a major on-street layover area around a
plaza located just two blocks from the Tren Urbano station entrance and the Paseo de
Diego shopping district. In contrast, the major AMA bus terminal (Capetillo) is located
about a half mile to the east of the Rio Piedras station (see Figure 4-6). The congested,
narrow, one-way streets in central Rio Piedras favor small pdiblico vans over large AMA
buses.
Considering the physical constraints, the pdlblicos can e expeted to gain riders
because of Tren Urbano. In order to provide fully accessible and scheduled service to
Tren Urbano, it makes sense to route AMA buses to adjacent Tren Urbano stations.
Figure 4-6: Transit in Rio Piedr
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Specifically, Carolina-bound AMA buses that currently terminate at the Capetillo facility
could be extended along the south side of the University of Puerto Rico campus to the
UPR station or even further north to the Pifiero station. This approach accomplishes
several goals: AMA buses would avoid traffic on narrow streets enroute to Tren Urbano.
At the same time, they would also serve the UPR market better by running closer to the
center of campus. Meanwhile, AMA buses would not confront the pdiblicos around the
plaza in Rio Piedras. Circumventing the pdblicos altogether would make it easier
politically for AMA to increase service to meet demand. One would expect the
scheduled AMA service to capture most of the Tren Urbano riders, particularly if fare
policies allow for free or heavily discounted transfers between AMA and Tren Urbano.
However, AMA buses will not directly encroach into the pd'blicos' primary market;
namely, travel between outlying areas and the Rio Piedras business district, and
undoubtedly the pdiblicos will capture some of the Tren Urbano feeder market.
4.5.2 Bayam6n Area
Unlike Rio Piedras, the pdblicos face little direct competition from AMA in the
Bayam6n area. Only one AMA and one Metrobd's route currently serve the area and both
are oriented toward the central spine of the region. In contrast, a dense network of
pdblico routes radiates outward from several major terminals in central Bayam6n, which
are approximately a third of a mile from the Tren Urbano station. Meeting the
accessibility needs of Tren Urbano in this area presents a unique challenge. On the one
hand, judging from present operations, it would be difficult to rely on the pd'blicos to
provide the high-quality service needed to attract choice riders. On the other hand,
introducing an entirely new feeder network would increase operating costs substantially
and could encounter stiff opposition from pdiblico operators, who might feel threatened
by perceived or real competition. This section explores possible operating arrangements
for feeder services in the Bayam6n area. Of the basic options reviewed in section 3.2,
there are three major approaches that merit further consideration.2
2 For additional information, please refer to "Strategies for Improving Jitneys as a Public Transport Mode"
(Lau [1997])
4.5.2.1 Minimalist approach
The simplest way to handle the pdblicos would be to leave them in their present
state. At least in the short term, the pdiblicos would continue to serve communities with
few other transportation alternatives at no direct government expense. Jitneys generally
thrive in cities with cheap labor, inadequate or costly conventional transit services, and
high transit dependence. Captive riders also have low expectations for service regularity,
comfort, or safety (Takyi, 1990). While Puerto Rico may have had favorable conditions
for pd'blicos in the past, it is rapidly moving away from such an environment. In many
areas of San Juan, wages and the standard of living have improved substantially.
Reliance on automobiles has also grown correspondingly. Expectations for service
quality have also risen with Metrobls, improvements in AMA bus services and in
anticipation of Tren Urbano.
Given San Juan's unfavorable transit environment, it is not surprising that the for-
profit pdiblico enterprise has been unable to produce a quality system that attracts choice
riders. In fact, it may be unreasonable to expect profit-motivated individuals to run a
transport system that fulfills important but not remunerative social mobility objectives.
Some of these objectives may include expanding service coverage, assisting with national
"Access to Jobs" and "Welfare-to-Work" programs, and providing mobility to seniors
and individuals with disabilities. Once Tren Urbano opens, some pdlblico drivers may
attempt to migrate to the most lucrative, high ridership routes. Considering the alarming
shrinkage of the publico system as a whole, customers on less profitable routes might
lose most or all of their service.
Service irregularity is perhaps the fundamental impediment to adopting a
minimalist pdblico strategy. Although pd'blico drivers belong to route associations, each
retains its own passenger revenue. This arrangement motivates pd'blico drivers to fill
their vehicles before leaving the terminal or collect additional payment from other
passengers for any empty seats. Fluctuations in passenger arrival rates inevitably result
in inconsistent terminal departures. It also results in long and irregular waiting times
during the off-peak. On Sundays and evenings, little pdblico service exists because
drivers do not feel that potential passenger revenue will offset expenses. Attracting riders
to Tren Urbano depends upon both the availability and reliability of pdiblico service, since
many trips will require intermodal transfers. The status quo, a free-enterprise transport
"system" driven by individual profit-motivation, will likely result in passenger
frustration.
High-quality flexible transit services can still supplement scheduled, fixed-route
public transit. However, their high cost structure (and service irregularity) precludes
them from becoming practical substitutes for a comprehensive transit system. Demand-
responsive operations that carry relatively few people per vehicle and serve scattered
origins and destinations are inherently cost-inefficient, whether operated by the private or
public sector. To stay afloat, they must charge high fares, consume huge subsidies, or
limit service availability. Common examples in the United States include taxis and
paratransit. In San Juan, the for-profit "Taxi Turisticos" charge $8 to $16 for a one-way
trip along the Airport-to-Viejo San Juan corridor (Puerto Rico Compafiia de Turismo,
1998). Few residents can afford to ride them regularly. Subsidized paratransit offers
door-to-door service with advance reservations at much lower fares. However, they are
extremely unproductive with farebox recovery ratios of under 10% and individual trips
requiring subsidies of $20 or more, according to National Transit Database (FTA, 1999).
For this reason, only people with conditions that prevent them from riding conventional
transit services can usually take advantage of paratransit.
Assuming that no large operational changes occur, Tren Urbano should have
generally positive short-term effects on the pn'blicos in Bayam6n as in Rio Piedras. The
terminals in these communities are located within walking distance of Tren Urbano
stations. Existing riders are already accustomed to pdiblico service quality. In contrast,
pdblico routes that parallel Tren Urbano could experience sharp ridership drops since the
train will provide faster, more reliable service at only a slightly higher fare. However,
there are only a handful of pdblico routes (notably the Bayamon to Rio Piedras line) that
directly compete with Tren Urbano. These routes could even gain ridership by serving as
local distributors, carrying passengers from areas between stations to Tren Urbano.
Regardless of Tren Urbano, however, the pdlblicos will continue to have trouble in
the long term without external intervention. Economic factors, poor service quality, and
growing automobile usage will result in further ridership erosion. At the same time, the
heavy investment in a new rail system may cause some critics to blame the government
for supporting large-scale projects at the expense of driver "entrepreneurs". Meanwhile,
poor accessibility will prevent Tren Urbano from reaching its ridership potential, and a
lack of wheelchair accessible feeder service to Bayam6n stations could be an ADA
compliance problem (see Appendix D). Ultimately, any negative publicity for Tren
Urbano will diminish support for future extension.
San Juan can learn from other cities that have relied on jitneys as rail feeders.
When Miami opened its Metrorail system in the mid- 1980s, for example, the transit
agency allowed private jitneys to connect rail stations with neighborhoods in the
northwest part of the metropolitan area. This decision enabled the agency to cut costs by
curtailing bus service. As in San Juan, vehicles were uncomfortable and the jitneys
provided service only during busy, profitable times. Drivers were also averse to fare
integration, since that would directly reduce their income. However severe public
resistance to the changes developed, eventually resulting in a political fiasco that
included the removal of some top transit officials and the restoration of most bus service
(Fialkoff, 1990) (see Appendix A.2).
4.5.2.2 Contracted operations approach
In the contracted operations model, the public transit authority contracts some or
all operations to private companies. Also known as "contracting out", this model
involves both the public and private sectors. The public agency determines routes, fares,
schedules, and vehicle characteristics, while private contractors bid to operate the service.
Thus, this strategy transfers the daily operational responsibility from the agency to the
contractor. Since few cities have the density and ridership to make transport services
profitable, this model does not eliminate the need for subsidy. Rather, it allows the
private contractor to incorporate an implicit profit margin into its bid price. This profit-
making potential, coupled with competition in the bidding process from other private
firms, motivates the contractor to achieve operational efficiency and better service quality
for a reasonable price.
The contracted operations strategy does raise some serious concerns. First,
bidding must be competitive in order to improve upon the standard publicly-owned and
operated transit system. Monetary barriers to entry, such as requiring contractors to
provide their own equipment and maintenance garages, can limit the number of bidders
and thus reduce competition. Secondly, the model requires public agencies to undertake
the bidding process every few years, sometimes a difficult undertaking with transitional
problems. For instance, if the previous contractor leaves involuntarily, it may purposely
allow service to deteriorate to embarrass the public agency.
In order for this model to succeed, a public agency also must monitor the service
provider to ensure that it is fulfilling the contract specifications. In theory, incentives and
penalties encourage the contractor to meet or exceed service quality expectations.
Without oversight, a contractor may believe that it will receive payment regardless of
performance. This may lead to skipped runs, deferred maintenance, or other cost-cutting
behavior that hurts both the public agency and its customers. Thus, this model depends
upon careful structuring and a commitment to enforce its provisions. As mentioned
previously, two examples of contracted transit operations in San Juan include Metrobdis
and Tren Urbano.
Political Considerations
Political considerations will play an important role in determining the contract
structure and specifications. In the past, pdiblicos could survive because they carried
captive riders and mostly served different territory than AMA. Maintaining the status
quo likely would lead to a further drop in mode share; their poor service quality
motivates riders to switch to automobiles as soon as they have the financial means. More
reliable and frequent AMA service has already siphoned away pdlblico riders along the
Bayam6n to Santurce and Carolina to Rio Piedras corridors.
Tren Urbano and a feeder service bidding process could place pdiblico owners in
an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, if they do not change, they will have to
compete with contracted Tren Urbano feeder services. Their decline may accelerate as
riders likely will prefer the contracted service's reliability and comfort. On the other
hand, they can try to win a Tren Urbano feeder service contract. Success would mean a
complete paradigm shift for pdiblico drivers. For example, they would need to adhere to a
schedule and work evenings and Sundays. Fares would no longer provide daily, cash
income; instead, drivers would earn wages and pay the appropriate taxes. In addition,
drivers would lose personal use of the vehicle and have to learn how to accommodate
customers with disabilities.
Given the need to offer high-quality transit accessibility to Tren Urbano, it does
not make sense to encourage pdiblico drivers to operate the contracted feeder services.
While it may not be feasible to exclude pdblicos from contract negotiations, the
contractor must deliver quality service. Judging from their current operating practices,
they may be ill-prepared or unwilling to transition to the contracted service model.
Furthermore, the pd'blicos still fill an important transportation niche in San Juan.
Contracting out new Tren Urbano feeder routes to pdblico drivers would allow them to
abandon their existing markets. For both equity and political reasons, Tren Urbano should
not lead to service degradation.
Despite the steady decline of the pdiblicos, drivers and their route associations still
wield considerable political power. In addition, pdblicos have historically met the
transport needs of many Puerto Ricans and employed many people. In recognition of
their functional and political importance, the government and PRHTA (Puerto Rico
Highway and Transportation Authority) still need to "negotiate" with pd'blico operators
and leaders. The PRHTA must avoid the perception that it wants to hasten the pdblicos'
decline by introducing publicly-supported Tren Urbano feeder services. To demonstrate
its commitment to the existing pdblicos, it could build new passenger waiting shelters,
reserve exclusive lanes to expedite services, provide low-interest vehicle loans, etc.
Contract Specification
Considering the above discussion, the contract specifications should primarily
encourage bids from high-quality service providers. Emphasizing high, enforceable
standards from the beginning is especially important to make a good first impression and
attract new riders to Tren Urbano. Some relevant contract points include:
e Geographical Scope and Contract Size
While the contract model could eventually cover pd'blico services throughout the
island, the government needs to start small to control costs. Initial attention should focus
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on pdiblico routes in subregions such as Bayam6n, for example, which are adjacent to key
Tren Urbano stops. Separate contracts could be established for each subregion, or for
individual routes or small groups of routes. A more extensive geographical area would
minimize the contract overhead and favor larger and more organized bidders. This in
turn may improve the chances of obtaining higher quality service since it would
encourage bids from established transport companies.
Theoretically, a large-scale contract would still enable some pdiblicos to consider
competing in the bidding process. The pd'blicos maintain a well-defined, hierarchical
structure; most drivers belong to union-like route associations to which they pay dues in
exchange for legal protection and other benefits. A few politically powerful cooperatives
and federations in turn "control" these route associations (Lau, 1997). However, pdiblico
associations would still have to compete with outside professional transportation
providers.
* Service Level Requirements and Changes
A competitive procurement specifies basic service requirements to help
contractors determine their bid price and size their fleet and workforce. Of course,
demand variation can make forecasting service requirements difficult, especially over the
length of the contract. The situation for new operations like Tren Urbano is even more
uncertain than for established systems. The anticipated Tren Urbano feeder requirements
are derived from a demand model that relied on assumptions about long-term economic
conditions, traffic congestion levels, population growth and many other variables. In
reality, ridership may not materialize at the expected levels, or may overwhelm the
system from the beginning.
The contract will need to include provisions for incremental service changes.
Though the uncertainty may increase bid prices, potential contractors will know that they
may have to adjust service in the short-term. Preferably the contract should also begin
with conservative (relatively low) service requirements. It may be difficult to get the
service provider to agree to less compensation even if service levels drop.
* Gross Cost v. Net Cost Reimbursement
In a gross cost contract, the transit agency pays the contractor a fixed amount to
provide the service and receives all fare revenue. In a net cost contract, the contractor
receives a smaller payment from the transit agency but retains the fare revenue. Since
ridership fluctuates, the net cost approach motivates them to provide better service so that
they can capture more revenue. A gross cost contract lessens the risk for the contractor,
which may lead to more bids and greater competition.
The gross cost structure initially may result in more reliable service. At least during a
specified "break-in" period after Tren Urbano opens, the primary goal of the
supplemental minibus network should be to develop ridership by providing reliable but
not necessarily high-productivity service. Allowing contractors to keep fare revenue
would motivate them to wait for their vehicle to fill before departing from the terminal.
In other words, the service provider would continue to equate every empty seat with lost
revenue and thus the operating procedures could degenerate into the status quo.
Although incentives for schedule adherence might encourage them to change, in practice
it may be difficult and costly to enforce contract regulations.
A "shared revenue" scenario represents a compromise between these two options. In
this situation, the public agency partially reimburses the contractor for fares collected. A
graduated scale, where contractors earn a higher percentage of revenue as ridership
grows, encourages them to provide the consistent service needed to attract more
customers. However, it also increases the contractor's financial risk and may drive up
bid prices. Simply filling vehicles, the current operating practice, will not necessarily
generate more ridership or revenue. Since this behavior results in uneven headways,
particularly during the off-peak, it discourages ridership.
* Vehicle specifications and ownership
A typical pdblico van is approximately fifteen years old, lacks air conditioning, and
has an inefficient seating arrangement that hampers easy entry and exit. It is also
inaccessible to people with wheelchairs. New, accessible vehicles will be needed not
only to comply with federal ADA requirements, but also to attract customers who expect
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quality feeder services to deliver them to Tren Urbano. For a detailed discussion of
accessibility requirements, refer to Appendix D.
A modem accessible bus fleet that supplements Tren Urbano will require a substantial
capital investment. The standard lift-equipped minibus, also known as a "cutaway", sells
for about $50,000. Low-floor vans that avoid wheelchair lift maintenance, and
dramatically reduce dwell times for wheelchair customers, and enhance accessibility for
all passengers, cost much more. For example, the "ELF" (short for "Exceptional Low-
Floor Flexibility") costs at least $100,000. 3 If the government required bidders to
provide their own accessible vehicles, it would implicitly limit competition to large-scale,
established companies and increase bid prices. However, the contractor would also be
more motivated to maintain the vehicles. Realistically, pdblico route associations would
have little chance of winning this type of competition, unless they form partnerships or
joint ventures with other, well-financed entities.
It would also be in the best interests of the government to avoid the pdblico
system's long run demise. The deteriorating condition of the present pdiblico fleet
illustrates that owners can hardly afford to maintain their aging vehicles, let alone
purchase modem low-floor vans or minibuses with wheelchair lifts. While some
traditional pdlblicos may succeed in carving their own niche, many may cease operations
when faced with government-supported high-quality competition. Extending vehicle
loans and seeking exemptions from ADA regulations may help the pd'blicos survive.
4.5.2.3 Hybrid Approach
The hybrid approach combines elements of current pd'blico operations and the
pure contracted services model. "Base" contracted services would run approximately
every half-hour during all hours of operation on all routes. Licensed "Tren Urbano
Pdblicos," run as individual for-profit service, would supplement the base services at the
driver's discretion. The licensed publicos would not follow schedules; however, it is
likely that they would provide relatively frequent service during the busiest travel hours
in order to capture the most passenger revenue. To prevent them from "skimming"
3 Source: Overland Custom Coach, Thorndale, Ontario, Canada
passengers from the publicly funded base services, however, the licensed pdiblicos would
be forbidden to leave a station close to a scheduled base service departure. Standard,
non-licensed pdiblicos could not compete directly with either service; they would be
denied entry to Tren Urbano stations.
The owners of licensed pdiblicos would not receive direct assistance for operating
expenses or government assistance for vehicle procurement. However, Tren Urbano
would reimburse them for transferring passengers. Even with this indirect support, it is
uncertain whether becoming licensed pdlblicos will prove financially attractive for current
pdblico owners. According to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), any new
fixed-route, public transit vehicle purchased after 1991 must be accessible to individuals
with disabilities (refer to Appendix D). Unfortunately, these well-intentioned guidelines
make the capital cost prohibitive ($50,000 or more) for the average pdblico driver. One
cost-reduction tactic would be to attempt to waive ADA requirements by arguing that
these regulations would force drivers of the licensed pdiblicos out of business (Amador
and Wensley, 1999). Another possibility is to attempt to define the supplemental services
as "demand responsive." Specifically, drivers could deviate from fixed routes to pick up
or drop off passengers. According to ADA regulations, a demand responsive system
does not require accessibility if, "when viewed in its entirety, [it] provides a level of
service to [individuals with disabilities] equivalent to the level of service provided to the
general public." In this case, the base service and possibly paratransit would arguably
provide an "equivalent" level of service.
Table 4-3 describes the service characteristics for a preliminary hybrid model
developed for the Bayam6n area. Costs were estimated using the ridership forecasts from
the Tren Urbano Environmental Impact Statement. These estimates rely on the
assumption that base contract service costs approximately $35 per hour and that licensed
Tren Urbano Pdblico drivers would receive a $0.50 reimbursement for each transferring
customer (Multisystems, 1999 [3]).
Table 4-3: Proposed Bayamcn Base and Licensed Piiblico Characteristics
Characteristic Base Service Licensed Tren Urbano POblicos
Operator Under contract Pblico drivers
Proposed Fares $1.50 (combined piblico and TU $1.50 (combined piblico and TU
fare); $0.50 pOblico fare fare); $0.50 piblico fare
Span of Service 7 days/wk, matching Tren Urbano Determined by individual drivers,
hours of operation similar to current piblico hours
of operation (assumed to be
weekdays 5 am-7 pm)
Service Headways 30 minutes Determined by individual drivers
Schedule Adherence Yes No
Accessibility ADA compliant Not ADA Compliant
Estimated Year 2001 Annual 3.0 million 4.8 million
Ridership
Annual Revenue Hours 306,600 224,200
Assumed Contract Costs $35/revenue hour $.50 reimbursement per
transferring passenger
Estimated Annual Operating $10.7 million $0
Costs
Fare Revenues $1.5 million -$2.4 million
Estimated Net Cost $9.2 million $2.4 million
Source: Multisystems, Inc. [2], 1999.
Compared to the pure contracted operations model, the hybrid approach saves on
contract costs as well as capital costs for the government. In the preliminary analysis of
Bayam6n pdiblicos, the net cost per passenger was over $3 for base contract service but
only $0.50 per Licensed Tren Urbano Pdblico rider.4 If only contracted services were to
operate in Bayam6n, annual net costs would be approximately $16.1 million versus $11.6
million under the hybrid scenario. The difference comes from the public accepting
responsibility for the 224,000 service hours that are assumed to be privately operated
under the hybrid scenario. This would require additional financial support of $7.8
million annually (at a rate of $35 per revenue hour), less $2.4 million from fare revenues.
The hybrid model also has a few limitations, including:
* Schedule coordination: Licensed Tren Urbano Pdblicos are not required to operate
according to a specified timetable. As long as drivers derive their income directly
from fare revenue, they will be reluctant to leave the station until their vehicle fills.
4 Since Licensed Tren Urbano Pdblicos likely would run only during the most profitable time periods, these
numbers may exaggerate the benefits of this model. This hybrid model also assumes that pdblico owners
can acquire non-accessible vehicles, possibly an ADA violation. Requiring accessible vehicles will raise
the entry cost for licenses, discouraging potential drivers from joining the program.
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" Passenger Skimming: To maximize revenue, some licensed pd'blicos may try to
"skim" passengers by travelling directly in front of a base service vehicle, even if
contract provisions prohibit this practice. Unfortunately, this behavior would require
more public subsidies to support both the base service and Tren Urbano. Not only
would the base service lose revenue directly, but Tren Urbano also would have to
reimburse the licensed pdblico driver. While Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL)
technology or even human "starters" at rail stations can help "manage" pd'blico
drivers, passenger skimming is very difficult to prevent in real operating
environments.
" Fare Integration: Reimbursing drivers for individual transfer trips makes
implementing unlimited-ride intermodal passes very difficult.
" Regulating Private Entry and Controlling Base Service: For the hybrid scenario to
succeed, PRHTA must make clear that the pdiblicos providing supplementary service
do not "own" the Tren Urbano feeder market. Judging from past experience,
however, it would be difficult to regulate private carriers once they gain a foothold
along a given route. They might feel threatened by any attempt by the PRHTA to
increase base service in response to demand. Without their cooperation, it will be
difficult to coordinate bus service with Tren Urbano.
Summary and Recommendations
The contracted operations model, the hybrid model, and the existing pdiblico system
are in theory all driven by competition. Contracted operations, however, are more likely
to produce a higher level of service. In summary:
e Financial Assistance: The financial assistance provided to contracted operations
results in more comprehensive service, not just along high volume routes during peak
hours. Financial support also enables periodic fleet renewal with comfortable, air-
conditioned vehicles that also meet ADA requirements. Pdiblicos only operate when
and where drivers feel they can earn a profit. To stay solvent, most drivers have also
decided not to upgrade their vehicles.
" Organizational Scale and Structure: The contract structure makes it easier to achieve
the consistent, coordinated service needed to complement Tren Urbano. A private
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entity operates the service, but the public agency specifies fare policy, routes and
schedules. Pdblicos are more difficult to "control" because they are individually
owned and operated, even though they belong to route associations and federations.
Drivers leave a terminal when they have a full passenger load, not on a fixed
schedule. Furthermore, since they derive their income directly from passenger fares,
they may be reluctant to undertake intermodal fare integration with Tren Urbano.
* Nominal v Real Competition: Although the pniblico is sometimes hailed as a "free
enterprise", competition-based transport system, pdiblico route associations basically
act like cartels. At least in Bayam6n, few pdblico routes face direct challenges from
AMA buses because they mostly serve different geographical territory. Pdiblico
drivers queue at major terminals and are not supposed to "steal" customers from
fellow drivers. Riders, most of whom are transit-dependent, have no viable
alternatives. Currently San Juan realizes few benefits from the current form of
private transport since little competition actually occurs. In the contracted operations
model, on the other hand, the bidding process encourages competition, can require
higher quality service, and favors cost-efficiency. Assuming that enough firms bid,
providers that can meet the proposal specifications at a reasonable price have a better
chance to win. Incentives, penalties, and the threat of contract termination all
motivate an operator to fulfill the service requirements.
For reasons discussed previously, the pure contracted service model has the best
chance of fulfilling an intermodal system's desired qualities (service frequency, schedule
reliability, integrated fares, vehicle comfort, and accessibility). Unfortunately, this model
is also the most expensive; in Bayam6n, for example, it would require financial support
of approximately $16 million annually, or $5 million more than the hybrid approach.
With the hybrid model, however, motivating the licensed Tren Urbano pdiblico operators
to provide a high level-of-service may be as difficult as it is now.
To develop ridership as well as long-term public and political support, it might make
more sense to adopt the contracted service model and simply "do it right" the first time.
One or more of the following strategies could help contain costs:
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* Larger vehicles - Increasing vehicle capacity on busy routes can reduce fleet
requirements. Larger vehicles may cost more initially, but they save on ongoing
expenses. However, larger vehicles also mean poorer service headways, a major
ridership deterrent. In addition, they do not maneuver as well along narrow or hilly
streets commonly found in San Juan.
" Shortening service hours and increasing base headways - Shortening service hours,
particularly by limiting late-night and weekend morning service on low-demand
routes, can trim expenses. Lengthening the base headways on low patronage routes
can also reduce costs. Even with these cutbacks, service would still be far superior to
present pdblico operations, which run erratically and do not operate at all during the
evening or on Sundays.
" Limiting service coverage - Under the current Bayam6n service plan, the proposed
feeder route density is extremely high in certain areas, with some lines being only a
few blocks apart. In the Levittown neighborhood, some planned feeder routes also
duplicate existing AMA bus service. Consolidating routes, particularly during the
off-peak, could substantially cut vehicle and driver costs.
" Higher fares - Higher fares can increase the cost recovery ratio; however, they may
also result in lower ridership. The actual revenue gains depend upon the fare
elasticity, or the sensitivity of riders to fare changes.
None of these options sound favorable from a customer's perspective. However,
limiting service hours (especially during the late evening) or coverage initially probably
would have the least impact on customers since this service does not currently exist
anyway. Nevertheless, the PRHTA should aim for incremental increases in off-peak
services as ridership develops. Finally, one should not overemphasize cost-cutting
measures for transit services that supplement Tren Urbano. First, the operating costs for
feeder service are relatively small compared to Tren Urbano's capital costs. Secondly,
Tren Urbano's success greatly depends upon drawing customers from areas that are not
adjacent to rail stations. A relatively small expenditure on buses and pdiblicos will allow
many more people to take advantage of Tren Urbano.
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Finally, introducing a contracted service in Bayam6n could face political
obstacles. Naturally, pdiblico operators and their associations will probably view any
incursion into "their" territory as a threat. Unlike Rio Piedras, the publicly-funded AMA
transit system has not already established itself in the area. Nevertheless, pursuing a
similar strategy of avoiding direct competition would help diffuse possible conflicts.
This approach would involve market segmentation: the pdiblicos would continue to
provide transport between residential areas and the markets in Bayam6n, while the
contracted services would primarily enhance accessibility to Tren Urbano. To
accomplish this objective, the contracted routes could initially be diverted from the
Bayam6n station to the Deportivo station, one stop to the east. Meanwhile, fare
coordination between Tren Urbano and the contracted service as well as regulations that
bar the traditional pd'blicos from entering the Bayam6n station would further reinforce the
distinction between the two services. Alternatively, the contracted service could charge
$1, with free transfer privileges, effectively minimizing any siphoning off of current
pdblico riders.
This strategy would admittedly lead to some inefficiency. Customers headed
toward central Bayam6n (either to the commercial district or Tren Urbano) would not
always be able to board the first vehicle that arrives at their stop. The routing to
Deportivo would also depress the contracted system's ridership because the station is
located away from major commercial areas. For these reasons, it may make sense
eventually to provide the contracted service to Bayam6n station. Delaying this move until
long after Tren Urbano's opening day, however, may be necessary to facilitate the
transition period to rail.
4.5.3 Peripheral Areas and "Tren Urbano Plazas"
Currently, San Juan's pdiblicos offer limited service to periphery of the
metropolitan region. While potential Tren Urbano riders live in these areas, low
densities, good highway access, and high automobile ownership make it difficult to
provide high-quality feeder services. Without improved transit access to Tren Urbano,
ridership may not reach its potential because there are relatively few park-and-ride spaces
at rail stations to accommodate automobiles.
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The "Tren Urbano Plaza" is an innovative concept designed to improve rail
accessibility in suburban areas with relatively poor transit service. Tren Urbano Plazas
would be located in outlying areas near major highways (Figure 4-7 shows a map of
potential plaza sites). Each plaza would consist of a transit center with kiss-and-ride and
park-and-ride facilities, as well as varying levels of commercial development depending
on location. Express shuttle buses would operate non-stop between each plaza and a
Tren Urbano station along dedicated high-occupancy vehicle lanes, offering faster travel
times and better reliability than the car. For customer convenience, plaza shuttles would
operate during both the peak and off-peak on weekdays, corresponding to Tren Urbano
service hours. Shuttles would sport the Tren Urbano logo to encourage customers to
think of the plaza as an integral component of the rail system. Finally, modest parking
and concessionaire fees could help offset operating costs (Multisystems, 1999 [1]).
The Tren Urbano Plaza concept makes sense for several reasons. It effectively
serves low-density areas with high car ownership rates. Instead of operating many long-
headway routes in the suburbs, resources are consolidated into a few frequent, fast, point-
to-point routes originating at strategically located plazas along key highways and close to
suburban neighborhoods so as to intercept motorists who might otherwise forgo transit
altogether. Passengers can reach many regional destinations quickly by connecting to
Tren Urbano. The plazas would also provide excellent kiss-and-ride locations, close to
suburban homes. Finally, Tren Urbano Plazas avoid the need to use space adjacent to rail
stations - choice locations for transit-oriented development - with expansive parking and
kiss-and-ride facilities.
The plaza concept serves an untapped, distinct market: suburban "choice" riders.
With this product differentiation, it reduces the potential for political conflicts with the
pdblicos. Federal transit officials have also endorsed the plaza concept. In June 1999,
the Federal Transit Administration chose San Juan to participate in a nationwide "bus
rapid transit" demonstration. Specifically, the 2.5-mile Rio Hondo express shuttle route,
which links the PR 199/Rio Hondo Tren Urbano Plaza with the Bayam6n station, will
become one of ten funded projects nationwide (FTA, 1999).
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions
A new rail line has the potential to strengthen a transit system by introducing
quick, reliable, comfortable, and frequent transportation that attracts new riders and
generates public support. A bus network that supplements the rail line can extend
transit's reach and make the system more responsive to a variety of travel patterns.
Although a new rail system can bring about long-term gains for transit, in the short term
it introduces many changes that that may result in uncertainty for both passengers and
operators. At the same time, external pressures to demonstrate "success" (often measured
in terms of rail ridership) may cause agencies to divert their attention away from the
equally important bus system. As both bus and rail are critical components of a
successful intermodal system, agencies should focus on how both modes can work
together.
This work has had two primary motivations: (1) to address intermodal integration
issues generally with application to any North American metropolitan area developing a
rail system, and (2) to make specific recommendations for San Juan, Puerto Rico, where
the Tren Urbano heavy rail system is slated to open in 2002. It has developed a
framework to analyze intermodal integration strategies, which considers some important
factors (e.g. potential level-of-service, ridership, system productivity, and political
impacts) in the decision making process.
Given the North American experience with intermodal integration, there is clearly
a need to balance long-term system objectives with the short-term considerations of
introducing a rail component to a transit network. An incremental approach to the issue
may be appropriate, a strategy that few (if any) North American cities have pursued.
Specifically, this approach suggests that a transit agency should initially focus on
capturing riders through fare incentives and other promotions, while deferring large
decisions with significant impacts (such as bus restructuring) beyond the rail system's
opening day. This delay helps insulate the transit operator from potential political
difficulties when it is in the spotlight and provides real data to justify proposed service
changes. In the meantime, an agency must be prepared for some system inefficiency and
unmet ridership expectations.
5.1 Review of Planning Principles
This thesis has also discussed general intermodal integration planning principles,
supported by evidence from a handful of American cities with new rail systems.
Fare Coordination
Fare coordination is extremely important in a system that relies on transfers to
maximize the destination opportunities available to customers. The fare policy should
encourage customers to use the most efficient route(s) possible to reach their destinations,
regardless of mode. The majority of North American transit operators offer free or
heavily-discounted transfers, unlimited-ride day passes, or a combination of both. In
general, having a single regional transit provider overseeing all modes greatly facilitates
fare integration. Given the recent experiences in New York and Washington, DC, it
seems reasonable to conclude that simplifying and lowering the cost of intermodal (and
intramodal) transfers can attract new patrons to the system and encourage existing
customers to ride more frequently. These cities have experienced double digit ridership
increases as a result of innovative fare initiatives.
Network Structure
This thesis has investigated the impacts of new rail lines on the existing bus
networks. While rail service may strengthen the transit system overall, it may
inconvenience some existing riders. For example, passengers who used to have a "one-
seat" bus ride may need to use a combination of bus and rail to reach their destinations.
The transition period may be particularly difficult for express bus customers. Express
buses usually offer a direct peak-period ride from the home or a nearby park-and-ride lot
to downtown without intermediate stops. Due to these characteristics, they often attract
"choice" riders who live in the suburbs and work in the city. If a transit agency were to
truncate the line at the nearest rail station, sometimes the added transfer time may not
offset any train travel time savings.
From a service perspective, however, the express bus network that sometimes
exists prior to the opening of a new rail line is usually not comparable with an intermodal
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system. Because each express route is tailored to a specific but limited commute pattern,
it is very difficult for transit agencies to blanket an entire region with frequent, all-day
express bus routes. It is even more of a challenge to offer high-quality express bus
service to destinations outside the downtown core. In contrast, new urban rail systems
introduce relatively fast, frequent, all-day service. Connecting buses, which provide local
and rail feeder service, also often operate more frequently because they support a variety
of travel patterns. As a whole, an intermodal network may provide better access to
multiple points throughout a region. When deciding how to handle bus routes that
parallel a new rail line, agencies must weigh the potential loss of some riders with
potential improvements in network structure and opportunities to redeploy resources
elsewhere. An incremental strategy of deferring major changes until after the rail line
opens can help ease the transition period. After a transition period, real ridership data will
availabile and itshould be possible to show clear benefits of service changes to all
stakeholders. By committing to at least a zero-sum redeployment of bus services from
routes that parallel the rail line to other areas and avoiding any cutbacks in bus service
hours, bus providers can provide more frequent and expanded service elsewhere on the
network.
Transfers
Numerous studies (CTPS [1997], Liu et al. [1997, 1998]) identify transfer waiting
time as a critical deterrent to transit usage. They have found that the "transfer penalty" is
worth several minutes of equivalent in-vehicle time and is substantially more onerous
than initial waiting time. Despite these negative findings about transfer penalties, at least
some transferring will be necessary in an intermodal network or, for that matter, in any
transit system with intersecting routes. This research suggests that agencies should focus
on making transfers as convenient as possible, increasing feeder service overall to lower
transfer waiting time and/or coordinating schedules.
Case Studies
To support the planning principles and recommendations for San Juan, this
research has investigated the intermodal integration experiences in five cities.
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* Portland
Portland is an example of a highly coordinated bus and light rail system. In September
1998, the city extended its light rail line 18 miles to the western suburbs. While the
integration of bus and rail service resulted in the loss of some direct radial bus service, it
has facilitated non-radial trip-making and provided the resources to increase off-peak
frequency and expand network coverage. As a result, transit's peak-period mode share
along a parallel highway rose from 13% to 20% over a six-year period. As significantly,
reverse-commute usage more than tripled (from 4% to 14%) in less than two years (Tri-
Met and ODOT, 1999).
0 Miami
When Miami opened its Metrorail line in the mid-1980s, it faced difficulties because it
focused on cutting back bus service. The bus-rail integration plan "was marketed as a
service improvement when in reality it was a massive service cut" (Fialkoff, 1990). Many
areas lost evening and weekend service. Some routes were transferred to private-sector
jitneys, which the transit agency viewed as an easy way to reduce costs. However, these
jitneys - as in San Juan - were uncomfortable and lacked fare coordination with
conventional buses, providing a lower level of service to customers. The public
demanded and ultimately won restoration of most bus services. In the process, however,
the agency suffered negative publicity and several top officials lost their jobs (Fialkoff,
1990).
0 Los Angeles
Over the past decade, Los Angeles has developed a heavy and light rail network that
carries in excess of 100,000 passengers per day, more than several of the better-
publicized rail "success" stories (APTA, 1999). While the physical integration between
buses and trains has gone relatively smoothly, many people believe that Los Angeles has
two separate and unequal systems: an expensive rail network that caters to "choice"
riders and an underfunded bus system for the transit-dependent. Bus overcrowding,
ridership losses, and threatened fare increases came to reinforce this perception. While
115
some of the criticism may have been unwarranted, the damage has been done: the courts
instead of the transit agency seem to have the final say on service levels and bus
procurement. The agency has also suspended rail projects that would provide high-
quality alternatives to driving and, ironically, would serve the transit-dependent (Klabin,
1996).
0 Washington, DC
Overall, Washington's intermodal experience has been generally positive with buses and
rail playing complementary roles. Recent fare simplification efforts, which reduced most
transfer charges and bus fares, contributed to an immediate ten percent ridership jump
(WMATA Press Release, Oct. 20, 1999). Washington also demonstrates how a rail
system can successfully interface with a busway to offer customers the advantages of
both bus and rail modes. Commuter buses using exclusive high-occupancy vehicle lanes
terminate at a rail station just outside Washington, allowing passengers to transfer to the
subway to reach many scattered destinations quickly and efficiently.
0 San Francisco
The San Francisco Bay Area boasts one of America's most comprehensive transit
systems, in terms of mode diversity and service coverage. However, the sheer network
size and numerous transit providers hamper service and fare coordination. This thesis has
examined one particular example: the transbay corridor between the East Bay and San
Francisco served by both the BART rail system and AC Transit express buses. In
general, the rail and bus networks have evolved to serve different markets. Trains
provide line-haul service between major suburbs and the Bay Area's urban core; the bus
offers one-seat rides to commuters who live far from train stations. Recently, AC Transit
has become more aggressive and begun to concentrate on BART corridors. However,
improvements to attract choice transbay patrons - including BART customers - have
occurred while transit-dependent riders have seen many off-peak services disappear. In
some ways BART's fare and parking policies exacerbate the coordination problem.
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BART provides free parking at rail stations but offers only nominal discounts to those
who transfer to or from buses.
5.2 Application to San Juan
This thesis has developed and evaluated possible strategies for integrating San
Juan's bus and pd'blico system with Tren Urbano. Given the current state of San Juan
public transit, the city faces some tough but surmountable challenges in developing an
effective integrated system. Different vehicle standards, service levels, fares, and
organizational arrangements add complexity to the task. In particular, the inability to
control thousands of individually-owned pdiblicos makes it even tougher to achieve the
service quality necessary for effective integration with Tren Urbano. Active intervention
by the public sector, particularly through financial assistance and pdiblico restructuring
efforts, can help produce the service quality to attract new riders.
The mismatch between Tren Urbano, bus, and pd'blico riders presents another
challenge to effective multimodal coordination. While Tren Urbano will attract some
existing bus and pdiblico customers from parallel routes, many riders will continue on
their current travel patterns simply because the initial phase of Tren Urbano will not serve
their destinations. In other words, the bus and pd'blico systems will continue to play
important roles in San Juan even though Tren Urbano will emerge as the visual and
symbolic backbone of transit.
AMA and Metrobdis Service
In terms of integrating bus and rail services in San Juan, this thesis focuses primarily on
network design and fare policy. Major findings presented in this research include:
e Key AMA Bus Routes: This thesis evaluates proposals of either splitting or truncating
several key routes in order to feed Tren Urbano or address load factor and reliability
issues. A detailed analysis of origin-destination data, coupled with projected
ridership patterns with Tren Urbano, finds that current key routes serve existing and
future demand well. Routes not only provide trunk service along major arterials, but
also feed Tren Urbano at major stations. As such, they meet both local travel and rail
accessibility needs. In most cases, increasing frequency and extending service hours
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(rather than drastic route restructuring) will be sufficient to accommodate anticipated
changes in demand due to Tren Urbano.
* Metrobd's Service: Eventually, reducing or even discontinuing Metrobus I service that
parallels Tren Urbano should not severely impact the service quality for existing
customers. Rail stations are generally within walking distance of the vast majority of
Metrobd's I riders as long as fare integration with free transfers is provided. In
addition, other bus routes that parallel portions of the Tren Urbano alignment would
continue to provide local service. By avoiding service duplication, buses could be
redeployed to the remaining portion of Metrobdls I (between Santurce and Viejo San
Juan). However, the strong image of Metrobis I as San Juan's first public transit
success suggests that restrucutring should follow an initial Tren Urbano opening, and
be based on observed ridership preferences.
" Fare policy: Currently, no fare integration exists within or between San Juan's transit
systems. Nevertheless, fare coordination is necessary for a system designed around
both intra- and intermodal transfers. In particular, service changes that introduce
transfers need mitigation such as reduced or free transfers in order to minimize the
cost impacts on riders. Otherwise, fares could more than double, ridership could
drop, and the current strong support for Tren Urbano may weaken.
Pdiblico Service
Currently, the existing fleet will not provide sufficient carrying capacity to serve
the anticipated new rail feeder market. In addition, the pd'blicos' relatively poor service
quality and vehicle conditions are unlikely to attract many "choice" riders to Tren
Urbano. Integrating the pdiblicos with Tren Urbano involves two related challenges:
overcoming the institutional barriers that now impede service quality and creating
attractive supplemental services to meet induced demand. One must avoid the perception
that new or improved Tren Urbano feeder services - and Tren Urbano itself - are
consciously or unconsciously driving the pdiblicos out of existence. This research
investigates options for three areas: Rio Piedras, Bayam6n, and the region's periphery.
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Rio Piedras Area
In Rio Piedras, the pdlblicos currently face some competition from less expensive
and more consistent AMA buses, particularly on routes that link the area with Carolina.
With the anticipated increases in transit demand due to Tren Urbano, AMA service
expansion in the Rio Piedras area is clearly important. Nevertheless, avoiding direct
competition with the pd'blicos could help diffuse potential conflicts. Considering the
physical constraints of the street network and the difficulty of evicting pd'blicos from the
center of Rio Piedras, it might make sense to leave the pdlblicos alone and redirect AMA
buses to adjacent Tren Urbano stations. One possibility is to route buses along the south
side of the University of Puerto Rico campus to the UPR station, which would target the
university and rail feeder markets. Passengers could walk to the commercial district, but
buses would not directly compete with pdiblicos there, and both modes would likely enjoy
increased ridership from new Tren Urbano feeder market.
Bayam6n Area
Unlike Rio Piedras, the pd'blicos face little direct competition from AMA in the
Bayam6n area. Meeting the accessibility needs of Tren Urbano in this area presents a
unique challenge. It would be difficult to rely on the pd'blicos to provide high-quality
service. At the same time, introducing an entirely new feeder network would increase
operating costs substantially and could generate stiff opposition from pdiblico operators.
This thesis investigates three major strategies:
" Minimalist - This approach leaves pdiblicos in their present state, with no vehicle or
service improvements to tap the Tren Urbano market.
" Contracted Operations - In this scenario, the Puerto Rico Highway and
Transportation Authority (PRHTA) would initiate a set of contracted feeder routes.
The authority would determine routes, fares, schedules, and vehicle characteristics,
while private contractors competitively bid to operate the service.
" Hybrid - The hybrid approach combines elements of current pdiblico operations and
the pure contracted services model. "Base" contracted services would run
approximately every half-hour during all hours of operations on all routes. Licensed
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"Tren Urbano Pd'blicos," run as individual for-profit service, would supplement the
base services at the driver's discretion.
The contracted operations model is the most likely to fulfill an intermodal
system's desired qualities. It would facilitate fare integration, avoid passenger skimming
from licensed or traditional pdiblicos, and enable all service to run on a schedule.
Following a similar "pdblico avoidance" strategy as in Rio Piedras, the contracted routes
could initially terminate at Deportivo station instead of Bayam6n Centro, which is within
walking distance of several pd'blico terminals. Alternatively, based contracted service
could be provided to both stations, but with a $1 fare with a free transfer. This fare
policy would attract new Tren Urbano riders without directly competing for traditional
pdblico markets. Of course, this model is also the most expensive. Limiting service
hours (especially during the late evening) or coverage initially to contain operating costs
probably would have the least impact on customers since this service does not currently
exist anyway.
To make this model succeed, bidding must be competitive in order to reduce costs
and attract a high-quality contractor. A public agency also must monitor the service
provider to ensure that it is fulfilling the contract specifications. Finally, this model
depends upon careful structuring and a commitment to enforce its provisions. Table 2
outlines recommendations for Bayam6n feeder service contract provisions.
Table 5-1: Recommendations for Bayamon Feeder Service Contract Provisions
Geographical A more extensive geographical area would minimize the contract overhead
Scope and Contract and favor larger and more organized bidders. This in turn may improve the
Size chances of providing higher quality service since it would encourage bids
from established transport companies.
Service Level Given the uncertainty of feeder service ridership demand when Tren
Requirements and Urbano opens, the contract should preferably begin with conservative
Changes (relatively low) service requirements. It will need to include provisions for
incremental service changes.
Gross Cost v. A "shared revenue" scenario, where the public agency partially reimburses
Net Cost the contractor for fares collected, encourages contractors to provide
Reimbursement consistent service needed to attract more customers.
Vehicle The contract should require bidders to provide at least some of their own
specifications and vehicles, which would implicitly limit competition to large-scale, established
ownership companies and increase bid prices. However, the contractor would also be
more motivated to maintain the vehicles.
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Peripheral Areas
The "Tren Urbano Plaza" is an innovative concept designed to improve rail
accessibility in suburban areas with relatively poor transit service. Tren Urbano Plazas
would be located in outlying areas near major highway, and each would consist of a
transit center with kiss-and-ride, park-and-ride facilities, and possibly commercial
development. Express shuttle buses would operate non-stop between each plaza and a
Tren Urbano station along dedicated high-occupancy vehicle lanes, offering faster travel
times and better reliability than the car. Strategically located plazas along key highways
intercept motorists who might otherwise forgo transit altogether. The plaza concept
serves an untapped, distinct market: suburban "choice" riders. With this product
differentiation, it reduces the potential for conflicts with the pd'blicos.
5.3 Areas for Further Research
This thesis has covered many broad intermodal integration issues. There clearly
exists a need to explore many of these issues in greater depth. The following list
highlights potential areas for further research, both in the general case and the San Juan
context:
General
e Impact of new rail systems on transportation providers: Planners need to better
understand how new rail systems influence private carriers as well as transit
management, front-line workers and other employees. With this understanding,
transit agencies can take steps to reduce potential conflicts (e.g. job security issues).
Within this context, it would also be useful to identify strategies to involve the private
sector more in service provision to achieve cost efficiencies.
" Cost and demand modeling: This thesis primarily employed a qualitative approach to
assess various integration strategies. For instance, the discussion about network
structure involved general concepts rather than detailed modeling, supported by some
general data from the case studies. A simple, but limited model involving operating
costs and ridership was developed to describe the situation. Additional research into
cost and demand implications different strategies could help better estimate the
financial impacts of service changes.
* Intermodal facilities: The physical design of intermodal facilities can influence
people's willingness to use transit. Possible research areas include the safety and
comfort of waiting areas and the provision of real-time vehicle departure information.
Station parking policies and availability are also important because they influence rail
ridership, usage of feeder buses and other modes, station construction and
maintenance costs, and surrounding land uses.
" Cross-sectional analysis of cities outside North America: Many cities with
multimodal transit systems on other continents boast high transit mode shares.
Research into what makes these systems successful (both exogenous and endogenous
factors) can help North American planners identify additional integration strategies
for new rail systems.
* Intermodal integration in low-density environments: As noted in chapter 3, operating
effective intermodal transit systems in automobile-oriented suburbs is a tremendous
challenge. Given the importance of suburbs, it would be useful to conduct additional
research into how to integrate buses with new rail systems, particularly commuter
rail, which has grown rapidly in the past few years. In contrast to typical light and
heavy rail lines, commuter rail is tailored to long-distance, peak-hour, peak-direction
travelers and runs infrequently (if at all) during the off-peak. In most cases, this
level-of-service makes rail more reliant on automobile rather than bus access.
* Marketing: Often, existing bus services lack a strong image compared to a new rail
system. Additional research identifying ways to market supplemental bus services -
particularly as an extension of a rail line - can not only generate ridership, but
encourage people to think of bus and rail as one system.
San Juan specific:
* Institutional issues: Significant cultural differences exist between San Juan and other
American cities (including the case studies). Research on unique institutional issues
by people familiar with Caribbean and Latin American customs and culture would
help planners tailor successful integration strategies used in other cities to San Juan.
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In particular, the pdiblicos merit special attention since they are unique to Puerto Rico,
have had a long historical presence on the island, and pose the greatest challenge to
effective service integration with Tren Urbano and conventional bus services.
" Route Analysis: While this thesis examines some major bus routes in the San Juan,
several key transit corridors with high ridership potential require a more extensive
analysis. Some of these present opportunities for the implementation of "Bus Rapid
Transit" as an interim step to full Tren Urbano service. Examples include the Viejo
San Juan/Santurce and the Rio Piedras/Carolina corridors.
" Transfers: As in other systems, transfers will be a key component of San Juan's
intermodal transit network. To improve the methodology for evaluating service
alternatives, further research needs to be done to quantify the impacts of transfers
(e.g. trading off faster rail service and possibly shortened headways on improved bus
feeder routes with transfer wait times).
" Extensions: After Phases I and IA of Tren Urbano are complete, there are proposals
to extend rail service to Carolina, the Airport area, Viejo San Juan, and Caguas.
Work is needed to determine how to integrate bus and pdblico services with these
extensions.
" Intercity bus service: Currently, pdiblicos provide the major intercity transit service
between San Juan and the rest of Puerto Rico. To make Tren Urbano play a greater
regional carrier role, planners need to determine how to integrate rail with these
intercity pd'blicos, or other possibly new services using standard over-the-road
coaches.
" Other modes: Other ways of accessing Tren Urbano stations include taxicabs and
automobile dropoffs ("kiss-and-ride"). These modes can supplement bus feeder
services, particularly during off-peak hours and in remote areas. Better accessibility
to Tren Urbano can allow family members to share cars (instead of leaving a car idle
at a park-and-ride lot), creating a more transit-dependent culture. Additional research
can help identify ways to encourage alternative modes (for example, neighborhood
taxis).
123
* Marketing: Marketing of new and expanded transit service is extremely important in
San Juan, where transit does not have a strong positive image. Research should focus
on how to build a transit "culture" with Tren Urbano, buses, and pd'blicos. In
particular, it should identify ways to adapt successful marketing practices elsewhere
to the Puerto Rican environment.
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Appendix A: Case Studies
The following case studies of intermodal integration provide lessons for San Juan.
They focus on the United States for two reasons. First, cities in the United States in
general have developed differently from those in Latin America, Europe, Asia, Australia
or Africa. Low density, high automobile ownership, and a severe decline of public
transport have created unusual challenges for emerging rail systems that merit attention.
Secondly, although the San Juan is arguably closer to Latin American cities in terms of
language, culture and population characteristics, its travel patterns resemble many
automobile-dependent United States cities. Indeed, American policies and capital have
greatly influenced the transportation system and physical development of the San Juan
metropolitan region.
While all North American cities with urban rail systems could provide lessons for
San Juan, this research focuses on only a few: Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco,
Washington, and Portland. The chosen case studies have one or more of the following
characteristics:
(a) major restructuring of the surrounding bus network took place in response to a new
rail line,
(b) a new rail line altered the social or political landscape with respect to transportation,
(c) multiple regional transit operators complicate route and schedule coordination,
(d) demand responsive services meet some transportation needs
In addition, the case studies almost all involve rail systems that began during the 1970s or
later. Like San Juan, these cities were mostly automobile-oriented but also had transit-
dependent neighborhoods prior to the opening of their rail lines.
A.1 Los Angeles
With the world's most extensive freeway network and a legendary affection for
cars, Los Angeles is a well-known symbol of sprawl, smog, and traffic congestion.
Although often overshadowed by the automobile, public transit still has played a
noteworthy role in the city's overall transportation picture. Los Angeles once boasted an
extensive electric streetcar and interurban railway network that rivaled systems in
Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. By the Second World War, Los Angeles
was engaged in a transportation strategy that emphasized private mobility and massive
highway construction over public transit investment. This policy allowed a once
venerable rail empire to decline into a bus system patronized principally by transit-
dependent minorities. Due to its sheer population size, however, Los Angeles
nevertheless operates the nation's second largest bus system, now managed by the Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA).
Against this backdrop, Los Angeles embarked on an ambitious rail construction
program in the 1980s. The Blue Line, a 22-mile light rail line linking Long Beach and
Los Angeles, opened in 1990. Five years later, the Green Line added another 20 miles to
the system. The city's first modem subway, the 11-mile Red Line, opened in 1993. It
currently runs from downtown Los Angeles to Hollywood and will reach the San
Fernando Valley by the year 2000. "Metro Rail" now transports around 135,000
passengers on weekdays (MTA website), more than well-publicized urban rail systems in
San Diego, Portland, St. Louis, and Dallas.
While the physical integration between buses and trains has gone relatively
smoothly, many people believe that Los Angeles has two separate and unequal systems:
an expensive rail network that caters to middle-class white people and an underfunded
bus system for low-income minorities. Rail critics suggest that the MTA has diverted
resources from the bus system, used by over 90% of transit riders, to benefit
comparatively few rail passengers. Some opponents also accuse the MTA of cutting bus
service to force passengers onto trains (Rabin, 1999).
For many customers, bus overcrowding, ridership losses, and threatened fare
increases came to symbolize how MTA's rail program was hurting the bus system. The
widespread perception that the MTA favored trains over buses led to the formation of an
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activist "Bus Riders' Union". In July 1994, under budgetary pressures, the MTA made
itself more vulnerable to criticism by proposing to eliminate popular monthly passes and
increase fares from $1.10 to $1.35 per ride. The "Bus Riders' Union" and other bus
advocates took the MTA to court and forced the agency to continue monthly passes,
although the court allowed the base fare to increase (Klabin, 1996). In the summer of
1995, the MTA suffered another embarrassment: Red Line tunneling caused a sinkhole to
form on Hollywood Boulevard. This unfortunate incident drew unwanted media
attention to the beleaguered agency and spotlighted construction management problems
(Davis, 1995).
In 1996, the MTA faced another lawsuit charging that the agency had
discriminated against minorities and the poor by allowing the bus system to deteriorate.
To avoid a trial, it negotiated a "Consent Decree" with the Bus Riders' Union and its
allies in which it agreed to increase bus service and address overcrowding issues. More
specifically, the agreement restricted the number of bus standees during any 20-minute
period to 15 or fewer (9 or fewer by the year 2002). In March 1999, the Bus Riders'
Union won another victory. A judge agreed with bus advocates that the MTA was not
complying fully with the "Consent Decree" requirements and ordered the agency to
purchase 532 new buses (Rabin, 1999). This ruling came even though the MTA was
already complying with Consent Decree's standees requirements more than 95% of the
time and had added 100 peak-hour buses in the previous year (MTA Press Release,
October 18, 1999). Meanwhile, political pressures and budget problems forced the
agency to freeze rail projects to Pasadena, the Mid-City district west of downtown, and
East Los Angeles. Ironically, these proposed rail corridors traverse communities with
large transit-dependent and minority populations.
Even supporters of Los Angeles' rail program acknowledge that the MTA made
some tactical and political blunders. Still, they maintain that Metro Rail critics have not
given the agency enough credit for building a heavily-patronized rail system from
scratch. They suggest that opponents have been quick to polarize the discussion into a
"bus v. rail" debate about technology, class and race, but slow to find workable
alternatives to the automobile. One observer comments, "the [Bus Riders' Union] labels
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every light rail or subway system in Los Angeles County as 'racist', a statement that
stretches credibility" (Rivera, 1999).
An analysis of the rail system reveals that some criticism of the MTA may have
been unwarranted. Contrary to the perception that the rail system caters to white riders, it
actually serves mostly low-income and minority neighborhoods. The Blue Line, for
example, traverses African-American and Hispanic communities of South-Central Los
Angeles, Watts, Compton, and North Long Beach. The Red Line serves the Hispanic and
Asian-American enclaves of Westlake-MacArthur Park and Koreatown. In fact,
minorities comprise 89% of the riders on the Blue Line, 86% on the Green Line and 75%
on the Red Line. This hardly differs from MTA buses, where the figure is 88% (Stanger,
1999). From a level-of-service perspective, these riders have enjoyed faster and more
reliable service as a result of Metro Rail. For example, an afternoon rush-hour trip from
Downtown Los Angeles to Watts takes 20 minutes on the Blue Line compared to 57
minutes on the Line 55 bus. The Red Line shaves 25 minutes off a trip between
downtown and the mid-Wilshire district (8 minutes on the subway versus 33 minutes on
the Line 20 bus) (MTA website).
The transit controversy that has engulfed Los Angeles throughout the 1990s has
made it easy to overlook other intermodal coordination efforts. Without fanfare, the
urban rail lines have integrated with dozens of bus routes operated by both the MTA and
municipal carriers. They have also facilitated regional travel. The Red Line now links
some of the densest parts of Los Angeles County with Metrorail commuter trains to the
suburbs. The Red and Green Lines also connect with the region's two major bus priority
facilities, the Harbor Transitway and the El Monte Busway (MTA System Map).
The rail lines have enabled the MTA to shift buses from rail corridors to
underserved areas. Although this practice has been criticized in Los Angeles and in other
cities, the MTA actually reconfigured only a few routes. It basically overlaid the rail
lines upon an existing, comprehensive bus grid. In every case, it retained parallel local
bus routes to serve short-distance travel needs and provide multiple transit alternatives.
Rather than "force feeding" the rail lines to build ridership, the MTA mostly tried to give
passengers choices.
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In some cases, however, the MTA discontinued parallel express or limited stop
service where rail provided faster, more frequent, and more comprehensive service. For
example, the agency eliminated Line 456, an express bus route that paralleled the Blue
Line from Long Beach to Los Angeles. Unlike the train, this bus bypassed transit-
dependent communities in Compton, Watts, and South-Central Los Angeles. Without
intermediate traffic to support the route, Line 456 also had much lower demand than the
Blue Line. Consequently, it also ran less frequently (every 15-30 minutes versus every 5-
10 minutes during rush hours, and every 30-40 minutes versus every 12 minutes at other
times) (RTD, 1990). Even though the bus ran non-stop once it reached the freeway,
congestion still made it less reliable and slower than the train.
In other cases, opposition to transfers and a reduction in parallel bus service
resulted in missed service integration opportunities and unrealized bus system
improvements. Under pressure from the Bus Riders' Union, the MTA recently
abandoned plans to eliminate bus service between Hollywood and Downtown Los
Angeles that duplicates the Red Line. For the moment, express buses spend thirty extra
minutes each way fighting freeway congestion and downtown traffic and continue to
bypass major ridership generators (Richards, 1999). The three intermediate stops that
these buses do make require passengers to "negotiat[e] long narrow stairways" and wait
in an unpleasant freeway environment (MTA website). In contrast, redirecting these
buses to the subway in Hollywood would have facilitated access to a major bus hub,
Southern California's fourth largest employment center, and the nation's entertainment
capital. The MTA also missed the chance to reallocate resources to shorten headways
and ease overcrowding on other bus routes.
On a positive note, the MTA has begun to focus on the needs of bus customers
and recently initiated many bus system improvements. However, the political damage
has already been done. The Bus Riders' Union and sympathetic judges now seem to have
the final say on service levels and bus procurement. The agency has also suspended rail
projects that would provide high-quality alternatives to driving and, ironically, would
serve minorities and the transit-dependent. Unfortunately, the Bus Riders' Union has
conveyed the message that Los Angeles' transit system does not and should not serve
"choice" riders. Noting the absurdity of the internecine conflict, a local transit expert
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comments that the bus versus rail argument "is very damaging because it pits transit
advocates one against the other. [Rail] and bus are both important. In fact, we should be
arguing together for more transit spending in general and less spending on highways"
(Rivera, 1999).
Figure A-1: Map of Los Angeles Metro Rail system
Source: MTA website
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A.2 Miami
Background
Miami, Florida, resembles San Juan and many other cities that grew rapidly after
the Second World War. While the city has a fairly extensive bus network, low densities
and an automobile-scale development have contributed to heavy reliance on driving.
Like San Juan, Miami is unusual among North American cities because private jitneys
operate alongside the publicly funded transit system, Metro-Dade Transit. In both cities,
Caribbean and Latin American influences also have helped shape the "jitney culture" and
operations. Since the mid-1980s, the public sector has also undertaken efforts to develop
high-quality rail services. In 1985, Metro-Dade Transit completed Metrorail, a 21-mile
heavy rail line connecting downtown Miami with the northwest and southwest suburbs.
Soon thereafter, it opened a connecting people mover system called Metromover that
circulates around the central business district. In 1989, the Tri-Rail commuter rail line
began operating between West Palm Beach and Miami Airport.
Traditionally, public buses and jitneys have formed the backbone of Miami's
transit system. A 1992 study by the Urban Mobility Corporation (UMC) reported that
jitneys carried approximately 43,000 to 49,000 weekday passengers, compared to about
183,000 on Metro-Dade Transit buses (Lau, 1997). In the past, buses and jitneys have
vied for similar territory, creating an adversarial relationship between transit employees
and jitney operators. This contrasts with San Juan, where pdiblicos and AMA bus system
avoid direct competition in most corridors because they largely serve different
geographical areas. Nevertheless, the fundamental issue in both Miami as in San Juan is
the same: conventional transit operates both high-demand and low-demand routes as a
public service, whereas jitneys operate only where and when drivers can make a profit.
In 1985, Dade County passed an ordinance stating that jitneys could only operate
at least a quarter-mile away from "high-density" corridors where buses ran at least every
30 minutes. The regulation "allow[s] the County-operated bus system to maintain its
ability to achieve the maximum possible operating efficiencies without jeopardizing
existing service quality" (MDTA et al., 1987). Supporters of this policy contend that
direct competition often results in jitneys skimming passengers from the transit authority
by running slightly ahead of buses. Consequently, deregulating jitneys would cause
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Metro-Dade Transit to lose passenger revenue that could help support low ridership
routes. These routes do not attract enough traffic to support jitney operators but
nevertheless are important because they may be the only public transit available in certain
communities. Without adequate controls, the private sector would reap the benefits of
the busiest corridors and leave the public to subsidize the most unproductive routes.
As in San Juan, Miami's jitney operators view themselves as business people
more concerned with making a living than providing a social service. Jitney operators, of
course, argue that they should have the right to operate anywhere and maintain that
jitneys and buses serve separate markets. Estimates of costs and revenues suggest that
jitney drivers earn roughly the minimum wage (Lau, 1997). From the jitney operator's
perspective, the county ordinance limits their profitability. During the peak and weekday
base periods, they have few opportunities to operate because "high-density" bus service
covers most of the metropolitan area. The jitney owners have much more flexibility on
weekends and evenings, but demand at these times is also lower. In the past, one jitney
owner threatened to sue to deregulate the industry (MDTA et al., 1987). Jitney drivers
have also defied the route regulations. In one case, Metro-Dade Transit responded to
illegal jitneys by upgrading bus service. It "repackaged" route 77 as "Super 77",
lowering fares from $1.25 to $0.75 and shortening headways to every 10 minutes. As a
result, jitney business dropped 30% and bus ridership grew by 2,000 per day (Metro-
Dade Transit website).
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Figure A-2: Map of Miami's Metrorail system
Source: Metro-Dade Transit website
Planning for Metrorail in the mid-1980s posed many challenges for Metro-Dade
Transit. Not only did it have to grapple with standard integration planning issues, such as
how to handle parallel bus routes and transfers to the rail system, but it also faced budget
limitations and pressures from jitneys. In the end, transit management saw Metrorail as
an opportunity to reorganize the bus system, improve productivity, and provide the jitney
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industry with new ridership opportunities. The integration plan established three primary
goals:
(1) to eliminate bus routes that paralleled or duplicated other routes or Metrorail
(2) to shorten bus routes to improve operational performance
(3) to emphasize a grid network rather than a radial one, with a focus on connecting
buses with the Metrorail system
(4) to modify service spans and headways on bus routes that did not meet service
standards
(5) to streamline bus service by allowing private sector jitneys to operate low-
productivity routes without subsidy.
Metrorail opened in two segments, with the south line from downtown Miami to
Dadeland beginning a year before the north line to Hialeah. The transit authority adopted
a relatively low-key approach to integrating the south line with buses. On opening day, it
simply realigned bus routes that operated near Metrorail to serve the stations. Three
months later, it eliminated premium express routes that operated along the highway that
parallels the rail line. Finally, it restructured some bus routes to become rail feeders and
local circulators. The primary negative reaction came from passengers who formerly
had a one-seat bus ride, but now had to switch modes and pay a $0.25 transfer fee. In
general, however, the public accepted the changes because Metrorail reduced travel time
overall and stations provided pleasant transfer facilities.
Metro-Dade Transit pursued a much more aggressive integration strategy for the
Metrorail's north segment because the rail line served an area with significantly higher
bus ridership. Management was particularly concerned with how Metrorail would impact
transit service in adjacent communities. As with the south line, some customers would
lose one-seat bus rides and have to pay a $0.25 transfer charge. This raised some equity
concerns, since communities without rail service would continue to have direct bus
service to downtown Miami. To demonstrate that it was serious about the needs of bus
passengers, the transit authority decided to overhaul the system with the ostensible
purpose of upgrading service, even in areas outside Metrorail's sphere of influence:
"[The plan] was presented to the public and to public officials as the best way to
perform bus route planning. It offered more transit service with fewer miles and
therefore the system would cost less because the service would be more efficient;
it would be a response to critics who said that too much time and money were
being spent on Metrorail and not on Metrobus, the primary transit mode in the
County in terms of the number of passengers transported." (Fialkoff, 1990).
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The plan seems to have emphasized budget trimming over service enhancement.
Metro-Dade Transit significantly reduced evening and weekend bus service, leaving
riders in many communities with no transit service. A prime cost-cutting example was
the attempt to shift low-productivity service to the private sector. Jitneys replaced buses
on six poorly performing routes, some of which fed Metrorail stations. The public
reacted strongly. First, people were disappointed at the lack of fare integration. The
jitneys did not discount fares for senior citizens or people with disabilities and did not
issue or accept transfers. Simply put, Metro-Dade Transit wanted to withdraw all
financial support from these routes and jitney operators were unwilling to share revenues.
Secondly, many people, especially the elderly, found the vehicles uncomfortable. As a
result, "there was a public outcry for restoration of Metrobus service" (Fialkoff, 1990).
This embarrassing episode, which included unfavorable media coverage and involved
elected officials, soon forced the transit authority to reverse many of the service cuts
(Fialkoff, 1990).
Although many changes involved routes outside the rail corridor, the system
overhaul occurred in conjunction with Metrorail's opening. Thus, an observer might
have reasonably concluded that the rail line caused the bus system to decline. In
retrospect, the integration plan created problems because it "was marketed as a service
improvement where in reality it was a massive service cut" (Fialkoff, 1990). The
political fallout included the removal of the agency director, several deputy directors, the
planning director, and other transit professionals. Ultimately, Metro-Dade Transit
restored most evening and weekend service and realigned many routes to their previous
configuration (Fialkoff, 1990).
Subsequent Actions
In 1987, shortly after Metrorail's opening, a "jitney task force" revisited the jitney
issue. This panel, composed of county staff, jitney industry members, and transit unions,
could not agree on the specific role of Miami's jitneys. While jitney owners continued to
assert that they should be able to operate anywhere, county and union representatives
maintained that such a policy would leave the public sector with only the poorly-
performing routes.
Discussions also included the possibility of transfer discounts between the regular
transit system and jitneys. For the network to appear seamless to the customer, jitney
operators would have to agree on a specific transfer arrangement and reimbursement
policy. Some of the jitney operators expressed interest in revenue sharing while others
did not. The participants concluded that implementation would be difficult because the
transit authority could not force independent jitney operators into a transfer agreement.
Since jitney drivers pocketed fares directly, they would also be reluctant to accept Metro-
Dade monthly passes. From the passenger's perspective, varying transfer fees and the
inability to use monthly passes would make the system less convenient overall. Although
the task force felt that a fare demonstration project would be useful, these obstacles so far
have inhibited fare coordination between the jitneys and conventional transit systems
(MDTA et al., 1987).
Despite these setbacks, Miami has since demonstrated that jitneys can
complement the regular transit system. In September 1992, the Miami area became
eligible for temporary federal financial assistance to help recover from Hurricane
Andrew. Metro-Dade Transit began contracting with private van and minibus companies
to link neighborhoods south of Miami with Metrorail. The transit authority agreed to pay
four prime contractors $28 per hour for vehicles, drivers, insurance, maintenance, and
associated operations expenses; in turn, the contractors subcontracted services to private
van and jitney operators for about $21 per hour. By March 1993, the system had grown
to twelve routes with five to ten minute headways and 20,500 daily riders (Lau, 1997).
One reason for this success is that government support allowed passengers to ride
free. While the temporary financial assistance eventually ended, the experiment
demonstrated that conventional transit and jitney operations could work together under
certain conditions. First, the jitneys tapped a new market and met previously under-
served travel demand, rather than saturating already well-served corridors and skimming
passengers from buses. Secondly, outside funding provided a stable source of income for
jitney drivers. This arrangement reduced the incentive to drive erratically, delay
departures in order to fill vehicles, defer maintenance, or behave in other ways that
degrade service quality and reliability.
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The Miami experience shows that transit agencies should not view a new rail line
as an opportunity to curtail bus service. In particular, disguising service cuts as
"improvements" can ultimately embarrass the transit provider and result in political
troubles. In addition, counting on the private sector to operate unproductive, low-revenue
routes only works if operators receive financial assistance. Even then, fare and schedule
coordination difficulties can arise because different operating paradigms often result in
variable service and comfort levels.
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A.3 San Francisco
The San Francisco Bay Area boasts one of America's most comprehensive transit
systems, in terms of mode diversity and service coverage. Rapid transit, commuter rail,
light rail, buses, trolley buses, ferries, and even cable cars serve a population of about 5
million spread over eight counties. Unfortunately, the sheer network size and numerous
(over two dozen) service providers hamper service and fare coordination. Conflicts arise
between the major regional rail carriers, primarily the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)
and the CalTrain commuter rail line, and local transit agencies such as the San Francisco
Municipal Railway (Muni), AC Transit, and SamTrans.
Figure A-3: Map of the BART system
Source: BART website
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The Transbay Corridor
Although the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) heavy rail system serves some
intra-urban trip patterns within San Francisco and Oakland, primarily it connects outlying
suburban areas in the East Bay with downtown San Francisco. Figure A-3 illustrates that
most trackage lies outside the San Francisco/Oakland urban core. Historically, BART
represents the fourth generation of "transbay" public transit services across the San
Francisco Bay. Before the San Francisco/Oakland Bay Bridge opened in the late 1930s,
commuters rode the Key System interurban electric trains to West Oakland and
transferred to ferries to reach San Francisco. Between 1939 and 1958, interurban trains
ran along the lower deck of the bridge directly to the "Transbay Terminal" near
downtown San Francisco. As a result of declining ridership and booming suburbs, the
Key System converted entirely to buses in 1958 and was taken over by the publicly-
owned AC Transit system in 1960. Since then, AC Transit has operated all transbay and
local bus services in the East Bay (AC Transit, 1998).
When BART opened in 1974, some bus riders shifted to the "new" rail system.
Transbay bus patronage fell from over 40,000 daily trips in 1971 to less than 10,000 in
1996. By comparison, by 1996 BART had grown to 121,000 daily transbay passengers,
90,000 of which came from the AC Transit service area. In 1996, BART and AC Transit
captured a mode share of 40% and 5%, respectively, of afternoon-peak passenger trips in
the corridor. Despite their relatively limited presence, however, the buses continue to
provide a vital service for communities without BART. A week-long BART strike in
1997 also helped revive the transbay buses, then threatened by major service cuts. Since
then, ridership increased 39% as former BART commuters have decided to stay with AC
Transit (AC Transit, 1998).
In general, the rail and bus networks have evolved to serve different markets.
Trains provide line-haul service between major suburbs and the Bay Area's urban core;
the bus offers one-seat rides to commuters who live far from train stations. Buoyed by its
recent ridership turnaround, however, AC Transit has become more aggressive and begun
to concentrate on BART corridors. Its November 1998 Transbay Comprehensive Service
Plan states:
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"In the short term, most of the District's transbay lines will be oriented to areas
not served by BART or ferry service, or where BART is operating with load
factors above 1.0 during the peak commute periods, resulting in standees on
BART trains. But as congestion in the Transbay corridor increases and BART
lines extend out farther into Alameda and Contra Costa counties and begin to
reach capacity in the outlying areas, the District may need to initiate peak-hour
bus service even in areas well-served by BART." (AC Transit, 1998)
BART's 1999-2008 Short Range Transit Plan sees the capacity issue differently. System
improvements should allow the maximum peak headways to drop 20%, from 15 to 12
minutes, by 2002. The system's busiest line (Pittsburg/Bay Point) mainly carries
commuters from central Contra Costa County, which is outside the AC Transit service
area. The three transbay lines that overlap primarily with AC Transit (Fremont,
Richmond, and Dublin/Pleasanton) have room to grow. Within a decade, they are
projected to require seven-car trains on average, far less than the ten-car capacity of
station platforms (BART, 1999).
The focus on the radial market can also obscure the need to serve other travel
patterns. Unlike the transbay buses (or its predecessors), BART not only serves the
transbay corridor but also the East Bay intercity market. Stations in Berkeley, Oakland,
Walnut Creek, Concord, Fremont, and other major activity centers outside San Francisco
help to generate non-radial and reverse-commute ridership. BART trains also run
frequently from early morning until past midnight everyday. AC Transit's extensive local
bus network and BART together provide general mobility throughout the East Bay.
Meanwhile, AC Transit's transbay buses serve a much more limited set of
customers, peak-hour commuters. Most transbay bus routes run locally for a few miles
and then express once they reach the nearest highway. As individual routes are tailored
to link a limited number of neighborhoods directly to San Francisco, few have the
demand to operate during the off-peak. At the same time, they overlap with the local bus
network. According to AC Transit's Transbay Comprehensive Service Plan, "Transbay
bus service should focus on transbay passengers, and not try to serve both transbay and
local bus passengers." It continues, "In some cases, transbay routes were redesigned over
the years to combine them with a local route to increase overall ridership. Unfortunately,
the effect in most cases was to slow down the transbay route to a point that it is no longer
an attractive option to San Francisco bound passengers" (AC Transit, 1998).
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Using buses to reach communities that rail does not serve conveniently can help
attract customers to transit. However, saturating corridors with duplicative service can
become problematic in an environment of limited funding. Although premium fares can
offset higher costs, express service can be especially resource-intensive due to long cycle
times and low passenger turnover. In AC Transit's case, improvements to attract choice
transbay patrons - including BART customers - have occurred while transit-dependent
riders have seen many off-peak services disappear. Local buses, which act both as a
stand-alone system and a BART feeder, carry 94% of all AC Transit weekday bus trips
(217,000 customers compared to 13,000 on the transbay system) (AC Transit, 1998). In
1996, budget troubles forced AC Transit to eliminate all owl service and, except for a few
major arterial routes, cut most evening and weekend runs (Bowman, 1999). In October
1999, AC Transit finally restored about 40% of the service (Pimentel, 1999).
Unfortunately, in some ways BART's fare and parking pricing policies exacerbate
the situation, reinforcing the perception that BART and AC Transit run two entirely
separate systems. Built to connect low-density suburbs to the urban core, planners felt
that BART's success depended more upon parking availability than bus accessibility.
Today, BART offers about 42,000 free parking spaces at 28 suburban stations (BART,
1999). Customers who arrive on buses do not receive such generous benefits. Transfers
between BART and AC Transit cost $1.15, or 20 cents off the regular $1.35 bus fare.
Frequent riders fare only a little better. For approximately $22 to $26 extra per month,
BART riders have unlimited access to several local transit systems. An intermodal trip
from North Berkeley to San Francisco, for example, costs $3.85 ($2.70 for BART and
$1.15 for feeder bus). By comparison, AC Transit transbay buses cost $2.50, or $2.20
with a pre-purchased multi-ride ticket. From the passenger's perspective, this pricing
policy makes the intermodal trip less attractive than either the transbay bus or driving to
BART stations (Bay Area Transit Information website).
In essence, BART fares implicitly incorporate parking costs, regardless of
whether or not a customer arrives by car. One might also argue that people who walk or
ride transit to stations subsidize park-and-ride commuters. Spaces in parking garages cost
$6000 to $9000 each; surface lots cost $3000 to $5000 plus maintenance costs. Free
parking has attracted so many riders that many lots fill by 7 am in the morning. The
agency has also spent millions to construct parking structures, which also consume
valuable land around stations that could instead foster transit-oriented development.
Given the financial incentives to park and ride, it is not surprising that 42% of BART's
customers drive to stations while only 22% take transit (Cabanatuan, 1998).
Modifying the fare and parking policy might improve coordination with AC
Transit and encourage better resource utilization. For example, charging for parking but
lowering rail fares accordingly may ease parking shortages and increase ridership on
local buses that feed rail stations. This in turn would improve the local bus network
overall, even for passengers not transferring to BART. At the same time, it would relieve
pressure to operate parallel transbay express buses.
The San Francisco experience demonstrates that having multiple overlapping
transit providers often impedes fare and service coordination, especially between
different modes. Some customers may benefit from having more travel choices;
however, others may lack basic service if too many resources are devoted to competitive
routes. Separate agencies can also focus on satisfying their individual goals rather than
looking for transportation solutions from a regional perspective, leading to conflicting
organizational policies.
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A.4 Washington, DC
Following BART in San Francisco, the Washington Metro was the forerunner of
the modern generation of heavy rail systems in the United States. Opened in 1976, the
103-mile system serving the national capital and adjacent Maryland and Virginia suburbs
is nearing completion. Over the past 25 years, the Metro has grown into the country's
second largest heavy rail system, carrying about 600,000 passengers per weekday
(APTA, 1998). The Metro has also influenced land development. The radial
configuration has helped sustain the District of Columbia as the primary regional
employment hub during a period of severe urban population decline. Meanwhile, it has
also fostered relatively dense and transit-friendly suburban development surrounding
stations, most notably in Silver Spring and Bethesda in Maryland and Rosslyn and
Crystal City in Virginia.
From an intermodal systems perspective, Washington has also advanced from the
pre-Metro era. After the disappearance of the last streetcars in the early 1960s,
Washington's four uncoordinated, private bus firms limped along in an environment of
rapid decentralization and declining ridership. The Washington Metropolitan Area Rapid
Transit Authority (WMATA) was formed in 1967 to revitalize public transit in the capital
region. The organization's primary mission, however, was to build a world class subway
system, not to rescue buses from financial ruin. Recognizing the importance of both bus
and rail modes, Congress forced WMATA to absorb the four private bus companies in
1973 (Feaver, 1999). Soon afterwards, WMATA overhauled the bus system. It
streamlined routes, eliminated duplicative service, expanded into new territory, and
instituted a zone-based fare structure. At the same time, some suburban jurisdictions also
initiated independent contract bus operations, some of which overlapped with WMATA
bus service (WMATA, 1993).
The Metro has brought significant changes to the bus network. When new rail
segments have opened, WMATA has usually terminated bus routes at the nearest rail
stations, particularly those that formerly ran express to Downtown Washington. It has
generally retained some parallel local service to serve intermediate areas between rail
stations, however. This policy reflects WMATA's desire to capitalize on the economic
strengths of each mode. From a financial standpoint, the Metro's farebox recovery is
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more than double that of buses, in part because the rail system has a higher ridership
density, charges higher fares for premium service, and earns revenue from park-and-ride
fees. Meanwhile, buses fill in the gaps between rail lines and penetrate neighborhoods
where demand or geography does not justify rail infrastructure.
Table A-1: Service Integration at the Washington's Pentagon and Anacostia Metro
Stations
Pentagon Anacostia
(Shirley Busway (excludes
routes only) crosstown routes)
AM Peak Inbound Bus Trips 225 137
Weekday Inbound Bus Trips 350 430
Weekday Ridership (Sept. 98) 15,171 21,391
AM Peak Vehicles 79 39
Base Vehicles 8 16
Source: WMATA Metrobus Scheduled Time & Miles By Line Report, Jan. 6, 1999.
WMATA Vehicles Scheduled Report, Jan. 24, 1999.
Two specific examples in the Washington region illustrate the effects on customer
service and operating efficiency of WMATA's service integration policy. At the
Pentagon station in Virginia, WMATA demonstrates that a rail system can successfully
interface with a bus transitway to offer customers the advantages of both modes. The
station is located strategically between the Pentagon and the entrance ramps to the
Shirley Busway, two reversible high-occupancy vehicle/bus lanes in the median of the
Interstate 395. During the morning peak period, approximately 225 commuter bus trips
originate from Virginia suburbs southwest of Washington, enter the busway and then
travel non-stop in a separate right-of-way until they reach the Pentagon (see Table A-1)
(WMATA Vehicles Scheduled Report, Jan. 24, 1999). From their passengers can
connect to the Metro to reach employment centers in Virginia and the District of
Columbia. In the afternoon, buses run in the reverse direction.
For about seven years prior to the opening of the Pentagon station in 1977, the
Shirley Busway services had run directly into downtown Washington (WMATA, 1993).
Truncating bus routes at the Pentagon and requiring a transfer to the Metro was
undoubtedly a difficult transition for passengers initially. On the positive side, this policy
expanded destination opportunities for customers, improved WMATA's operating
efficiency, and allowed the agency to redistribute resources to provide more local bus
service. Busways by themselves tend to encourage point-to-point routes that avoid
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transfers; however, they usually result in a "many-to-one" network that provides direct,
but low connectivity and low frequency services often confined to the peak period. In the
decentralized national capital region, a "many-to-one" route structure misses many
potential ridership markets. Although Washington boasts a high concentration of
government jobs, height restrictions have led to a sprawling "downtown" and the
proliferation of satellite employment centers in adjacent Maryland and Virginia. By
connecting to the Metro, the Shirley Busway services allow passengers in suburban
neighborhoods to reach the Metro quickly. From there, the Metro acts as a circulator (in
addition to providing radial service to the suburbs), facilitating access to key peripheral
destinations such as the Pentagon, Rosslyn, National Airport, Crystal City as well as to
downtown government offices.
If the Shirley Busway services were to continue directly into Washington, some
225 buses during each peak period would spend an additional half-hour circulating
around downtown Washington.5 The agency would need to divert resources from local
services or enlarge its bus fleet in order to maintain existing headways, and most of these
new vehicles would remain idle throughout the day. Even in its present configuration,
the Shirley Busway services are overwhelmingly commuter-oriented: 79 vehicles operate
during the morning rush hour, but only 8 vehicles provide base service (WMATA
Vehicles Scheduled Report, Jan. 24, 1999). Despite the enormous financial undertaking
that would be needed to ensure a one-seat bus ride for some passengers, many customers
would still have to transfer to reach peripheral destinations.
Instead of duplicating rail services, WMATA has now begun to use buses to
develop new markets. For example, it recently initiated a circumferential express bus
route between Montgomery County, Maryland, and Tysons Corner, a major suburban
employment and retail center in northern Virginia. As the Metro has expanded outward,
suburban buses now spend more time in local communities than on highways into and out
of Washington. Not only are local buses delivering suburbanites to rail stations, but they
also are linking train stations to adjacent suburban employment centers to facilitate
5 Estimated time based on the travel time of an existing bus route that links the Pentagon with downtown
Washington (WMATA website)
reverse-commuting. In fact, the reverse-commute is now WMATA's fastest growing
market segment (Erion, 1998).
Transit service in southeast Washington also provides another example of
WMATA's service integration policy. Following its standard operating practice, the
agency truncated many routes at the Anacostia terminus when the Metro was extended to
the area in 1991, except during early mornings when trains do not operate. As with the
Pentagon/Shirley Busway services in Virginia, the reorganization of buses in southeast
Washington was quite successful from a service and operational perspective. Some 137
morning rush-hour trips and 430 daily trips terminate at the Anacostia station instead of
continuing to central Washington (WMATA Vehicles Scheduled Report, Jan. 24, 1999).
Since buses do not have to navigate downtown traffic, they save at least 40 minutes in
cycle time per round trip and have a better chance of adhering to schedules.
For southeast Washington residents, the Metro system improved access not only
to employment opportunities downtown, but also in other parts of the city and the
suburbs. The community has not wholeheartedly embraced the Metro, however. For
both logistical and political reasons, the transition to an intermodal system has not gone
as smoothly as elsewhere. Situated only a few miles from grand monuments and
institutions, southeast Washington is largely poor and African-American. Some
community leaders believe that outsiders "forget" that this section of the national capital
exists, especially concerning transportation issues. For example, the Metro system
arrived in southeast Washington years after it had been extended to distant, wealthy
suburbs, even though the area has a large transit-dependent ridership base (Ripley, 1998).
Some residents felt that WMATA had reorganized bus routes to disguise service
cuts and force passengers onto the train. Many bus riders also seemed concerned with the
time and financial impacts of transferring at the Anacostia station. In particular, the lack
of schedule coordination has tended to worsen the transfer waiting time problem, not just
at Anacostia but throughout the system. Specifically, transferring from rail to bus can
become inconvenient during off-peak hours when vehicles arrive less frequently. On
Saturdays, for example, trains run relatively frequently (every 12 minutes) but do not
consistently meet with buses that operate 20, 30, or 40-minute headways. In this
situation, tight connections arise periodically. Passengers can increase their waiting
times deliberately by taking an earlier train to ensure a connection, or "risk it" and hope
that the train is not delayed. WMATA is looking to improve transfer reliability with
experimental signal lights that warn bus drivers of delayed trains, but so far has not
addressed the schedule coordination issue (Erion, 1998).
Customers from southeast Washington also complained about the lack of fare
integration. Riders can purchase rail-to-bus transfers for a nominal 25-cent fee; however,
there are no discounts for bus-to-rail transfers. Thus, round trips using both bus and rail
services cost an additional $1.35 (the $1.10 base bus fare to the Metro plus $0.25 in the
opposite direction). For low-income southeast Washington residents, this charge seemed
particularly burdensome compared to the pre-Metro days without transfers. WMATA
management, however, did attempt to soften the impact by reducing fares on selected
Anacostia routes to $0.60, which in effect reduced the round trip bus fare to $0.85 with a
rail-to-bus transfer (Erion, 1998).
Indeed, poor or non-existent fare coordination historically has hampered
intermodal integration throughout the region, despite the fact that a single agency
controls core bus and rail services. The proliferation of independent suburban transit
agencies has also contributed to fare (and service) fragmentation. The rail system has a
complex, but "equitable" pricing structure based on distance traveled and time of day.
Fares range from $1.10 for short trips at all times to $3.25 for long rush-hour trips. Park-
and-ride lots also cost $1.75 to $2.25 for parking on weekdays, but are free on weekends
(WMATA website).
Prior to July 1999, Metrobus also charged by distance, time of day, and
sometimes direction. The metropolitan area consisted of eight fare zones: one for the
District of Columbia, two for Maryland, and five for Virginia. Public timetables listed a
total of 24 zonal fare categories, each of which had a peak fare, an off-peak fare, a rail-to-
bus peak transfer fare, and a rail-to-bus off-peak transfer fare. Express routes also had
varying surcharges. Bus-to-bus transfers cost 10 cents for each use; there were no
discounts for bus-to-rail transfers. In total, there were at least a hundred different fares.
In some cases, the pricing policy made little sense. For example, passengers boarding a
Maryland-bound bus within Washington city limits paid $0.90 with a rail-to-bus transfer,
but paid the full $1.10 fare if they boarded the same bus with a transfer in Maryland.
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In July 1999, WMATA launched "A Simple Fare to Anywhere," a complete
overhaul of its fare structure. Rail fares continued to vary by distance and time-of-day,
but the system shortened the peak surcharge period by an hour. On local buses, the
agency set the base fare at $1.10 regardless of jurisdiction, direction, or time of day. It
also dropped the bus-to-bus transfer fee and charged $0.25 for all rail-to-bus transfers,
although it continued not to issue bus-to-rail transfers. Express fares became $2.00
(WMATA website). Base fares and transfer fees remained constant on many routes; on
others, the overhaul also resulted in a real fare decrease. "A Simple Fare to Anywhere"
boosted ridership immediately. By August 1999, two months after the new fare policy
began, average Metrobus weekday boardings grew 12.6% over the previous year
(473,000 v 420,000 trips). Saturday and Sunday ridership increased by 12.5% and 16%,
respectively (WMATA Press Release, Oct. 20, 1999).
Overall, Washington's intermodal experience has been generally positive.
Although WMATA has had to reduce service levels in the past due to budget constraints,
the transit system has improved dramatically since the pre-Metro era. Management
seems to understand the need to design an efficient route structure that serves multiple
travel patterns while avoiding service duplication. Nevertheless, more attention to
schedule coordination and other details could result in more effective integrated services.
With its recent fare overhaul, WMATA seems to be headed in a positive direction.
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Figure A-4: Map of Washington's Metro System
Source: WMATA website
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A.5 Portland
Within the planning community, Portland is perhaps best known for its policies
on metropolitan development. In the 1970s, Portland established an urban growth
boundary designed to curb sprawl and focus resources on existing neighborhoods and
downtown. Recognizing the importance of coordinating land use and transportation,
Portland has also become one of the country's most progressive transit-oriented cities.
City leaders replaced a riverfront highway with a park and cancelled a freeway that
would have plowed through southeast Portland. Tri-Met, the regional transit operator,
then used highway funds to build the "MAX" light rail line out to the eastern suburbs in
the 1980s. Due to these efforts, Portland's urban core and transit system are healthier
than most cities of similar size.
In September 1998, Tri-Met opened "Westside MAX", an 18-mile light rail
extension that parallels the heavily-congested Sunset Highway out to the western suburbs
in Washington County. Combined with the initial eastern line, light rail now runs across
the entire metropolitan area. While Tri-Met has worked hard to promote MAX, the
agency has also paid close attention to redesigning bus services to complement the new
rail line and to serve new markets. In formulating an integration plan for Westside MAX,
Tri-Met planners were particularly concerned with how urban and suburban growth
would affect transit. By the year 2010, population and employment in downtown
Portland and Washington County are projected to increase 25% to 40% over 1995 levels
(Tri-Met, 1998).
Cognizant of these trends, Tri-Met had established a progressive route structure
for the Westside area many years prior to light rail. The network consisted of radial local
and express lines linking the area with Portland and a few supplemental feeder routes.
Transit centers provided key interface points for timed transfers between buses.
However, limited financial resources and equipment forced Tri-Met to concentrate
service on a few radial routes with high ridership (more than 70% of the service hours).
Tri-Met also developed an extensive peak-hour express network with direct service in the
peak direction to downtown Portland to build ridership for the future light rail extension.
Meanwhile, local routes provided some limited mobility for suburb-to-suburb trips.
Nevertheless, there were clear service gaps and unmet travel needs. Large areas of the
service district had no bus service at all. In most neighborhoods with direct peak-hour
express routes to Portland, buses did not operate during the off-peak. These express lines
also ran into traffic along the Sunset Highway, which lowered reliability and on-time
performance. There was hardly any service to the burgeoning "Silicon Forest" suburban
employment corridor (Tri-Met, 1998).
The MAX light rail extension provided an opportunity for change. With
explosive Westside residential and job growth, Tri-Met wanted its bus system to be more
responsive and relevant to the travel needs of people living and working within its service
area. The agency's "Westside Bus-Rail Integration Plan" notes that:
"Westside residents expressed interest in local bus service that would connect to
MAX, but would also allow for intra-Westside and non-downtown Portland trips.
Interest has also been high among Westside employers regarding how they could
be connected to Westside MAX" (Tri-Met, 1998).
In the end, Tri-Met ended most bus services that paralleled the light rail line, but retained
four radial routes that served intermediate areas and neighborhoods distant from the train.
With the resources saved from eliminating duplicative service, the agency
expanded service coverage and boosted frequency throughout the Washington County.
Approximately 20,000 more residents and 12,000 employees now were within walking
distance of a transit route. Some 70,000 residents and 79,000 employees gained more
frequent service. For commuters, Tri-Met initiated six rush-hour shuttle routes between
MAX stations and job centers. Four of these routes circulate around suburban office
parks, while the other two serve large Portland employers. The agency also shortened
headways on three key suburban trunk lines, introduced daily service to areas that
previously had only limited peak-hour or weekday-only express buses, and initiated a
demand response taxi shuttle linking a low-density area with light rail (Tri-Met, 1998).
Along with the service coverage and frequency improvements, Tri-Met also
redesigned the bus network to support multiple travel patterns both during the peak and
off-peak. The new configuration emphasizes route connectivity rather than direct, but
infrequent express routes. To facilitate both bus-to-bus and bus-to-rail transfers, it
established three new transit centers at key rail stations with timed connections during
off-peak hours. An integrated, three-zone fare structure with free transfers also helped
make the system equitable for passengers who had to transfer to complete their trips.
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Figure A-5: Map of integrated Westside light rail and bus services
Source: Tri-Met website
Table A-2: Restructuring Effects on the Westside Bus System
Before After Change
Weekday Rev. Hrs. 837.3 873.6 5.1%
Saturday Rev. Hrs. 400.1 506.5 26.6%
Sunday Rev. Hrs. 225.8 339.6 50.4%
Weekly Rev. Hrs. 4812.4 5213.9 9.0%
Peak Vehicles (estimated) 113 102 -8.9%
Base Vehicles (estimated) 56 62 10.7%
Ridership 30,915 31,255 1.5%
Riders/Rev. Hour 36.9 35.8 -3.2%
Wkdy Deadhead Hrs. 125.9 83.4 -32.1%
Portland CBD Trips 613 309 -49.6%
Portland Transit Mall Trips 460 156 -66.1%
Pop. Within %/ mile of route 125,461 146,596 14.4%
Employment within % mile of route 123,586 135,756 9.0%
Radial percentage of Rev. Hrs 70.50% 26.20%
Local percentage of Rev. Hrs 28.8% 66.9%
Shuttle percentage of Rev. Hrs 0.7% 6.9%
Sources: Tri-Met FY 98 Route Performance, Tri-Met Route Performance Report (Sept.
12, 1998-Nov 29, 1998), Tri-Met Operations Planning and Analysis: Recapitualation and
Analysis of Schedules (June 4, 1998 and Dec. 7, 1998)
Ignoring light rail for the moment, the restructuring effort resulted in some
significant performance and operational changes for Tri-Met's buses. Table A-2 shows
that despite the major frequency and coverage increases, weekday revenue hours did not
increase significantly because buses were reallocated from radial to local routes.
Weekend revenue hours grew substantially, in contrast, reflecting Tri-Met's emphasis on
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expanding weekend service coverage. In terms of fleet requirements, discontinuing
express lines also freed a disproportionately large number of buses for redistribution
during the peak and decreased the substantial deadheading associated with these lines.
The peak vehicle requirement actually decreased, while the base vehicle requirement
increased. This relieved pressure on the bus system during the busiest periods, utilizes
the fleet better throughout the day, and potentially reduces driver spread penalties.
Other operational effects included a precipitous drop in bus traffic in downtown
Portland, by over 300 trips per weekday (see Table A-2). This helped improve traffic
flow for other Tri-Met buses using the Portland Transit Mall, a pair of dedicated bus
lanes on two downtown streets. Train traffic increased only slightly, since the Westside
MAX was an extension of an existing light rail line that already ran through downtown.
Bus system productivity slightly decreased in terms of rides per revenue hour. Replacing
busy peak-hour express buses with large amounts of less-patronized off-peak local
service probably contributed to the modest productivity decline.
Tri-Met's integration strategy also produced significant ridership gains. For the
past six years, Tri-Met and the Oregon Department of Transportation have monitored
flow along the Sunset Highway corridor between Portland and Washington County.
During this time, a 9% growth in population and a 26% jump in employment have led to
sharp increases in travel demand in Washington County. Their joint "Westside Corridor
Travel Study," released in October 1999, reveals that the combination of light rail and
enhanced bus services has boosted transit usage in the corridor. From May 1993 to May
1999, transit's mode share of afternoon peak-direction trips rose from 13% to 20% along
the corridor, even though the Sunset Highway was widened during the same period. Tri-
Met has also succeeded in penetrating new markets. Between October 1997 and May
1999, afternoon reverse-commute transit usage more than tripled from 4% to 14%. The
study explains,
"The growth in Washington County employment has resulted in substantially
more reverse commute travel ... than occurred in 1993. The combination of
Westside MAX and restructured westside bus service allows Tri-Met to serve the
reverse commute more efficiently than the bus service available before September
1998 [when light rail opened]" (Tri-Met and ODOT, 1999).
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In the relatively short time since the light rail extension, Portland's system
integration effort appears to be producing favorable results. Of course, some bus riders
who lost one-seat rides were undoubtedly inconvenienced by Tri-Met's service changes.
However, the present system continues to handle the traditional radial commute well but
is also much more responsive to off-peak, suburb-to-suburb, and reverse-commuting
travel needs. In the Sunset Highway corridor, the increasing transit mode share indicates
that Westside MAX has not merely shifts transit customers from buses to trains; rather, it
has allowed Tri-Met to attract choice riders with a more efficient intermodal network.
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Appendix B: Quantitative Analysis of Bus Routes that Parallel Rail
In many cities developing rail system, the typical questions that arise are whether
to convert a radial bus line into a feeder to a nearby rail station and whether to
discontinue or reduce parallel service. Before examining specific situations in detail, we
will first examine the impacts of such decisions on both the operator and the riding
public.
Any service modification may have major cost implications for the operator. In
the transit industry, a common principle guiding bus-rail network restructuring is to
reallocate resources from parallel radial bus lines (express or local) to expand local
service. This local service feeds rail stations, enhances overall mobility outside the CBD
especially during the off-peak, and provides shuttle service to outlying employment
areas. Of course, the size of a transit system's operating budget will determine the extent
of bus restructuring. Given that radial routes generally attract disproportionately more
riders than these other route types, this restructuring strategy will likely lower
productivity (measured in rides per vehicle hour, for example) for the bus system.
(Overall system productivity, however, may not decrease if the rail line can carry
passengers much more efficiently.)
Nevertheless, restructuring may still improve the bus system's operating
efficiency. For example, radial express routes with long cycle times and limited service
hours require a disproportionately high number of vehicles and deadhead hours per trip
operated. Depending on the transit agency work rules and the availability of part-time
workers, these peak-hour runs may also incur expensive driver spread penalties. Thus, a
transit agency can lower maximum equipment requirements and reduce expenses for the
bus fleet by converting an equivalent number of peak service hours to off-peak service
hours. The train's larger capacity can partially offset the labor expense of providing
replacement service for former CBD-bound bus riders.
To arrive at an estimate of the financial costs, we will first calculate the change in
vehicle requirements necessitated by a bus route truncation. Dividing a route's cycle
time by its headway h gives the number of vehicles required to operate the route. Cycle
time consists of: (1) the mean round trip running time, (2) the maximum of the layover
time and the recovery time needed to start the next run on schedule due to run-time
variations. The following formula gives the number of vehicles required to operate a
route:
Vehicles required on route i = (cycle time)(frequency) = (p + max {z,l})f (1)
R = mean round-trip running time
a = round-trip running time standard deviation
z ,= a run-time standard deviations desired for recovery time
1 = layover time
h = headway
f = frequency
Suppose a new rail line opens. Common route modifications include
discontinuing or reducing service on parallel bus routes, or converting radial services into
rail feeders. The following equation estimates the impacts on bus requirements due to
these modifications:
A buses required for route i = buses required before change - buses required after change
A buses required for route i = (po + max{zao ,l0 })fo - (pi + max{za, l)f (2)
Note that the frequency of bus service may change (from fo to f). A reduction in
service may occur should ridership densities drop due to line truncation or the
introduction of an additional transfer, for example. On the other hand, ridership densities
could increase if the shorter line allows reliability to improve or service to increase
(shorter headways or a longer span of service). A more detailed discussion of elasticity
of ridership with respect to route structure or service level changes will follow.
A transit agency may choose to alter headways based upon a systemwide
maximum passenger load standard. To provide reasonable service quality, however,
transit agencies should also consider passenger utility in addition to their own costs when
setting frequencies, particularly for low frequency routes commonly found along the
suburban alignments of new rail extensions. Setting uniform load factors across all
routes regardless of ridership would tend to provide extremely poor service quality for
sparsely-patronized routes. Presumably, the low frequency route is providing more of a
"lifeline" base level of service. Further, the consequences of denying passengers
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boarding a full bus that comes once an hour are much more severe than on high-
frequency routes due to the higher waiting time penalty.
Perhaps the best-known theory for setting frequencies on a bus route that
incorporates passenger utility is the square-root rule. This method attempts to minimize
the sum of total passenger wait-time costs and total operator costs. It states that service
frequency for a given route should be proportional to the square root of the ridership per
unit distance or time on that route. Unfortunately, it does not consider capacity
constraints as a lower bound for frequency or the elasticity of demand with respect to
headways.
An alternative strategy considers the benefits versus costs of each route. All
transit routes display diminishing marginal benefit in relation to costs beyond a certain
frequency level. Shortened headways may not necessarily attract the ridership (and
therefore revenue) necessary to offset the costs associated with service improvements.
Wait time benefits as well as ridership suffer from diminishing marginal returns. At the
optimum "solution", the marginal benefit-to-cost ratios are similar across all routes
although individual subsidies may differ. Total benefit cannot increase by reallocating
resources at this point (Furth and Wilson, 1981).
In addition to modifying the bus network, train service will also have to increase
above base levels to accommodate passengers who now transfer from the bus or switch
entirely to rail. Assuming that the train has sufficient capacity so that additional
passengers will have negligible effects on dwell times, the number of trains needed above
base levels equals the train's cycle time divided by the change in headways needed to
accommodate the extra passengers.
trains to accomodate bus passengers for route i (over base levels)
= (cycle time tran )(Aftrain )
= (P train + max {z,a-, l})(Aftrain)
If the transit agency wants to provide just enough capacity to handle the extra bus
passengers, then frequency at a minimum changes enough to accommodate demand.
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passengers per hourbus,>rail
train capacity
(%passengerse ,->rai)(loadu, ) (f b)
capacity tran
As in the bus case, a transit agency should also incorporate "passenger utility"
when establishing rail levels of service. An appropriate desired load factor can again
reflect this preference:
(%passengers e,->rai)(load factor,,s )(capacity bs )(fbus
(load factortrain )(capacity tain )
Thus, the number of additional trains needed to accommodate bus passengers from route i
(over base levels) is given by:
(cycle time train )(Aftrain)
t(%passengersbus->rail )(load factoru, )(capacityus, Wb5 )
= train + max {zat,,i a,, ,l,,an })(load factorrain )(capacity train )
Comparing the net financial effects of an integration strategy can give some idea of the
impact of introducing a rail line into an existing bus network. Ideally, a transit agency
will want a high marginal savings-to-expenditure ratio, defined by:
Marginal savings-to-expenditure ratio
(Costbus I hr)(Abus)
(Cost train hr)(Atrain)
(Costus / hr)[(uo + max{zaoo ,lo })f 0 - (p + max{za, l})f]
p+t (%passengersbu,->rail )(load factorus )(capacityus, )(bu,)
(Cost )a +(load factortrain )(capacitytrain )
Cost bus /hr (po + max{za ao, lo})fo - (u + max{za-, l})f (load factortrain )(capacity train
Costtrain /hr (ptrain + max{zatrain0train 'itrain } (%passengers bus->rail )(load factorbus )(capacitybus bus
Important Observations
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From a cost perspective, this equation suggests that it may make sense to truncate
or reduce service on a route that parallels the rail line in whole or in part when one or
more of the following occurs:
e Load factor and capacity for the train is much higher than on the bus
e The difference in cycle times for the pre- and post- rail bus route is large, especially
relative to the cycle time for the train. Longer-distance buses also tend to have poorer
reliability, especially compared to the train. Clearly, bus routes that duplicate rail
services for a long distance are better candidates for truncation than those that do not.
This assumes a demand profile for the train where most people are travelling to the
central business district; an agency could short-turn trains to better match the profile.
" A small number of people would have to transfer from bus to rail.
" The cost to run a train is relatively low, and the cost to run a bus is relatively high.
This equation also illustrates the tradeoff between bus frequency and cycle time. Budget
constraints mean that more direct service, which requires longer cycle times, limits the
level-of-service that an agency can provide on each route.
The model presented above has its limitations. For example, it does not model the
larger network impacts of route design policy or the distinction between commuter-
oriented and regular buses. It also does not handle some of the political subtleties that
surround these decisions; for instance, the low marginal costs of operating rail service
relative to its high infrastructure costs may encourage agencies to maximize rail usage
and level-of-service. In contrast, the presence of separate bus and rail operators can
result in duplicative bus service even when it is slower, less efficient, or less reliable.
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Appendix C: Analysis of AMA & Metrobds Service Modification
Proposals
This section analyzes specific proposals for modified AMA bus routes in
conjunction with the opening of Tren Urbano in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It utilizes two
major data components: existing ride check data and forecast Tren Urbano usage
predicted by demand models. To understand current travel patterns better, ride check
data were collected on a sample of trips on key bus routes (Multisystems, 1999 [4]). This
information helps predict how bus route restructuring for Tren Urbano might affect
existing riders. Specifically, it provides passenger origin and destination data at the stop
level. This would be useful, for example, in quantifying passenger inconvenience caused
by splitting a bus route and requiring a transfer. The ride checks also help determine
basic route load profiles, which may highlight existing or potential vehicle overloading or
underutilization problems. For San Juan, such information would help determine how
reducing rail-competitive bus service might impact loads on remaining bus routes.
Rail ridership forecasts come from the Tren Urbano Environmental Impact
Statement, which applies the commonly-used four-step demand model. This model
predicts the number of home-based work (HBW), home-based non-work (HBNW), and
non-home based (NHB) trips that are expected to use Tren Urbano in the year 2010.
When generating the numbers, the model recognizes that an entire "Tren Urbano trip"
may require other modes such as automobiles, buses, or walking to reach the stations.
The model then generates origin-destination matrix data by estimating the number of
Tren Urbano trips between each pair of TAZs in the San Juan metropolitan area.
Predicting the origins and destinations of Tren Urbano trips can help in the design
of a route structure that meets the anticipated bus access demand. To determine the bus
access needs of individual areas within the San Juan metropolitan area, the model data
were used to map the density of Tren Urbano trip origins and destinations by zone. Since
this method assigns each end of all trips to a zone, the map actually represents twice the
number of expected one-way Tren Urbano boardings.
Of course, these data have some significant limitations. The ride check sampling
techniques capture only a tiny subset of trips, and thus inherently are subject to error.
The Tren Urbano Demand Model makes many assumptions regarding, for example,
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economic growth, highway congestion, and the quality of bus and pdblico feeders.
Therefore, one should exercise caution when analyzing proposals due to potential data
integrity problems and uncertainty.
C.1 Proposal: Modify A9's northern terminal
Route A9 serves Viejo San Juan, the Isleta, Santurce, Barrio Obrero, Avenida
Barbosa, UPR, and Rio Piedras. The route currently ranks as San Juan's second most
heavily patronized bus route (after Metrobd's). Dense transit-dependent neighborhoods
and major San Juan destinations help to generate substantial traffic and support 10-
minute weekday headways. Indeed, the level of passenger crowding has become a major
concern, with rush-hour vehicles approaching capacity on average between Santurce and
Rio Piedras. Like other high-frequency lines without tight operations control, buses on
Route A9 have a greater tendency to "bunch". This suggests that vehicles may arrive at
irregular intervals. On average buses may be comfortably full, but some may have severe
overcrowding while others have few passengers on board.
When Tren Urbano opens first to Sagrado Coraz6n and then to Minillas, it will
likely carry many passengers who will need to transfer to buses destined for Miramar, the
Isleta, and Viejo San Juan. Since the route's heaviest loads typically occur from
Minillas to just south of Sagrado Coraz6n, with the peak load point around Sagrado
Coraz6n, Tren Urbano's transferring passengers may overwhelm the route.
To reduce the likelihood of overcrowding, one possiblity includes terminating the
northern end of Route A9 at the Isla Grande Naval Base (the future site of a large
convention center) or even sooner at Parada 18. Under this proposal, passengers
travelling from south of Santurce to the Isleta and Viejo San Juan could no longer take
route A9 directly. Forcing these customers to switch to other bus routes would reduce
passenger volumes on route A9 at the peak load point. Additionally, average loads drop
as buses leave Santurce and enter the Isleta and Viejo San Juan. Discontinuing a major
route to Viejo San Juan could potentially lead to better resource utilization and reduce
vehicle requirements, but also introduce a bus-to-bus transfer.

Figure C-2: Route A9 Average Loads
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Option A: Terminate Route A9 at Isla Grande
Diverting route 9 to Isla Grande instead of continuing onto Viejo San Juan would
not likely produce significant run time savings. While traversing the Isleta takes perhaps
6 or 7 minutes, looping through Isla Grande would also require extra time. With a small
cycle time difference, this proposal would likely result in few, if any, resource savings.
In contrast, the change would impact ridership greatly. Some 1,511 trips from Rio Piedras
to the Isleta would lose direct bus service on two routes (A9 and Metrobd's I), although
the quicker ride on Tren Urbano could offset the transfer time, inconvenience, and
additional fare. Over two-thousand daily trips from south Barbosa/Borinquen area to the
Isleta would require a bus-to-bus transfer. Depending on fare policy, passenger may also
have to pay again to board the second vehicle. The bus-to-bus transfers would not
accomplish the objective of boosting Tren Urbano ridership, and passengers could fault
for Tren Urbano for the inconvenience. As the Isla Grande site develops and demand for
transit services grows, options such as a shuttle connecting the convention center with
Condado hotels and a link to Tren Urbano should be explored.
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Table C-i: Impacts of terminating A9 at Isla Grande
Travelling Between Impacts Number
of Riders
Santurce-Borinquen/Barbosa seg. Bus-to-bus transfer introduced; additional 2,043
to Isleta-Viejo San Juan seg. transfer charge
Rio Piedras to Isleta-Viejo San Bus-to-bus transfer introduced; additional 1,511
Juan seg. transfer charge, but perhaps a faster ride
Option B: Terminate Route A9 at Parada 18
Terminating Route A9 even sooner at Parada 18 would result in even greater
impacts. The difference in scheduled cycle times for this shortened route 9 is
approximately 27 minutes (14 minutes in the westbound direction and 13 minutes in the
eastbound direction). With daytime headways of about 8 minutes, truncating the route
could produce savings of 3 to 4 buses. However, the heavy demand along this segment
would require additional service on other routes, which would probably offset most of
these savings. Over two thousand trips from Rio Piedras to Miramar and the Isleta
would lose direct bus service on two routes (A9 and Metrobdls I), but could still benefit
from Tren Urbano's higher level-of-service. More significantly, approximately 3,590
trips from south of the Barbosa/Borinquen area to Miramar and the Isleta would require a
bus-to-bus transfer and an additional fare. As in the previous case, these changes would
inconvenience riders, but not result in higher rail ridership.
Table C-2: Impacts of terminating A9 at Parada 18
Travelling Between Impacts Number
of Riders
Santurce-Borinquen/Barbosa seg. Bus-to-bus transfer introduced; additional 3,590
to Santurce-Viejo San Juan seg. transfer charge
Rio Piedras to Santurce-Viejo Bus-to-bus transfer introduced; additional 2,069
San Juan seg. transfer charge, but perhaps a faster ride
Unfortunately, these proposals cause significant impacts on existing riders: two to
three thousand daily trips would require an additional bus-to-bus transfer. While they
may help alleviate overcrowding along certain segments of the route, they would not
accomplish the objective of encouraging Tren Urbano usage. The affected customers
may perceive that Tren Urbano has affected their bus service negatively, and would not
even have the opportunity to ride the train. Further, these changes would not likely
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produce significant resource savings. Other options might better address the crowding
problem.
C.2 Proposal: Truncate Metrobils I
Several bus routes currently parallel the Tren Urbano alignment from Rio Piedras
to Minillas. The A3 enters from the west at Hato Rey, and continues south along the
corridor to Rio Piedras. Metrobd's 1I also enters from the west at Hato Rey, but continues
north along the corridor to Minillas and Parada 18. Metrobdls I parallels the entire
alignment north of Rio Piedras. Metrobdis Expreso, which bypasses Santurce, is a faster
version of Metrobd's I.
Serving the region's major commercial spine, Metrobds I offers very frequent
service and is the most heavily patronized public bus route in San Juan. Metrobd's I
parallels Tren Urbano from Minillas to Rio Piedras. Once train operations begin, the
corridor may become saturated with competing services. To lessen redundancy and
facilitate the reallocation of resources to other areas of San Juan, one possibility is to
eliminate Metrobdis I south of Santurce. The A3 and Metrobdis II routes would still
continue to provide local service along the entire alignment. Thus, current short-distance
bus customers (between Hato Rey and Minillas, or between Hato Rey and Rio Piedras)
could choose between the bus and Tren Urbano while long-distance customers travelling
through Hato Rey would need to take Tren Urbano. This plan would also require some
passengers continuing to the northern end of Santurce or Viejo San Juan to transfer
between Tren Urbano and another bus.
Current Metrobd's I operations require up to 25 buses (17 for regular service and 8
for express service), more than 10% of the entire Metrobd's and AMA peak fleet
combined. Curtailing bus service that directly competes with the train would free bus
resources for service expansion elsewhere. In particular, these resources could be used to
shorten headways on the remaining portion of Metrobdis I, from Santurce to Viejo San
Juan. Tren Urbano should generate significant new transit ridership along the entire
Viejo San Juan-to-Rio Piedras corridor, and many people destined for Viejo San Juan
will need to transfer to buses in Santurce. Reducing duplication would also fulfill the
objective of encouraging existing bus riders to take Tren Urbano. Before making such a
iscontinue MetrobOs I south of Minil
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change, one must consider impacts on current ridership (such as accessibility, transfers,
and fares) as well as on system operations.
Accessibility Impacts
Tren Urbano stations are generally located about every half-mile along the Rio
Piedras corridor. Bus stops, which are usually spaced every three blocks or so, provide
slightly better area coverage than the train. Thus, discontinuing Metrobd's may require
some customers to walk further to reach Tren Urbano. To determine accessibility
impacts, this analysis compares the physical location of bus stops compared to train
stations, ridership levels at impacted and non-impacted stops, and the impacts on various
rider groups categorized by their origins and destinations.
Table C-3: Metrobd's Stop Locations between Minillas and Rio Piedras
Northbound Southbound Total
Bus stops within 1 block of TU station entrance 12 9 21 (48%)
Bus stops within 2-4 blocks of TU station entrance 7 8 15 (34%)
Bus stops in the Rio Piedras area 4 4 8(18%)
Table C-4: Metrobdis Stop Activity between Minillas and Rio Piedras
Boardings Alightings Total
Bus stops within 1 block of TU station entrance 9,863 7,987 17,850 (42%)
Bus stops within 2-4 blocks of TU station entrance 4,201 5,738 9,939 (23%)
Bus stops in the Rio Piedras area 8,165 6,718 14,883 (35%)
Due to the short spacing between Tren Urbano stations, the majority of existing
bus stops are located within one block of planned station entrances. As well, the majority
of boardings and alightings are at stops adjacent to future stations. In the Rio Piedras
area, the effects of stop location are unclear. Buses currently skirt the commercial district
along peripheral arterials to avoid the narrow and congested streets. The large Capetillo
transit center is located on the eastern edge of the neighborhood. It is likely that most
Rio Piedras passengers are now walking several blocks anyway to reach their
destinations. Tren Urbano's centrally located Rio Piedras station may well provide
superior access compared to existing bus routes.
Customers fall into four categories, based on their walking distance to Tren
Urbano:
(1) those who have the option of taking a direct bus (A3 or Metrobd's II) or Tren Urbano
(2) those who must take Tren Urbano with no additional walk at either end
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(3) those who must take Tren Urbano with an additional walk at one end
(4) those who must take Tren Urbano with an additional walk at both ends
Of the four categories, the last two require additional walking. In the third
category, customers may have to walk a little further (up to about four blocks or mile),
but the inconvenience could be offset by the more comfortable station waiting
environment. The last category has the most negative impact since a person may have to
walk roughly eight more blocks or an additional mile.
Accessibility impacts were evaluated for bus riders currently travelling entirely
within the Rio Piedras to Minillas corridor. (Separate transfer issues affect passengers
destined for points north of Minillas, such as Viejo San Juan. Changes in accessibility
are relatively less significant; at most, they will affect one end of their trip.)
Table C-5: Summary of Impacts based on Origin-Destination Data, Rio Piedras to
Minillas only
Weekday % of Total
Riders
Option of taking Tren Urbano or Bus (A3 or Metrob6s 1l) 6,569 60.1%
Tren Urbano only, but no extra walk 643 5.9%
Tren Urbano only, but extra walk at one end 746 6.8%
Tren Urbano only, but extra walk at both ends 164 1.5%
Tren Urbano only, Rio Piedras trips 2,808 25.7%
TOTAL 10,931 100.0%
Of the passengers travelling within the Rio Piedras-San Juan corridor, the
majority will continue to enjoy direct bus service and have the option of taking Tren
Urbano. The rest will lose direct bus service, but Tren Urbano stops will be near both
their origins and destinations. About 6% of trips will require minimal additional walking,
while another 7% will have to walk up to four additional blocks at one end. Eliminating
Metrobd's I will "seriously" impact just 164 passengers (or 1.5%), who will need to walk
further at both ends. Rio Piedras trips were classified separately since the effects the
neighborhood station would have on transit access distance was unclear.
Transfer and Fare Impacts
If Metrobdis were curtailed, "long-distance" riders that travel through Hato Rey
will not have the option of taking the remaining Metrobdis II or A3 buses. Tren Urbano
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would directly serve some 4,360 trips with origins and destinations between Santurce and
Rio Piedras. These riders would pay higher fares ($1 according to latest plans versus
$0.50 for Metrobd's). The other 4,090 trips originate south of Sagrado Coraz6n and
continue beyond Santurce to Miramar and Viejo San Juan. These passengers would pay
a higher train fare and transfer to buses to complete their trip. (If kept in its present
form, Route A9 could handle all local trips between Sagrado Coraz6n and Viejo San
Juan.)
While these fare and transfer impacts may seem dramatic, Tren Urbano's higher
level-of-service (speed, reliability, frequency, service hours, more comfortable waiting
areas, etc.) may help offset the inconvenience. As well, the frequent bus service planned
for the Minillas-Viejo San Juan corridor should reduce wait times for passengers
transferring from Tren Urbano. Reliability along this segment should also improve
because Metrobdis will no longer have to travel through heavily congested Hato Rey and
Rio Piedras. Finally, a coordinated fare policy with provides discounted or free transfers
could also mitigate the monetary effects of transferring.
Service Impacts on Remaining Routes
While Tren Urbano will likely attract many former bus customers, buses will
continue to serve some trips more conveniently. For instance, current A3 and Metrobdis
II riders who travel between the Minillas/Viejo San Juan corridor and points west of Hato
Rey are unlikely to ride Tren Urbano since the train does not serve one end of their trip.
Once Tren Urbano opens, discontinuing Metrobdis I may add pressure to the remaining
A3 and Metrobd's II routes. Some local travelers may prefer the bus if it offers lower
fares and better accessibility.
This demand could tax the remaining bus service. To estimate this effect, existing
bus riders with at least one trip end within the Minillas/Hato Rey or Hato Rey/Rio
Piedras segments are classified according to the likelihood that they would remain on the
bus versus switching to Tren Urbano. To focus on service planning issues, this initial
level of analysis ignores fare impacts on mode choice. The "unlikely" bus rider group
consists of people whose trips begin and end within one block of future station sites. For
Metrobd's II, "unlikely" bus riders also included people who traveled from Bayam6n to
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Hato Rey or Minillas. Tren Urbano will take about half the time as the bus does now
between these points; thus, it was assumed that these people would prefer the train even
at a higher fare. "Possible" bus passengers have one trip end next to a Tren Urbano
station, and the other end several blocks away from a station entrance. "Likely" bus
customers either must walk several blocks to reach a station at both trip ends, or travel
between the rail corridor and somewhere else (such as San Patricio or Cataflo).
Using origin-destination data from ride checks, the load impacts of removing
Metrobd's I on the remaining A3 and Metrobn's II routes were simulated. A conservative
model was employed that assumes that only "unlikely" bus riders switch to Tren Urbano
while "likely" and "possible" ones remain on the bus. The results, illustrated in the two
tables below, indicate:
" At present ridership levels, overcrowding on Metrobnls II and Route A3 should not be
a serious issue.
" Metrobd's II has fairly consistent, but relatively low-to-moderate loads along the
entire route. Discontinuing Metrobdis I should increase loads on the overlapped
section between Hato Rey and Minillas, although some local riders may also elect to
switch to Tren Urbano. Enough capacity to absorb them exists because many current
end-to-end Metrobds II riders can take Tren Urbano instead. The model suggests that
the current 10-minute headway may lead to low productivity.
Figure C-5: Projected Metrobds II Average Loads (with Tren Urbano)
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* Compared to Metrobdis II, Route A3 has higher loads and a more uneven load profile.
With future ridership growth, it is possible that the segment between Plaza las
Amdricas and Rio Piedras might warrant additional service. A shuttle between
ferrying customers from Tren Urbano and Plaza las Americas could relieve some
pressure and improve regional access to the shopping mall.
Figure C-6: Projected Route A3 Average Loads (with Tren Urbano)
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Discontinuing the Metrobd's I segment that parallels Tren Urbano could well be
the most controversial piece of any bus-rail integration effort. In summary, the above
analysis suggests that if the route were discontinued:
" The vast majority of existing customers would not have to walk very much further to
reach Tren Urbano. Tren Urbano riders may have to pay a higher fare but would also
receive better service.
" "Local" customers could still use Metrobd's II or A3 services. In their present form,
these routes could accommodate the traffic.
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* People travelling on to Miramar, the Isleta, and Viejo San Juan would have to
transfer. Frequent connecting bus services should reduce the transfer wait time.
However, friendly transfer policies would need to be enacted to avoid large de facto
fare increases.
These observations suggest that discontinuing Metrobdis I is feasible from a
service delivery standpoint as long as a favorable fare coordination policy with Tren
Urbano exists. Nevertheless, when Tren Urbano opens, current Metrobd's I customers
might react strongly to the loss of bus service and may be reluctant to switch to the train
immediately. To avoid negative publicity during the transition period, it may make sense
to simply reduce bus service levels on opening day, but defer route discontinuation until
several months later.
C.3 Proposal: Revamp services on the Santurce -Viejo San Juan corridor
In the future, Tren Urbano may expand beyond the planned Phase 1A terminal at
Minillas to the Isleta and Viejo San Juan. At present, the Isleta and Viejo San Juan
attract significant ridership - approximately 12,000 daily trips - from throughout the San
Juan metropolitan area. Well-developed bus service runs in this corridor, including two
major AMA routes (A9 and A5) and Metrobd's I. Another bus route connects the area
with Condado.
According to the Tren Urbano Demand Model, trips to Viejo San Juan from the
rail corridor should nearly double over current levels. Ridership on existing routes could
also jump given current growth trends and favorable economic development. In short,
greater demand could necessitate service increases.
One possible option is the development of an express bus linking Tren Urbano
with Viejo San Juan. This service, a shortened version of the existing Metrobd's I
express, would bypasses the Miramar area of north Santurce and local stops on the Isleta.
This would help relieve traffic from local routes and shorten trip times for Viejo San Juan
passengers. Another possibility is to implement high-quality "Bus Rapid Transit" as an
interim step to a possible long-term Tren Urbano extension. "Bus Rapid Transit" would
take advantage of existing exclusive bus lanes along the corridor. These service
concepts would require further research.
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Table C-6: Estimated weekday trips travelling to Viejo San Juan/Isleta
Current Future
Local travel between Viejo San Juan and the Isleta 1,026 1,200***
Viejo San Juan/Isleta segment to Tren Urbano corridor 2,968 5,474*
Viejo San Juan/Isleta segment to Santurce 2,620 3,065***
Viejo San Juan/Isleta segment to east of Minillas (current A5) 1,825 2,135***
Viejo San Juan/Isleta segment to south of Sagrado Coraz6n 2,043 2,390***
(current A9)
Viejo San Juan/Isleta segment to Rio Piedras (current A9 or Metrobis I) 1,511 **
Total 11,993 14,265
*Source: Tren Urbano Demand Model
**Included under Tren Urbano numbers
*** 17% assumed growth in current ridership
C.4 Proposal: Split Metrobtis II at San Patricio
As noted earlier, Metrobdis II presently runs from Santurce to Bayam6n, serving
the future Tren Urbano terminals at Bayam6n Centro and Minillas (as well as the interim
terminal at Sagrado Coraz6n). Although Metrobd's II charges $0.50 instead of the regular
$0.25 fare, it is extremely popular given that it runs along major east-west arterials (PR 2
and Avenida F.D. Roosevelt) and stops by Hato Rey, Plaza Las Americas, San Patricio,
and other major destinations. The ridership helps support frequent service (every 10
minutes on weekdays, every 15 minutes on Saturdays, and every 20 minutes on Sundays),
which in turn makes the route attractive. As of 1998, it registered approximately 9,000
daily boardings.
Metrobds II presently connects the endpoints of Tren Urbano. It also parallels the
rail alignment from Bayam6n to Guaynabo, and from Hato Rey to Minillas. However,
Metrobdls II is much slower and serves more local traffic. With heavy traffic, the bus
takes about 50 minutes to travel from Bayam6n to Hato Rey and over an hour from
Bayam6n to Santurce. By contrast, these trips on Tren Urbano will take slightly over half
that time, even though the train takes a more roundabout path. Approximately 2,100
Metrobdis II riders travel between the areas served by both Metrobdis II and Tren Urbano.
About 1,900 of these riders access Metrobns II at points within a reasonable walking
distance of future Tren Urbano stations at Torrimar, Jardines, Deportivo, and Bayamon.
Earlier analysis suggests some Metrobd's II patrons would switch to Tren Urbano.
Average loads would drop but would become relatively balanced along the route. The
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route would also continue to serve local travel patterns. Even so, options were explored
to eliminate any competition between bus and rail. If Metrobn's II remained in its present
form, some Bayam6n-to-Hato Rey/Minillas riders may elect to stay on the bus because of
a lower fare and more direct routing.
Option A: Convert the western half of Metrobtis II into a feeder route and discontinue
through service
This proposal calls for the breakup of the route at San Patricio, approximately
midway between Hato Rey and Bayam6n. A reconfigured Route 4 would absorb the
western half, connecting with Tren Urbano at both San Francisco and Bayam6n.
Metrobdls II would continue to cover the eastern half between Santurce and Minillas. On
weekdays, Metrobdis II would maintain its current headway of 10 minutes; however,
Route 4 would run only every 20 minutes. Reducing frequency between San Patricio and
Bayam6n would save resources. The affected segment's cycle time is about 54 minutes
(29 minutes eastbound and 25 minutes westbound). On weekdays, this translates into
eliminating three buses with a change from 10-minute to 20-minute headways.
People now travelling between the Hato Rey-Minillas corridor and the areas of
northern Guaynabo beyond walking distance to Tren Urbano could potentially benefit
from this change. According to origin-destination survey data, approximately 260 daily
trips on Metrobls II fit this category. They would receive direct service to Tren Urbano's
San Francisco station via Route 4. Unless their ultimate destinations were Rio Piedras or
Centro Medico, however, the route would take them on a very roundabout and time-
consuming path. The trip to the area around the future San Francisco station takes about
as long as Metrobds now takes to reach Hato Rey (about 20 minutes from San Patricio).
Then these passengers would have to ride Tren Urbano to reach their final destination.
Unfortunately, this proposal would negatively impact the approximately 5,500
daily riders customers who use Metrobdis II between Bayam6n and San Patricio. Slightly
less than 2,000 of them (those travelling Minillas/Hato Rey corridor) would have the
option of taking Tren Urbano. More than sixty percent, however, now take trips that do
not involve travel to points that Tren Urbano serves. People with origins and destinations
entirely within the Bayam6n-San Patricio segment (about 2,255 daily trips) would avoid
transferring, but could wait twice as long for a bus. Customers with one trip end along
the Bayam6n-San Patricio segment and the other along Avenida Roosevelt (about 1,209
daily trips) would experience both a bus-to-bus transfer and longer waiting times. Given
Metrobd's II's present riding patterns, halving service on the San Patricio-Bayam6n
segment may result in overcrowding. It may also drive away customers as there exists
some elasticity of ridership with respect to headways.
Table C-7: Impacts of Splitting Metrobdis II at San Patricio
Travelling Between Impacts Number
of Riders
Bayam6n-San Patricio segment & Bus-to-bus transfer introduced; frequency 1,209
San Patricio-Plaza las Americas reduced from 10 to 20 minutes along
seg. (through San Patricio) western segment
Bayam6n/San Patricio to Hato Feeder bus to Tren Urbano with bus-to- 2,164
Rey/Minillas rail transfer, but long diversion OR bus-to-
bus transfer to Mll; many of these people
could walk to Tren Urbano directly,
however
Bayam6n & San Patricio Frequency reduced from 10 to 20 minutes 2,255
San Patricio & Santurce local No impacts 4,223
Potential Beneficiary: segment Direct feeder bus (but long ride) to TU; 263
just west of San Patricio to Tren frequency reduced from 10 to 20 min
Urbano (outside walking distance
of station)
Option B: Short-turn some Metrobus II buses at San Patricio, reducing service along the
western half
Table C-8: Impacts of Short-Turning Metrobds II trips at San Patricio
Travelling Between Impacts Number
of Riders
Bayam6n-San Patricio segment & Frequency reduced from 10 to 20 minutes 1,209
San Patricio-Plaza las Americas along western segment
seg. (through San Patricio)
Bayam6n/San Patricio to Hato Frequency reduced from 10 to 20 minutes 2,164
Rey/Minillas along western segment
Bayam6n & San Patricio Frequency reduced from 10 to 20 minutes 2,255
San Patricio & Santurce local No impacts 4,223
Short-turning certain Metrobd's II trips at San Patricio (instead of continuing onto
Bayamon) also reduces service along the line's outer portion, but avoids introducing a
bus-to-bus transfer. It can also present operational problems, however, particularly on
high-frequency routes such as Metrobd's II. Passengers travelling entirely within the
heavier segment will tend to board the first vehicle, while those headed for the lighter
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segment may have to wait for a specific vehicle going to their destination. Assuming
random passenger arrivals, short-turn patterns may distribute traffic unevenly with more
people on full-route vehicles than on short-turn ones. Non-uniform loading may increase
bus bunching and average waiting times in the absence of tight operations control. 6
Unfortunately, both of these proposals would have significant side impacts on
existing customers. These may include significantly longer headways, operations control
problems, or additional transfers. At the same time, they would not accomplish goals of
diverting significant numbers of additional riders to Tren Urbano. Even with no route
structure changes, many people would still switch to rail for the time savings. In a
scenario with both Metrobd's II and Tren Urbano, the two would serve different markets
and therefore would not truly "compete" with each other. Adjusting headways over the
entire route may be the most appropriate way to handle Tren Urbano-induced demand
changes.
6 Furth, Day, and Attanucci. "Operating Strategies for Major Radial Bus Routes," Mulitplications, Inc.,
May 1984.
Appendix D: Americans with Disabilities Act Implications
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 specifies the accessibility
requirements for public transportation providers. Different regulations apply based on
service type (fixed route or demand responsive) and service provider (public entity -
including contracted operations to a private party - and private entity).
Regarding service type, the pd'blicos would probably be classified as "fixed route"
operations. Although they do not adhere to schedules presently, they follow specific
routes and passengers do not have to make advance reservations for the service. The U.S.
Department of Transportation interprets the ADA to mean the following:
"With fixed route service, no action by the individual is needed to initiate public
transportation. If an individual is at a bus stop at the time the bus is scheduled to
appear, then that individual will be able to access the transportation system. With
demand-responsive service, an additional step must be taken by the individual
before he or she can ride the bus, i.e., the individual must make a telephone
call.(S. Rept. 101-116 at 54).
"Other factors, such as the presence or absence of published schedules, or the
variation of vehicle intervals in anticipation of differences in usage, are less
important in making the distinction between the two types of service. If a service
is provided along a given route, and a vehicle will arrive at certain times
regardless of whether a passenger actively requests the vehicle, the service in
most cases should be regarded as fixed route rather than demand responsive." 7
Currently, the pdiblicos are considered private carriers since they receive no direct
financial assistance from the government. (Public funding has supported the construction
of pdiblico terminals and vehicle loans, however.) Some future options include:
(1) making no substantive changes,
(2) contracting out service completely during all hours of operation, or
(3) contracting out base service during some or all hours of operation, supplemented by
licensed, for-profit "Tren Urbano Pdiblicos". Tren Urbano would subsidize the
pdblicos indirectly by reimbursing operators for transferring passengers.
7Construction and Interpretation of Provisions of 49 CFR part 37, US Department of Transportation
(http://www.fta.dot.gov/library/legal/ada/appendix.html)
According to the ADA, the accessibility requirements for public agencies also apply
"under a contractual or other arrangement or relationship with a public entity."' With the
last two options, both the contracted and licensed feeder services probably would have to
meet "public entity" requirements. In the latter case, the government would form, in
spirit, a service contract by agreeing to reimburse transfer revenue to the licensed
operators.
Table A. 1 summarizes the requirements according to system classification. Given
the considerations discussed above, any significant government intervention to assist the
pdblicos would likely trigger the ADA requirements for fixed route services operated by
public entities. Specifically, the public agency must ensure that all new vehicles have
wheelchair lifts and must initialize paratransit for the corresponding service area. The
agency could avoid paratransit if it demonstrates that such operations would create an
"undue financial burden," or if it successfully argued that Tren Urbano feeder services
were equivalent to "commuter bus" operations.
Even if the public transport agency could show that the licensed pdiblicos were
completely separate private operations, all new vehicles would still require full
accessibility. In essence, the government would merely pass the ADA responsibility to
potential licensed pdlblico owners. The added expense, approximately $10,000 per van,
would discourage owners from joining the program. (Theoretically, the pd'blico owners
could exploit a "loophole" by always purchasing used vans.) The public agency would
also need to address the paratransit requirement (through compliance or exemption) since
it would operate contracted base service in any case.
However, licensed pdiblicos would not need to be accessible if they fell into the
"demand responsive" category. Specifically, if they were the permitted to deviate upon
customer request, one could arguably consider them "demand responsive". In this case,
the ADA waives the accessibility requirement as long as the system, "when viewed in its
when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to such individuals equivalent to
the level of service provided to the general public." One could interpret this to mean that
this arrangement would not violate the ADA as long as the contracted base service
provided alternative accessible vehicles.
8 Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 221
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Table D-1: Accessibi ity Requirements
Public Entities Private Entities
(including contract operations) (primarily engaged in the business
of transporting people)
Fixed Route Services Required for all new vehicles. Required for all new vehicles.
Exception: Used vehicles, as long Exception: an automobile or van
as the entity made "good faith" with a seating capacity of less than
efforts to acquire accessible used 8 people as long as alternative
vehicles (Sect. 222) accessible service is available
(Sect. 304)
Demand Response Not required as long as the Not required as long as the
Services system, "when viewed in its system, "when viewed in its
entirety, provides a level of service entirety, provides a level of service
to such individuals equivalent to to such individuals equivalent to
the level of service provided to the the level of service provided to the
general public" (i.e. alternative general public" (i.e. alternative
accessible services are available) accessible services are available)
(Sect. 224) (Sect. 304)
Complementary Required if the public entity Not specifically addressed in ADA
paratransit required? operates a fixed route system legislation and assumed to be not
Exception: If the public entity can required.
demonstrate that paratransit would
impose an " undue financial
burden" or it operates "commuter
bus" services. (Sect. 223)
Source: Americans with Disabilities Act
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Appendix E: Relevant Americans with Disabilities Act Passages
SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS. 42 USC 12141.
As used in this part:
(1) Demand responsive system. The term demand responsive system means any system
of providing designated public transportation which is not a fixed route system.
(2) Designated public transportation. The term designated public transportation means
transportation (other than public school transportation) by bus, rail, or any other
conveyance ... that provides the general public with general or special service (including
charter service) on a regular and continuing basis.
(3) Fixed route system. The term fixed route system means a system of providing
designated public transportation on which a vehicle is operated along a prescribed route
according to a fixed schedule.
(4) Operates. The term operates, as used with respect to a fixed route system or demand
responsive system, includes operation of such system by a person under a contractual or
other arrangement or relationship with a public entity.
SEC. 222. PUBLIC ENTITIES OPERATING FIXED ROUTE SYSTEMS. 42 USC
12142.
(a) Purchase and Lease of New Vehicles. It shall be considered discrimination for
purposes of section 202 of this Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) for a public entity which operates a fixed route system to purchase
or lease a new bus, a new rapid rail vehicle, a new light rail vehicle, or any other new
vehicle to be used on such system, if the solicitation for such purchase or lease is made
after the 30th day following the effective date of this subsection and if such bus, rail
vehicle, or other vehicle is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.
(b) Purchase and Lease of Used Vehicles. Subject to subsection (c)(1), it shall be
considered discrimination for purposes of section 202 of this Act and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) for a public entity which operates a fixed
route system to purchase or lease, after the 30th day following the effective date of this
subsection, a used vehicle for use on such system unless such entity makes demonstrated
good faith efforts to purchase or lease a used vehicle for use on such system that is
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals
who use wheelchairs.
(c) Remanufactured Vehicles.
(1) General rule. Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be considered
discrimination for purposes of section 202 of this Act and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) for a public entity which operates a fixed
route system
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(A) to remanufacture a vehicle for use on such system so as to extend its usable life for 5
years or more, which remanufacture begins (or for which the solicitation is
made) after the 30th day following the effective date of this subsection; or
(B) to purchase or lease for use on such system a remanufactured vehicle which has been
remanufactured so as to extend its usable life for 5 years or more, which
purchase or lease occurs after such 30th day and during the period in which the usable
life is extended; unless, after remanufacture, the vehicle is, to the maximum extent
feasible, readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including
individuals who use wheelchairs.
SEC. 223. PARATRANSIT AS A COMPLEMENT TO FIXED ROUTE SERVICE. 42
USC 12143.
(a) General Rule. It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 202 of this
Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) for a public entity
which operates a fixed route system (other than a system which provides solely
commuter bus service) to fail to provide with respect to the operations of its fixed route
system, in accordance with this section, paratransit and other special transportation
services to individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, that
are sufficient to provide to such individuals a level of service (1) which is comparable to
the level of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without
disabilities using such system; or (2) in the case of response time, which is comparable,
to the extent practicable, to the level of designated public transportation services provided
to individuals without disabilities using such system.
(c) Required Contents of Regulations.
(4) Undue financial burden limitation. The regulations issued under this section shall
provide that, if the public entity is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary
that the provision of paratransit and other special transportation services otherwise
required under this section would impose an undue financial burden on the public entity,
the public entity, notwithstanding any other provision of this section (other than
paragraph (5)), shall only be required to provide such services to the extent that providing
such services would not impose such a burden.
SEC. 224. PUBLIC ENTITY OPERATING A DEMAND RESPONSIVE SYSTEM.
If a public entity operates a demand responsive system, it shall be considered
discrimination, for purposes of section 202 of this Act and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), for such entity to purchase or lease a new
vehicle for use on such system, for which a solicitation is made after the 30th day
following the effective date of this section, that is not readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless such
system, when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to such individuals
equivalent to the level of service such system provides to individuals without disabilities.
SEC. 304. PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN SPECIFIED PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE ENTITIES. 42 USC
12184.
(a) General Rule. No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of specified public transportation services provided by a
private entity that is primarily engaged in the business of transporting people and whose
operations affect commerce.
(b) Construction. For purposes of subsection (a), discrimination includes
(3) the purchase or lease by such entity of a new vehicle (other than an automobile, a van
with a seating capacity of less than 8 passengers, including the driver, or an over- the-
road bus) which is to be used to provide specified public transportation and for which a
solicitation is made after the 30th day following the effective date of this section, that is
not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals
who use wheelchairs; except that the new vehicle need not be readily accessible to and
usable by such individuals if the new vehicle is to be used solely in a demand responsive
system and if the entity can demonstrate that such system, when viewed in its entirety,
provides a level of service to such individuals equivalent to the level of service provided
to the general public;
(5) the purchase or lease by such entity of a new van with a seating capacity of less than 8
passengers, including the driver, which is to be used to provide specified public
transportation and for which a solicitation is made after the 30th day following the
effective date of this section that is not readily accessible to or usable by individuals with
disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs; except that the new van need not
be readily accessible to and usable by such individuals if the entity can demonstrate that
the system for which the van is being purchased or leased, when viewed in its entirety,
provides a level of service to such individuals equivalent to the level of service provided
to the general public;
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